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THE WEST, RUSSIA, AND EASTERN EUROPE: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES

Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen,

Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”. The description still seems to be apt. Twenty years have passed since  the fall of the Berlin wall marked the beginning of sweeping changes across captive Europe that led to the demise of the Soviet empire. Yet the subject of Russia, how to deal with Russia and what to expect in Russia’s relations with the West is still hotly debated.

The Georgia war last summer offered a stark reminder of both the challenges posed by Russia’s great power ambitions and the urgent need to extend stability and security further east. Importantly, it also highlighted the perceived vulnerability of states situated along the eastern border of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Worse still, the current financial-economic crisis has increased that sense of vulnerability across Eastern Europe by directly affecting political-economic stability in the region. One after another, countries of the region are experiencing major difficulties, raising the specter of more serious difficulties to come.

Crisis in Eastern Europe

In spite of a number of frozen conflicts, the area east of the transatlantic space has been a relatively calm one, allowing Western partners to focus on a number of hotspots further afield, particularly in the Middle East.

The current crisis could change this equation. Its consequences could have significant repercussions for the necessary but uneasy interaction between the West and Russia and the aspirations of both towards Eastern Europe- as well as for the West’s ability to stay its course globally.

Over the years the expansion of both NATO and the EU has proven to be the best guarantor of a Europe that is prosperous and at peace. Given the positive track record, we believe in continuing along a path that works by keeping the doors of the EU and NATO open, and eventually embracing our eastern neighbors that have expressed a specific desire to join, such as Ukraine and Georgia.

Those who aspire for membership must do their homework by implementing necessary administrative and legal reforms, ridding their respective countries from corruption and crime, ensuring transparency and accountability at all levels, and fostering mature civil societies.  Only if they do so can they make their eventual membership meaningful and beneficial to both, themselves and the organizations they seek to join.

On our part, we must do all we can to help those countries proceed along the path of democracy and reform. We welcome the forthcoming launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, which will provide an important instrument to draw our eastern neighbors closer to Europe by creating a comprehensive framework for bilateral and multilateral cooperation.  It is a timely initiative by the European Union which will, hopefully, help the countries concerned respond to the hard-hitting global financial crisis and economic downturn.

But given the scope of the crisis, the Eastern Partnership alone may prove insufficient. We should worry about a possible systemic breakdown of national economies in Eastern Europe, followed by a collapse of governments in the countries affected. A scenario of this kind, happening in the uneasy space between Western Europe and Russia, would be precisely the type of failure that historically has threatened the entire Euroatlantic area.

Instability is now looming on Europe’s eastern doorstep. We cannot allow that instability to turn into chaos because if that happens, we as the transatlantic community will not be able to cope with the double burden of conflicts along the perimeter of the Euroatlantic area. And if, heaven forbid, we have to, the costs of dealing with it later will by far exceed the cost of doing the right thing now.

Europe has a lot on its plate right now, seeking ways out of the crisis and countering doubts about the strength of the underlying principles of the EU, as recently expressed by some member states. It is essential to maintain the solidarity of all the EU member states while adopting recovery measures, so that we continue to coordinate the implementation of national recovery plans on the basis of jointly agreed guidelines, while ensuring a level playing field for everyone.

But we cannot limit our efforts to countries within the club. EU decisions and actions aimed at coping with the economic recession should also contribute to the stabilization of economic and financial situation in the EU’s eastern neighborhood. This will be a vital investment in our own longer-term security, since we cannot afford to see those countries suffer internal breakdown that could deflect them from their Euro-Atlantic course.

Take, for example, Ukraine. We should consider how the situation will change if Ukraine’s current economic crisis produces results similar to those of the 1998 Russian financial crisis. As you may remember, after the 1998 crisis in Russia middle-income people lost their savings and turned their backs on democracy, embracing authoritarian rule instead. What would be the consequences for European stability and security if Ukraine abandoned its democratic path? 

So we believe it will be useful to develop closer EU-US cooperation by setting a homogeneous approach towards Eastern Europe and creating a coordinated transatlantic Eastern policy, involving a joint EU-US recovery plan for our Eastern European neighbors.

On the other hand, we expect the EU and the US, as the lodestar of freedom and free market, to lead by example and maintain pressure on Eastern European countries to renounce protectionist moves to introduce higher import tariffs, which would violate WTO rules and practices.  At times of economic slowdown, we need more free trade, not less.

Energy

The challenges that this financial- economic crisis is posing are enormous. However, while tackling these challenges, Europe must not forget to address other vital security interests, first and foremost energy-related ones. Lithuania is particularly sensitive to energy matters, since in terms of infrastructure integration the Baltic States remain a valley of exclusion within the European Union.

The recent Ukraine-Russia gas conflict reminded us once again that energy has become a tool of power politics and that we need to act decisively to diversify European energy supplies, by focusing on a systematic policy response, that includes de-bottlenecking and diversifying energy supply routes.

We need concerted European action to create a well-functioning and integrated internal energy market by developing internal interconnections; strengthening the external energy policy dimension by implementing in practice the principle of solidarity; ensuring the transparency of external supplies and developing alternative supply sources. Ukraine’s deeper integration into the EU energy system must also be tackled within this context as a matter of priority.  It is essential that we find a way to clean up Ukraine’s murky energy sector and help the country formulate a proper energy strategy.

Given that energy security challenges are global, we encourage developing an intensified transatlantic energy dialogue between the EU and the United States and establishing a mechanism of regular energy security consultations between the EU and the USA as well as between the EU and NATO.

Russia

Where does the Russian puzzle fit into this picture? In the aftermath of the Russia- Georgia conflict a number of observers remembered George Kennan’s observation that Russia’s neighbors have to choose between beings its vassals or its enemies.  We believe there is a third way- that of mutually respected friends and partners. But for this to happen we must have a uniform understanding of how Russia treats its neighbors and achieve a common policy of the EU and the US towards Russia.

As we all know, the past decade had been marked by Russia’s resurgence and efforts to influence and dominate. However, the oil-generated economic boom in Russia is over, posing limitations to its assertiveness internationally. What challenges and opportunities does this situation offer?   

US Vice-President Biden had recently called for  reset mode in the West’s relations with Russia. We support this call for dialogue, as without dialogue there can be no prospect for clearing the hurdles and moving ahead. But dialogue must be a tool of strategy and not a substitute for it. We must be very clear about our interests and ensure that we are guided by them. In so doing, we should engage with Russia where we can, while understanding that such engagement must be carefully graduated and met by a matching engagement by Moscow.

I believe that we can come out of the current crisis with enhanced mutual interdependence. In the global world of today, Russia needs broader security relationships with militarily effective countries and the West can benefit from Russia’s constructive contribution to handling a range of issues that are beyond any one nation’s control or capacity to handle.

There is no doubt in my mind that Russia needs the West.  After all, NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan mean fewer drugs and less crime crossing into Russia, and radical Islam is as much of a threat to Russia as anywhere else. Equally, Russia depends on Europe as the latter continues to be Russia’s major trade partner. And Western investments are badly needed all over the country, including in Russia’s ageing energy infrastructure.

Lithuania favours pragmatic and business-oriented relations with Russia. We wish Russia to become a prosperous and stable nation, developing a genuine democracy, a vibrant civil society and the rule of law. We do not believe that this vision is unrealistic.  Russia will only be a prisoner of its history if its political elite wants it to be. I believe it is important that tomorrow’s political leaders in Russia should grow up knowing that there is a genuine openness towards their nation and a chance for Russia to join the democratic community of nations. For example, I would not exclude the possibility of a democratic Russia joining NATO one day, as an equal among equals.

In fact, we do not believe in exclusions.  To us a “Russia first” policy is a policy of exclusion, which has proven its deficiencies time and again. What we need is not some sort of preferential or deferential treatment of Russia but a common policy of engagement and influence, marked by due vigilance and caution, able to curb Russia’s temptation to assert its domination over its neighbors, but also offering a possibility of moving ahead on mutually advantageous terms.

We cannot make Russia join our fold. It can only happen if and when Russia chooses to do so. But we can and must help those who want to join our path. Our political relations with Russia should not be at their expense. On the contrary, building relations with Russia requires active support of its neighbors.

By helping countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to continue on the path of democratic reforms and improve the lives of their people, we are providing a vivid example to ordinary Russians of the benefits of healthy democratic institutions. We can tell by our own experience of implementing diverse cross-border and people-to-people projects with Russia’s Kaliningrad Region that there is a desire locally for more cooperation and dialogue. And that, in turn, gives us hope that their will be more openness and change to come in the longer run.  

NATO-Russia

Let me now briefly turn to NATO-Russia relations.  NATO-Russia dialogue is an important element of the modern international security environment. So we have to gradually rebuild our relations in an adequate manner, in proportion to Russia‘s actions and reactions.

We need to set a balance between pragmatism and matters of principle in all cooperation forms, including the NRC, without undermining the core principles of the latter. We support NATO cooperation with Russia in areas of mutual interest, such as Afghanistan transit, fight against terrorism, modern day piracy, disarmament and nonproliferation, aid to Russia (for example, ecological rehabilitation of the former military bases in the Kaliningrad Region) and other relevant areas.

At the same time we remain convinced that full political dialogue with Russia has to be approached with due caution, so as not to create an impression of condoning Russia’s actions in Georgia. The Alliance should keep reminding Russia of all its commitments under the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement: namely to withdraw troops from occupied Georgian lands; provide adequate conditions allowing the EU and other international observers to implement their mandate in all of Georgia; and stop support for the separatist regimes in the region.

NATO

Regarding the broader picture of transatlantic cooperation, we remain convinced that a strong Alliance and a vibrant transatlantic link are the cornerstone of Europe’s security. In our view, the core purpose of NATO- to provide for collective defense of its members and to institutionalize the transatlantic link - must remain rock solid.

The NATO of today is active primarily out of area, with the operation in Afghanistan as a key to the Alliance’s success and a test to its credibility. Lithuania will continue to support out of area missions as necessary and agreed by the allies. At the same time we believe we should renew our focus on   NATO operating in area and maintaining solid deterrence and defense, including continues conduct of NATO air policing of the Baltic states air space.

As we prepare for the NATO summit later this spring, enhancing transatlantic dialogue with the US administration is critical.  President Barack Obama’s election has offered a great opportunity to give a qualitative boost to Europe’s relationship with America.

We must draw the necessary lessons from the recent history of disagreements and remember that both, America and Europe are weaker and more vulnerable when acting alone. We therefore need a comprehensive common transatlantic approach, including but not limited to the issues of global financial crisis, creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area, tackling energy security and climate change, closure of Guantanamo, building peace and stability in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East, tackling nonproliferation and disarmament, developing a pragmatic but principled policy vis-à-vis Russia and expanding the zone of democracy and stability in the world. 

I can assure you that Lithuania will do all we can to make sure the  opportunity we now have to boost transatlantic cooperation is not missed.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Out of the rubble of the Berlin Wall, out of courageous actions of countless people such as those who joined hands to form the human chain across the Baltic states twenty years ago, a new kind of transatlantic space emerged- ever changing and open to new members as they embrace the shared values of democracy and freedom and undertake to build a common area of prosperity and peace. Today those aspiring to build and expand the area of shared values are facing new challenges, posed by the global economic downturn.

It is very important that the crisis should not be allowed to thwart the emergence of an ever larger democratic community spanning America and Europe, and that we should not become too self-absorbed with our own troubles to ignore the troubles of those who want to be  with us in building a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous world.

To paraphrase J.F. Kennedy’s prophetic words, we in the transatlantic area, “in this generation, are- by destiny rather than choice- the watchmen on the walls of the free world”. As the economic crisis unfolds in Eastern Europe, failure to act is not an option. Whatever the challenges ahead, I am convinced that Lithuania and the United States will stay the course together.

Thank you