TRANSATLANTIC FOCUS SHIFTS (Lithuania in the World.- Vol.13, No 2, 2005)
Nato's choice of Vilnius for its meeting of foreign ministers on 20 and 21 April made the city the first capital of a new member state to be chosen to host an informal meeting of foreign ministers. The first ministerial talks were held in Romania last autumn, when a meeting of defence ministers was held. Also envisaged for the Vilnius gathering was a Nato-Ukraine meeting at the foreign minister level, which had originally been planned for December. The fact that the event included both Nato-Russia Council and Nato-Ukraine Commission meetings is a major achievement, not only for Lithuania as host but also for Nato. Despite the frictions that exist between the Alliance and Russia, both acknowledge the need to move forward, saying that disagreements should be put aside when talking about serious business. Russia, which has been acknowledged by Nato as a strategic partner, is starting to attach special value to bilateral cooperation. Practical cooperation is ongoing, and an ambitious plan to fight terrorism has been on the table since December, awaiting progress on its way towards implementation. Moreover, as discussions in Brussels have shown before, it appears that the will from Russia to discuss even contentious issues that have plagued relations in the past, including Georgia and Moldova, is there as well. It' so, Russia is starting to redesign its geopolitical rationale vis-a-vis Nato. What creates a certain ill-feeling, at the same time, is the seeming inclination by Russia to do "forum-shopping". One example is the OSCE failure to agree on extending the border monitoring mission in Georgia. Opinion polls in Russia have shown increasing support for Nato-Russia cooperation. Public opinion, however, still remains critical of Nato, and Russia has to change this if further progress is to be achieved. The story with Ukraine is different. At the recent meeting in Istanbul. Nato heads of state and governments tasked foreign ministers to review the nature of the partnership and possible ways of strengthening it. The December meeting was cancelled due to the lack of availability of certain members. The Vilnius meeting provided the first opportunity to make up for lost time. Another opportunity was to determine Nato's response to the event which has since been referred to as the “Orange Revolution". Even without the Nato-Ukraine ministers' meeting in December, they met at a senior level on 22 February. Viktor Yuschenko was impressive there, both as the leader of a 50-million-strong nation and as a person. What the Alliance will actually offer Ukraine remains to be seen. What is expected, however, is that there will be a linkage made between offers made to Ukraine in Vilnius and what Ukraine eventually expects: namely, membership, and the Membership Action Plan. Arnas Lazdauskas
Nato's choice of Vilnius for its meeting of foreign ministers on 20 and 21 April made the city the first capital of a new member state to be chosen to host an informal meeting of foreign ministers. The first ministerial talks were held in Romania last autumn, when a meeting of defence ministers was held.
Also envisaged for the Vilnius gathering was a Nato-Ukraine meeting at the foreign minister level, which had originally been planned for December.
The fact that the event included both Nato-Russia Council and Nato-Ukraine Commission meetings is a major achievement, not only for Lithuania as host but also for Nato. Despite the frictions that exist between the Alliance and Russia, both acknowledge the need to move forward, saying that disagreements should be put aside when talking about serious business.
Russia, which has been acknowledged by Nato as a strategic partner, is starting to attach special value to bilateral cooperation. Practical cooperation is ongoing, and an ambitious plan to fight terrorism has been on the table since December, awaiting progress on its way towards implementation.
Moreover, as discussions in Brussels have shown before, it appears that the will from Russia to discuss even contentious issues that have plagued relations in the past, including Georgia and Moldova, is there as well. It' so, Russia is starting to redesign its geopolitical rationale vis-a-vis Nato. What creates a certain ill-feeling, at the same time, is the seeming inclination by Russia to do "forum-shopping". One example is the OSCE failure to agree on extending the border monitoring mission in Georgia.
Opinion polls in Russia have shown increasing support for Nato-Russia cooperation. Public opinion, however, still remains critical of Nato, and Russia has to change this if further progress is to be achieved.
The story with Ukraine is different. At the recent meeting in Istanbul. Nato heads of state and governments tasked foreign ministers to review the nature of the partnership and possible ways of strengthening it.
The December meeting was cancelled due to the lack of availability of certain members. The Vilnius meeting provided the first opportunity to make up for lost time. Another opportunity was to determine Nato's response to the event which has since been referred to as the “Orange Revolution".
Even without the Nato-Ukraine ministers' meeting in December, they met at a senior level on 22 February. Viktor Yuschenko was impressive there, both as the leader of a 50-million-strong nation and as a person.
What the Alliance will actually offer Ukraine remains to be seen. What is expected, however, is that there will be a linkage made between offers made to Ukraine in Vilnius and what Ukraine eventually expects: namely, membership, and the Membership Action Plan.
Arnas Lazdauskas