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This year saw the third anniversary of Lithuania’s joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On 29 March 2004, at a ceremony in Washington, Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas, along with the heads of state and governments of six other Central and East European countries (Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria), presented the ratification instruments of accession to Nato to the government of the United States.

After a few days, on 2 April 2004, the flag of Lithuania was raised at the Nato headquarters in Brussels.

These events epitomised the decade-long effort towards accession to both Nato and the European Union, which the country joined a month later, on 1 May. They also epitomised what many defined as the far longer and far more fundamental effort by all Lithuanians to return to where they belonged, that is, Europe.

Towards membership

The credit for accession to Nato cannot, and will never, go to one person or one institution alone.

Symbolically enough, ten years before accession, in 1994, Brazauskas, then the president, was the person who had formally requested membership in the Alliance. In his letter to Manfred Wörner, secretary general of Nato at the time, the president argued that accession was what all political forces in Lithuania wanted and agreed upon.

Many continue to wonder how, at a time of deep political divisions, and conflicting interests and approaches of various types in all areas, members of the Seimas managed to agree that there was no alternative to Nato membership, or anything that the country could seriously consider as a replacement.

When the prospects of accession became brighter, on 23 May 2001, Lithuania’s parliamentary parties signed the Defence Policy Agreement, covering the period 2002 to 2004. One important element was the commitment to spend around 2 per cent of GDP on defence. This approach to forming a consensus was not given up after accession.

The agreement was extended in 2004 for the period 2005 to 2008. Moreover, at the end of 2004, parliamentary parties also signed another agreement. This was the Agreement on the Main Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives, which postulates clearly that membership of Euro-Atlantic structures and other international organisations contributes to greater security and the well-being of the people, as well as ensuring better conditions for the development of the state and the nation.

It also says that, among other things, Lithuania should continue to pursue an active foreign policy, aimed in particular at broadening and deepening the integration of member states of the EU, whilst taking account of its national interests. It is also aimed at the consolidation of Nato as the main component of Euro-Atlantic security, and as the key instrument in the fight against current threats.

What was undertaken spread fast beyond the country’s borders. It continues to be an approach that the other countries aspiring to closer relations with Nato consider adopting as well.

For instance, on 13 March 2007, all the parliamentary parties in Georgia signed a very similar agreement. The country’s parties signed a declaration expressing their support for their aspirations to Nato membership.

Lithuania was also instrumental in formulating the Baltic position vis-à-vis accession to Nato and the EU. It formed the Vilnius Ten, a body that aimed to coordinate the efforts by northern, Central and southeast European candidate states to join the Alliance. The spirit of solidarity that was strong before the accession of seven members of this group is just as strong today.

The country is part of many more initiatives, involving not only governments, but also society at large. Most recently, this could be seen in the holding, together with Poland, of the Community of Democratic Choice Summit, in May 2006, in Vilnius.

There was also an important element of public information involved, something that even current Nato aspirants have tried to learn from. As a spontaneous effort in 1999, it became government policy, involving both raising public awareness as well as support for membership.

As a result, public support for integration, and now membership, which was never actually very low, has increased to around 70 per cent in favour. At the same time, it has never implied, nor does it imply today, that all doubts the population had with regard to security issues had been removed.

Accession and its aftermath

It has been quite an experience for the nation, for those directly involved, and for those for whom Nato membership is just one topic out of many that they encounter from time to time.

Indeed, there had been fears. There had been those who tried to say that life after entry would not be different, that it would be something nobody had ever wished.

It has been different. It has been a challenge. Yet, the accounts of those involved suggest that Lithuanians see as much added value in Nato as it did. The country is as ready to share the burdens and responsibilities that it had taken upon itself as it was before accession.

Three years ago

 Lithuania joined the Alliance in 2004. The country had been preparing for membership, and acting like a member, for some time before. It previously did what it could on an entirely voluntary basis, or somewhat close to that. Having become a member, the country had to heed what mattered to member states and the Alliance in a different way, and completely differently to before.

The country has committed itself to protecting others, and others have to protect it, from threats and hazards. The Alliance is about collective defence; and even while there might not be threats comparable to the East-West stand-off in the period of the Cold War, the idea of Article 5, the one that collective defence is based around, was and will remain as strong.

What people found out when the country joined was that Nato itself was in the process of internal transformation, political and military. The Alliance was in Kosovo and Afghanistan, areas where it went on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions. Its roles were primarily military ones, but not confined to that. It also became obvious that, with the Alliance’s roles and commitments expanding, there was a niche, an opportunity that Lithuania could take, to demonstrate its commitment in action. Its soldiers were already present in a number of Nato-led operations, including Kosovo.

Yet, the decision to take the lead of the Nato Provincial Reconstruction Team in the Ghor province of Afghanistan was as important as it was bold. It was a much more demanding task, since it includes tasks far broader than military, first and foremost in development (building roads, schools and hospitals).

Lithuania is not alone in the province. It is being assisted by the United States, Iceland, Norway, Croatia and other nations. This list will soon be reinforced by a few other countries as well.

Some say that in Afghanistan, Lithuania, one of the smallest countries in Nato, has already exceeded what was expected of it. Yet, it does not limit itself to these operations and Afghanistan.

This year, Lithuania chairs the South Caucasus Clearing House, a mechanism to coordinate the assistance that Nato and other interested countries provide to countries in the region (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) in their defence and wider reform efforts.

Lithuania has been looking at ways to support the efforts of Moldova and Ukraine, as well as countries of the western Balkans and Central Asia. It has, for instance, extended advisory support to Croatia in its effort to develop a viable public information strategy on Nato.

It contributes to developing cooperation with the Alliance’s important neighbour, Russia. Recently a Nato-Russia high-level event was hosted in Vilnius to discuss defence reform and cooperation.

Operational and reform tasks

In terms of tasks, Lithuania is bound to perform, first and foremost, militarily. Accession to Nato has not made the list any shorter; nor has it made life any easier. Lithuania is now part of the collective Nato force and defence planning processes, where it plans and spends money in accordance with, as well as in line with, the Alliance’s broader requirements.

Usability, deployability, sustainability, efficiency, survivability, command and control: these are just a few of the general tasks that Lithuania has been facing as it performs the transition from what was a system of territorial defence into what is now a system of collective defence.

Operations have been an important and successful part of Lithuania’s involvement so far. It has contributed to all Nato-led operations, including two major ones, in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

In comparison with other new member states, which are richer and more populous, the contribution (in Afghanistan there are more than 130 military and civilian personnel involved) has been exemplary. What is more, the plan is to increase the number of troops involved in operations to 420.

Yet, if operations are the area where Lithuania’s performance has been exemplary, one area where it has not is defence spending. The country has not been spending enough, neither from the point of view of what Nato countries have been spending, nor from what it has committed itself to (for instance, in the parliamentary parties’ agreement).

In 2004, Nato provided a new definition of defence expenditure. Based on this, the country is spending two-thirds of what it should, around 1.28 per cent, instead of 2 per cent of GDP.

It has not stopped reforms; neither has it in any way diminished the will to carry on. Probably it has limited the capacity of those responsible for implementing reform. Nevertheless, the plans, tables and timetables are in place.

The aim is to have 10 per cent of land forces ready to deploy in operations at any time; 50 per cent should be properly organised. In 2014, Lithuania should be able to sustain a battalion-size (at least 1,000 soldiers) battle group, as well as a platoon-size (50 soldiers) special task force in one single operation, or company-size battle and battle support units in three operations at the same time.

Nato’s Riga Summit

In November 2006, Nato heads of state and government met in Riga. The main discussions revolved around Afghanistan. The Allies reiterated their commitment to Afghanistan. What was new in their emphasis was what they said with regard to a link between security and development. They said that there can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security.

The Allies also discussed the so-called comprehensive approach. This means Nato’s partnership reform to involve to a greater extent countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and others, current and potential contributors to its operations, as well as to energy security.

They also discussed Nato enlargement, and issues related to cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, as well as to other international organisations, first and foremost, the United Nations and the European Union. This year, Nato will celebrate the tenth anniversary of its relations with both Ukraine and Russia.

On issues related to military reforms, Nato has accomplished what many doubted it would manage. It has announced full operational capability of high-readiness, a joint 25,000-strong Nato Response Force, one of the main elements in Nato’s transformation.

This was the first time in its history that Nato went so far to the East, and it went to what a mere 17 years ago used to be occupied by Nato’s biggest adversary ever, the Soviet Union. There is no need to repeat how symbolic it was to Nato, let alone the countries concerned.

Gains

It is widely known that when the three Baltic States joined Nato, they did so without any significant air force. When it came to the issue of the defence of the airspace over them, none was in a position to ensure it efficiently, and to the level that Nato’s own security standards would require. They had air surveillance systems and other things, but they did not have fighter planes.

It was agreed that these countries should not and must not be left without what is ultimately needed for air protection. It was not about providing a full-scale air force. It was about providing the support that is deemed appropriate at the current stage, taking into account the requirements of the current situation.

It may be rather limited in terms of scope (some four fighters are permanently based at Zokniai). But what it does not exclude is that if the situation changes, the presence will be upgraded.

As a result, Lithuania’s airspace became Nato’s when Belgian Royal Air Force fighters arrived. The fighters are based at Zokniai, an airport near Šiauliai, where every three months another Nato member takes over the mission from the previous one. There have been 11 rotations so far. Belgium was the first, and France is the most recent. The number of airspace violations has decreased.

The financial benefits have also been evident. More than 50 million euros have so far been invested by Nato in developing the airport, as well as in creating the conditions for its proper operation. Since a significant number of personnel are involved in each such mission, the economic benefits to the city and the population have also been considerable, estimated in millions of euros.

In the long term, it is too expensive for Lithuania and the other Baltic States to buy and then maintain fighters and everything associated with them. Unless the circumstances require otherwise, other members will continue doing what they currently do, whereas the Baltic States will focus their spending on something else, which is in line with their and Nato’s interests.

Afterthoughts

Some say that if Nato had never existed it should be created. In the same way, if it were disbanded, it would then again have to be reinvented, because by itself it presents such an unprecedented endeavour.

There is another view as well.

Representatives of some countries, though smaller in number, say that with the end of the Cold War, the Alliance’s core mission was fulfilled. It has already served its purpose, and thereby must either become something different, or “go out of business”. Some are also becoming increasingly anti-Nato. Less so the public, more so the experts.

Some of the latter are less driven by the fact that they dislike or oppose Nato, but by other considerations. Some think that too strong a Nato impedes the development of the European Union’s security and defence identity (19 members of the Alliance are also members of the EU), or that in its policies Nato is too influenced by the United States.

What the former argue about when they hear such arguments is that eventually, if Europe comes to face a threat, it will ultimately have to lean on the United States for its security. It should first think about developing its capacities and capabilities, and only then start seriously talking about disbanding the Alliance. Of course, these are radical views, sometimes driven by emotions. At the same time, however, they represent a certain degree of truth. Issues related to Nato’s reform and relations with the European Union will have to be dealt with.

Nato also exports security. It does so to regions, countries and peoples in its vicinity, but also far beyond. In some places, such as the Balkans, its presence has been instrumental in raising hopes of security and prosperity, as well as in reconciliation.

Elsewhere, for instance in Afghanistan, Nato’s involvement on behalf of the international community, whose efforts are part of a broader picture, may finally end up giving stability and prosperity to a country which has failed to enjoy both for a long time.

Since its establishment, the Alliance has been a symbol of unity among countries of the West. It is also a symbol of transatlantic unity, an institution where countries from the two sides of the Atlantic sit and decide together.

As the Alliance continues to serve democracy, peace, stability and prosperity, it will enjoy the support of Lithuania, and everybody. There might be some who doubt it, but, so far, the Alliance has been able to prove otherwise.

Arnas Lazdauskas