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The expansion of Cooperation between countries of the Baltic rim is set to continue “The location of the Baltic is in fact more a question of awareness than of geography, but that awareness has to be guided and educated …” wrote the English historian David Kirby in 1999.

“Old legacies,” he went on, “continue to dog the states formerly under Soviet domination, whilst new opportunities may undermine the fragile sense of regional community. There is much to be done. Defining the Baltic at the beginning of a new millennium is thus an exciting challenge for all who study the region.”

Indeed, the rest of the world sees Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as “Baltic”, whereas the local media has often spoken out against the so-called “Baltic” identity.

But is the Baltic identity really dead?

Baltic identities

Descartes once wrote: “Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum.” Doubts and scholarly curiosity, which fortunately do not kill, do not give us the privilege of taking things for granted, even if they are embedded in media stereotypes. Therefore, it is time to reexamine the regional identities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia since the end of the Cold War.

Let us take a look at two more key statements.

One: the trilateral Baltic sub-regional identity has been the most important one for Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian politicians since the collapse of the USSR. Two: sovereignty and security concerns, along with the Soviet legacies and transatlantic integration, have been at the core of the political regional identities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia up till now.

The sensitive sovereignty issue in the Baltic States has been vital. The break from the USSR and the consolidation of statehood has been the top priority on political agendas.

The Baltic States inherited quite similar economic and political problems from Soviet rule. These relate to the four-point post-communist transformation: the transition to a democracy, the transition to the market economy, nation/state-building, and transatlantic integration.

Security concerns were stressed in foreign policy objectives. “Go West” became a priority Baltic foreign policy. But what are the most important regional identities to politicians in the Baltic States?

At first glance, a study of the political rhetoric might look meaningless. Who cares what politicians say, as they soon change their minds the next day? Examples of the erosion of political responsibility, especially in the new democracies, are abundant. However, probably very few failed to take heed of similar words uttered on separate occasions by George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin.

“They’ve got a problem on their hands.  We’re going to find them. And if they’re hiding, we’re going to smoke them out. And we’ll bring them to justice” (remarks made by President Bush to employees at the FBI headquarters on 25 September 2001).

“We will pursue the terrorists everywhere. You will forgive me, but if we catch them in the toilet we will wipe them out in the outhouse” (remarks made by President Putin on 26 September 1999).

Anyone who heard or read these probably believed that the statements delivered a very strong message, followed by real actions. So why cannot the same principle be applied to the political utterances of other politicians, say in the Baltic States?

Whether we like it or not, meanings are constantly being constructed in language. The regional identities of a country appear in the political language of key policymakers, such as presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers.

The term “Baltic”

In the course of history, the term “Baltic” has built up geographical, historical, linguistic and political features. The first geographical mentions of words with the root “balt” in them emerged at the beginning of the first millennium (Baltia, Mare Balticum, Balticum Fretrum), and such terms were widely used in Europe during the Middle Ages.

In the 19th century, the name for the Baltic Sea acquired national forms which had little in common. The Germans called it Ostsee and Baltisches Meer, the Swedes Östersjön, the Lithuanians Baltijos jūra, the Latvians Lielā jūra, and the Estonians Läänemeri.

However, the term “Baltic” has gradually crept on to the political agenda in the region. In the 19th century, the aristocracy in Livonia, Courland and Estland called themselves “Baltisch”. The Russian administration also employed the term, for provinces in which Germans had political, cultural and economic influence.

The beginning of the 20th century marked the expansion of a different “Baltic” from the German “Baltic provinces”, ranging from Latvia and Estonia to Lithuania, and sometimes even including Finland.

After (re)establishing their statehood after the First World War, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia faced the need for the recognition and consolidation of their fragile independence. Trilateral cooperation took its first steps in the interwar period. The countries coordinated their positions at the peace conference in France, and applied together to the League of Nations in 1919 for de jure recognition.  

Other collective actions included agreements to start peace negotiations together with Soviet Russia, and a joint appeal to Poland not to consider the negotiations with Russia as support for the Soviets.

In the 1930s, in an attempt to avoid international isolation, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed the trilateral Treaty on Concord and Cooperation, referred to as the Baltic Entente. However, the Baltic Entente did not last long. The alliance could not withstand military pressure from Europe.

The initial political perimeters of the Baltic sub-region could be traced after the First World War. In the interwar period, the perception of the Baltic sub-region fluctuated from large (including the Baltic States, Finland and Poland) to small, trilateral, alliances.

The Lithuanians’ quarrels with Poland over Vilnius and its region, which had been annexed by Poland, as well as Latvian and Estonian reluctance to support Lithuania, led to the concentration of national interests and ad hoc regional alignments. Besides, rivalry for influence with Germany and the Soviet Union thwarted Baltic cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s.

There were more differences than similarities in the interwar years, but the final shape of the Baltic sub-region was fixed by the Soviet occupation and annexation in the 1940s. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia lost their statehood, and the possibility to pursue independent policies.

However, the Soviet occupation and its legacy became a strong basis for the prevailing Baltic identity in all three countries.

Four main regions

In taking a closer look at the political statements by leading politicians in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, we should first single out the four main regions to which the Baltic States can belong: “Central and Eastern Europe”, the “Baltic Sea”, “Northern” (Nordic, Scandinavian), and the trilateral “Baltic”.

An analysis shows that the abundance of regional references in Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian politicians’ statements until the round of Nato and EU enlargement in 2004 shows trilateral Baltic references significantly outnumbering all other regional references.

The Northern/Nordic/Scandinavian references come second, and the number of Central and Eastern European and Baltic Sea references is the lowest.

However, simple figures such as these do not tell the whole story. We have to look at the content of the regional references, and the degree of their compatibility in political statements. Politicians in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia talk differently about Central and Eastern Europe. The historical injustice over the last 50 years, the achievements in the region and the expansion of freedom and democracy all link Baltic attitudes.

In turn, ideas about the “Baltic Sea” identity are based on references to economic growth and cooperation, investment, growing markets, trade and the environment.

References to the “North” show the political, economic and geographical aspects of partnership and collaboration. Lithuanian and Estonian statements, and to a lesser extent Latvian ones, embraced similar discursive structures, with the stress on Nordic-Baltic political and economic cooperation.

Geographic location in northern Europe was a common denominator for Estonian and Latvian politicians, whereas Lithuania envisioned itself as a link with northern Europe or a North European economy.

We might have anticipated that, with EU and Nato enlargement, old attributes of the Baltic identity, the legacies of the occupation and the subsequent security concerns, would dwindle. Surprisingly enough, the dominant and security-led Baltic sub-regional image is very much alive and kicking, even after transatlantic integration in 2004.

Security-led image

All leading politicians in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia talk of the occupation, the loss of sovereignty, liberation, the “Baltic Way”, traditional political and military cooperation and security issues. Moreover, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia see the Baltic States as countries which have experienced a successful transformation to democracy and the market economy. Baltic politicians seem to show a consensus rather than an indifference to trilateral issues, since security concerns are embedded in the hearts and minds of policymakers. Energy issues have gradually come to the fore as well.

In a sense, David Kirby was right that the location of the “Baltic” was rather a question of (even political) awareness, than of geography. Yet, defining “the Baltic” at the beginning of the new millennium reveals that regional mind-mapping in the Baltic States is still dogged by old legacies.

Patterns of friendship have disclosed increasing Baltic and Nordic partnerships. The Baltic sub-regional identity, and even ad hoc detachments from it, have mainly been constructed in the West/Russia division, putting the Baltic States on the Western side.

Admitting the fact that identities are inscribed in experiences and memories, we might anticipate that the next generations will have less interest in trilateral groupings, as future policymakers will have less direct experience of the Soviet period. However, security concerns do not seem to be separable from the political landscape in the Baltic States. Political and economic networking with Nordic counterparts have been deepening for years. Therefore, the Baltoscandian agenda, with extended cooperation along the eastern border of the EU, should loom over the horizon in the future.

Number of regional references in political statements, %

By Mindaugas Jurkynas