Arms control and nonproliferation
- Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Nuclear Weapons
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 1970. Lithuania acceded to the NPT on 23 September 1991. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have signed the Treaty. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan have not signed the NPT.
By joining the NPT, each nuclear-weapon State party undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, either directly or indirectly; and not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The NPT is the basis for achieving nuclear disarmament and represents an important element in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is generally understood that the NPT is built upon three key pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The three pillars are reflected in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
UNSC Resolution 1540
Adopted on 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 imposes legally-binding obligations on all States to prevent and deter non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, as well as the related materials. States are encouraged to report to the 1540 Committee on the actions they have taken, or intend to take, to implement the Resolution.
Lithuania submitted its comprehensive report on its UNSCR 1540 implementation in 2004, updating the report in 2005 with further information on the national measures addressing the non-proliferation of WMDs. In 2013, Lithuania was one of the few countries to submit an updated report on the national actions to implement the Resolution between 2005 and 2013. Lithuania encourages other States to implement the Resolution accordingly.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
The States party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) undertake not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The objective of the States party to the TPNW is to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. The TPNW entered into force in 2021.
None of the nuclear-weapon States have participate in negotiating the TPNW, arguing that their arsenals of nuclear weapons deter adversaries from nuclear attacks. Nuclear-weapon States posit that they are committed to gradual disarmament, as foreseen in the NPT.
According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the TPNW could undermine the NPT regime, as the latter not only prohibits the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also obliges nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals. NATO members do not support the TPNW and NATO's political position on this Treaty is explained in a North Atlantic Council statement: NATO - News: North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force, 15-Dec.-2020
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing, whether for military or peaceful purposes. The treaty was opened for signature in 1996 and was ratified by Lithuania in 1999. The Treaty has not yet entered into force, but Article XIV of the CTBT provides for a conference to be held every two years, to review issues related to nuclear testing.
The CTBT will enter into force once the following 9 States sign and ratify the Treaty: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, the United States, the DPRK, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation. There are 9 out of the 44 States, which negotiated for the Treaty between 1994-1996 and which were in possession of nuclear power or research reactors at the time.
In the 21st century, only the DPRK has conducted nuclear testing. In 2023, the Russian Federation withdrew its ratification of the CTBT.
Fissile Material Cutt-Off Treaty (FMCT)
The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is a proposed international agreement that has not yet been negotiated. Such a Treaty would prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Under consideration in this context are highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, which are the essential components of nuclear weapons.
The FMCT would foresee new limitations on the five nuclear weapon States recognized by the NPT (the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and China), as well as Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK. Non-nuclear-weapon states are prohibited from producing or acquiring fissile materials in line with the NPT.
Pending an agreement on the FMCT, all States are urged to declare and observe an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 as an independent organisation within the UN system. Lithuania joined the IAEA in 1993. The IAEA's objectives are to strengthen international cooperation, peace and security in the area of nuclear energy. The Agency works to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States do not use nuclear technology for military purposes. Read More: International Atomic Energy Agency | Atoms for Peace and Development (iaea.org)
Lithuania is a candidate for the IAEA Board of Governors for the period 2025-2027. Lithuania was previously elected to the Board of Governors for the period 2007-2009.
Biological Weapons
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) is the first multilateral agreement to prohibit a whole category of WMDs. The BWC entered into force in 1997 and Lithuania ratified it in 1997.
Consistently with Lithuania’s responsible participation in disarmament and non-proliferation processes, Lithuania joined the initiative of Canada, Switzerland and the Czechia to submit voluntary reports on the national implementation of the BWC. Lithuania has submitted an annual report every year since 2014.
Chemical Weapons
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) is implemented by the Organization on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (OPCW), which oversee the elimination of chemical weapons.
The CWC was opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. Following the BWC, it became the second international agreement to prohibit a category of WMDs. The CWC currently has 193 States parties. Lithuania ratified the Convention in 1998.
Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
The OPCW is tasked with implementing the CWC to achieve the Convention's ultimate goal of a world free from chemical weapons, including the threat of their use, and in which chemistry is used for peace, progress and prosperity. The OPCW aims to reliably and transparently verify the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, prevent their re-emergence, while protecting the legitimate national security and intellectual property interests. In the event of suspected chemical weapons use, OPCW experts may carry out the necessary investigations to establish the facts.
The Conference of the States Parties is the main plenary body of the OPCW, which oversees the implementation of the CWC, promotes its objectives, and verifies the compliance. It also oversees the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council, which consists of 41 Member States elected for a two-year term, plays a key role in addressing compliance with the Convention. The Executive Council also deals with inspections and the investigations into suspected use of chemical weapons.
Lithuania is a member of the Executive Council for the current term until May 2026. Lithuania has previously been served the Executive Council for the period 2020-2022.
Sea-Dumped Chemical Weapons
Following the end of World War II, around 40,000 tons of chemical weapons were dumped into the Baltic Sea. It is estimated that these chemical munitions contain some 15,000 tons of chemical warfare agents. Various types of chemical warfare agents have been found in different locations. In Gotland Deep, which is in Lithuania’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Baltic Sea (the EEZ is about 6, 400 km² and reaches Sweden's territorial waters), an object was found with 9,5 mg/kg concentration of a hazardous chemical - arsenic.
On 20 December 2010, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the Lithuania-initiated Resolution on “Cooperative measures to assess and increase awareness of environmental effects related to waste originating from chemical munitions dumped at sea” (A/RES/65/149). The Resolution invites all States to cooperate in assessing the environmental effects of sea-dumped chemical weapons. This triennial resolution was the first one that Lithuania initiated on its own in the UN context. The report of the UN Secretary General, which accompanies the resolution, provides a more detailed picture of States’ initiatives regarding chemical munitions dumped at sea and sets out guidelines for further cooperation.
At the CWC Conference of States parties in the Hague, Lithuania organizes an annual informational event dedicated to the issue of sea-dumped chemical weapons, thus drawing attention to the need of cleaning up the seas and the oceans.
Lithuania has actively participated in the activities of organizations and projects involved in cleaning up the Baltic Sea. This includes the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), the CHEMSEA project (it ended on 15 February 2014), the Baltic Sea Action Summit (BSAS),the NATO project ‘Towards the Monitoring of Dumped Munitions Threat (MODUM) and MUNIMAP (2023-2027).
- Conventional Weapons
Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention (Ottawa Convention)
In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Resolution 51/45S, which called on States to conclude an international agreement banning anti-personnel landmines. In 1997, Norway hosted a conference which led to the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. This international agreement is also known as the Ottawa Convention because the treaty was opened for signature in Canada’s capital city.
States Parties to the Ottawa Convention undertake to:
- Not use anti-personnel mines;
- Not develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer anti-personnel mines;
- Not assist, encourage or induce activities prohibited to a State party under the Convention;
- Destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines;
- Destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under a State party’s jurisdiction or control.
Lithuania was the first of the Baltic States to join the Ottawa Convention. The Convention entered into force in Lithuania on 1 November 2003. Lithuania completed the destruction of all its stockpiles of anti-personnel mines in June 2005. Now, Lithuania is a territory free of anti-personnel mines. In Lithuania, the transit of anti-personnel mines is allowed only for destruction purposes. Lithuanian deminers a trained for possible demining missions and its armed forces will not participate in joint military operations involving the use of anti-personnel mines.
Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention)
In May 2008, at a conference in Dublin, 107 countries, including Lithuania, agreed on the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). This international treaty is also known as the Oslo Convention because it was opened for signature in the Norwegian capital. The Parliament of Lithuania ratified the Convention on 16 December 2010. Lithuania acceded to the Convention on 24 March 2011.
States Parties to the Oslo Convention undertake to:
- Not use cluster munitions;
- Not develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer cluster munitions;
- Not assist, encourage or induce activities prohibited to a State party under this Convention;
- to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions.
In the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the changed regional security situation, Lithuania took the decision to denounce the Oslo Convention by following the procedure set out in Article 20 of the Convention. On 18 July 2024, the Parliament of Lithuania approved the President’s proposal to denounce the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) was adopted in 1980 and entered into force in 1983.
The CCW is composed of two parts: the Framework Convention and the Protocols annexed to the Convention. The CCW Protocols prohibit or restrict certain types of weapons:
- Protocol I – Non-Detectable Fragments;
- Amended Protocol II – Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996;
- Protocol III – Incendiary Weapons;
- Protocol IV – Blinding Laser Weapons;
- Protocol V – Explosive Remnants of War.
In Lithuania, the Convention entered into force on 3 December 1998. Lithuania has ratified all the CCW Protocols, complies with all the CCW-related obligations, supports the universal application of the CCW and its Protocols, and considers the Convention to be an essential part of international humanitarian law. Lithuania sees the CCW as a unique forum for States to reconcile their military needs and humanitarian aspirations. Lithuania argues that the CCW allows for a flexible approach to emerging technologies, including Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS).
UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA)
The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) was adopted on 20 July 2021 at an international conference in New York. On 8 December 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), which helps States ensure that Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are appropriately marked and registered. Together, the PoA and the ITI encourage all States to improve national legislation in the areas of SALW control, import and export control, the management of stockpiles, marking and tracing, as well as mutual cooperation and assistance. Lithuania regularly (every 2 years) reports to the UN on its national implementation of the PoA and the ITI.
- Conventional Arms Control and Instruments
Since the end of the Cold War, a series of agreements have been reached in the context of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on arms control, transparency and military co-operation for conventional forces in Europe. The main instruments are the 1990 Vienna Document (last updated in 2011), the 1992 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty (OST).
Vienna Document
The Vienna Document is a politically binding instrument that provides concrete measures for transparency and predictability in the military activities of OSCE participating States. It obliges States to provide annual information on their armed forces, defence capability planning and military budgets, as well as to provide advance information on planned military activities. States undertake to receive a limited number of inspections and visits by military experts from other States (these are the so-called verification activities).
The Vienna Document also provides certain forms of military cooperation (the demonstrations of new weapons, visits to military bases, and the observation of certain military activities), joint action in the event of military incidents, and joint exercises. States can request an explanation from another in case unusual military activities raise concerns. For instance, in February 2022, prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania, alongside Estonia and Latvia, asked Belarus to explain unusual military activities on its territory. States also undertake to cooperate in assessing risky military incidents in order to prevent possible misunderstandings.
The Vienna Document is politically, not legally, binding, and Russia has followed it selectively, e.g. by purposely declaring reduced numbers of forces that participate in exercises, so as to avoid having to invite military observers from other countries.
Read more: Vienna Document 2011 | OSCE
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) set limits on the conventional armaments of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in five categories: tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters. The Treaty also included provisions on information exchange and verification. In view of the changed situation in Europe following the abolition of the Warsaw Pact and the enlargement of NATO, agreement was reached in 1999 on the Adapted CFE (A-CFE). A-CFE abandoned the two-block principle and imposed territorial and national limits on conventional armed forces. It also provided for the possibility of new members joining. At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, Lithuania expressed an interest in joining the A-CFE, but it was not possible to do so since the Treaty had not entered into force.
In December 2007, the Russian Federation suspended its implementation of the CFE Treaty. Since 2011, NATO members have adopted reciprocal measures and have stopped providing Russia with military information under the CFE Treaty. As of 11 March 2015, the Russian Federation terminated its participation in the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) and asked Belarus to represent the interests of the Russian Federation in the CFE. On 7 November 2023, Russia formally withdrew from the CFE. In response to this decision, the NATO Allies that participate in the CFE have unanimously announced the suspension of their participation in the treaty.
Lithuania was never member of the CFE but had reached bilateral non-binding agreements with Belarus and Russia based on the CFE. In 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of its bilateral agreement with Lithuania on additional confidence-building measures, and as of February 2022, Lithuania suspended its bilateral agreement with Belarus, which is assisting Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
Open Skies Treaty (OST)
The Open Skies Treaty (OST) is designed to increase transparency and trust in military activities between States. States party have the right to fly over each other's territories with special aircraft to ensure that no undeclared military activities are taking place. Lithuania joined the treaty in 2005. In 2020, the United States withdrew from the OST, citing repeated violations by Russia. In December 2021, Russia formally withdrew from the Treaty.
- Emerging Technologies and Outer Space
Emerging technologies and their application in the military domain present both risks and opportunities. Such technologies are changing the character of war and are becoming the focal point of competition among States. Technological advantage increasingly affects the probability of success on the battlefield. In February 2021, the NATO Allies have adopted the Alliance’s strategy that guides NATO’s relationship with Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs). The Alliance is currently focused on nine technology areas:
- artificial intelligence (AI);
- autonomous systems;
- quantum technologies;
- biotechnology and human enhancement technologies;
- space;
- hypersonic systems;
- novel materials and manufacturing;
- energy and propulsion;
- next-generation communications networks.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Lithuania follows the NATO AI Strategy, which was adopted on 22 October 2021. The Strategy identifies six Principles of Responsible Use (PRUs):
- lawfulness;
- responsibility and accountability;
- explainability and traceability;
- reliability;
- governability;
- bias mitigation.
On 13 November 2023, Lithuania joined the Political Declaration on the Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, which had been initiated by the United States. The Political Declaration contains 10 best practices, which are meant to promote the safe, ethical and responsible development and military use of AI and autonomy. The Political Declaration is meant to help facilitate compliance with international humanitarian law, while preserving human responsibility. The provisions of the Declaration are fully in line with the principles of the NATO AI Strategy.
In February 2023, Lithuania participated in the inaugural Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM), which took place in the Hague. The main objectives of the REAIM format are to improve the overall understanding of the risks and opportunities of AI in the military domain; to develop principles for responsible use; and to reflect on governance issues, including in the context of international cooperation.
Autonomy
Lithuania’s position that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is the appropriate multilateral forum to address the issue of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). Lithuania believes that the CCW ensures an appropriate balance between military needs and humanitarian aspirations.
Many States that participate in the CCW process, including Lithuania, could, in principle, support a potential two-tier solution, whereby some LAWS would be prohibited and the rest - regulated. LAWS that cannot function in compliance with international humanitarian law should be completely banned.
Lithuania participates in the work of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (GGE LAWS), which has been in place since 2017. In 2019, 11 Guiding Principles on LAWS have been agreed in the context of the CCW. The principles include the following:
- International humanitarian law applies fully to LAWS;
- Human responsibility for the use of LAWS must be retained;
- Safeguards (including in terms of cyber-security), in view of the risks of proliferation and acquisition by terrorist groups, should be considered.
Outer Space
Lithuania is committed to reducing the threats in outer space and promoting the peaceful uses of space. International law, including the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law, applies in outer space. Lithuania supports the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty). Lithuania calls on all countries to prevent an arms race in outer space, which is important for strengthening international security and stability, as well as ensuring the peaceful use of outer space.
In June 2019, NATO approved the Alliance’s Space Policy, which identifies outer space as a new operational domain, alongside land, sea, air and cyber space. This document confirms that outer space is key to the Alliance’s deterrence and defence, as well as for specific operational activities.
- NATO Policy on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept emphasises that the erosion of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has adversely affected strategic stability, and that Russia's non-compliance with, or selective implementation of, its arms control commitments has contributed to the deterioration of the security environment.
In the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the NATO Allies seek to reduce risks, promote security, transparency, verification and compliance. NATO members have committed to reducing risks, including by promoting confidence-building and predictability through dialogue, increasing mutual understanding, and developing effective crisis management and prevention measures, while taking into account collective defence and deterrence priorities. NATO serves as a platform for in-depth discussions and close consultations between Allies in the field of arms control.
- Export Control Regimes
Export control issues are closely linked to the overall security policy of Lithuania. Lithuania seeks to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and conventional arms through political, economic, diplomatic and legal means, as well as to implement its export control obligations. At the national level, the export control of strategic goods is coordinated by the Ministry of Economy and Innovation through the issuance of export, import and brokering licences for dual-use and military equipment.
Lithuania has been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) since 27 May 2004, a member of the Australia Group (AG) since 26 May 2004, and a member of the Wassenaar Agreement (WA) since 6 May 2005. Lithuania is pursuing membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Zangger Committee.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group regulates the transfer of nuclear and related materials or technology, while the Australin Group regulates the non-proliferation of chemical, biological and toxic materials. The Wassenaar Arrangement regulates the transfer and stockpiling of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technology. The Missile Technology Control Regime covers unmanned delivery systems that can be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is a political commitment by the participating members to control the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Lithuania joined the HCoC in 2002. voluntarily undertake to provide advance notification of ballistic missile and space launches and test flights, if any. States that join also undertake to make an annual declaration of their national policy on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.
Lithuania supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which was launched by the United States in 2003. The PSI seeks to stop the top proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and the relevant materials.
In December 2014, Lithuania ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The ATT entered into force on 24 December 2014. Lithuania supports the creation and implementation of rules that ensure the responsible arms trade. As such, Lithuania encourages all States to sign and ratify the ATT, in view of the Treaty’s universalization.