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LITHUANIAN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

**From Madrid to Vilnius:
Getting Ready for NATO Summit 2023 in Lithuania**

**A shift in German Defence
and Security Policy**

**The Role of the US in Strengthening
NATO's eastern flank**

**What is next for
the Belarusian regime?**

**The Strategic Imperative
of Economic Support for Ukraine**

**The Three Seas Initiative:
New Breathing for North-South Connectivity**

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A Note from the Editor



It is a privilege to serve as the Editor-in-Chief of the Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review (LFPR) for the fifth year. The annual journal aims to provide insights into the most pressing international developments and main challenges for Lithuania's foreign and security policy.

This year, the focus is on the catastrophic war launched by Russia on Ukraine and the global response to the aggression and blatant violations of international law. Particular emphasis is put on a discussion about the future of NATO. It covers the developments from Madrid, where NATO Summit took place in 2022, to Vilnius, which will host it in 2023.

An impressive group of international authors cover various aspects of these topics. Chris Miller estimates the economic consequences of the Kremlin's aggression. He looks at the impact on Russia and Ukraine and how the West could act more effectively in the future.

Aylin Matlé analyses the change in German security policy, titled *zeitenwende* by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and its implications for NATO's Eastern flank. It is especially relevant for Lithuania as Germany is willing to increase its military presence here. As the communique signed in June 2022 by the President of Lithuania Gitanas Nausėda and Scholz states, "Germany is ready to lead a robust and combat-ready brigade in Lithuania dedicated to deter and defend against Russian aggression."

European security also depends on strong transatlantic links. Thus Lukas Milevski looks at the role of the US in making sure NATO's deterrence and defense are sufficient. Again, this is crucial for Lithuania, as a plan to extend the presence of the US's rotating battalion until 2026 is gaining ground. Belarus, which was used by Russia as a staging ground for its February invasion and continuing attacks on Ukraine, is not overlooked. A conversation with Belarusian expert Artyom Shraibman gives a sense of what developments are expected from the Belarusian-Russian relationship.

Other important issues are also touched upon. Kevin Oswald looks at how Germany – and the European Union – could become more resilient in energy. The success of this endeavour is tightly linked to the rapid development of energy infrastructure. Therefore Ambassador Gediminas Varvuolis discusses the present and future of the Three Seas Initiative, which could play a significant role in providing more robust interconnections in Central and Eastern Europe. A summary of a research paper by two former Ambassadors, Neris Germanas and Gints Jegermanis, on the Lithuanian-Latvian relationship gives a glimpse of how that works in practice on a bilateral basis.

Finally, Marshall Reid writes about the US-Taiwan links and Beijing's reaction, while an excerpt from a research paper by Lithuanian analysts, Tomas Janeliūnas and

Raigirdas Boruta, provides a context of China's hard take on Lithuania because of increasing cooperation between Lithuania and Taiwan.

This publication would not have been possible without our friends and partners. I am pleased that Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains a key partner, providing support while ensuring editorial independence. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the U.S. Embassy in Lithuania are also project partners. All of these contributions have been essential in making this current issue of the LFPR as far-reaching as it is. I thank my colleagues at the Eastern Europe Studies Center for their help.

Finally, Rytis Paulauskas, Lithuania's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Margarita Šešelgytė, Director at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, and Andžej Pukšto, an Associate Professor at Vytautas Magnus University, form a fantastic Editorial Board. I extend my warmest thanks to all of them. Finally, we are all grateful for the exceptionally positive response to previous editions of the LFPR we have received from decision-makers and the expert community.

Please do not hesitate to share LFPR with your friends, colleagues and partners!

Sincerely,
Linas Kojala

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The Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review has asked prominent security and defense experts in various countries to briefly comment on the following question:

What steps must be taken by NATO before and during the Vilnius NATO Summit 2023 to ensure that deterrence (and defense) on NATO's Eastern flank is effective?

Their responses are published here.



Gabrielius Landsbergis

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania



We want our allies in NATO to step up their plans to be able to defend the Alliance's eastern flank, to defend the Baltic States, to defend Lithuania. Not just to deter, not just to send a political

message that something will happen in the event of an attack. Every one of us must contribute, and we have to be ready to send a military response if something is attempted on NATO's borders.



Margarita Šešelgytė

Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, Lithuania



The victory of Ukraine and the implementation of the decisions taken at the Madrid Summit on strengthening defense in the region are two of the most important objectives for the Alliance in the run-up to the Vilnius Summit. Achieving these goals will not be easy; they depend on the Allies' efforts to increase their defense capabilities and coordinate

steps towards common goals. The multiple crises faced by the Alliance today must become an opportunity not only to change the conventional wisdom to strengthen security in our region but also for the Alliance to adapt to new security challenges. It includes increased usage of new technologies, artificial intelligence and hybrid actions.



Col. (Ret.) Gintaras Bagdonas

Associate Expert at the Eastern Europe Studies Center, Vilnius, Lithuania, former Director of the Lithuanian Military Intelligence



Before the Vilnius Summit, the Allies should concentrate on strengthening the defense of NATO's Eastern flank and providing military assistance to Ukraine.

The defense of the Baltic States and the completion of the admission process of Sweden and Finland to NATO, as well as the integration of their forces into NATO's defense plans, should be among the priorities.

Moreover, in Vilnius, the Allies must stop wavering and decide to accept Ukraine into NATO. This would be a logical completion of the implementation of the promises made at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. The admission of Ukraine to NATO would be a long-term solution for ensuring security in Europe.



James Sherr OBE

Senior Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the International Centre for Defense and Security, Tallinn, Estonia



It is time to understand that Russia's war in Ukraine is also a total, albeit hybrid war against the West. Hybrid war is not a 'soft war'. It threatens lives as well as livelihoods.

The Vilnius Summit Declaration should state the following:

- Attacks on critical Alliance infrastructure will be treated as acts of war;
- NATO and Ukraine are agreed that there will be no further territorial compromises or frozen conflicts on Ukrainian land;

- NATO will support Ukraine as long as it takes until Russian forces are expelled from the territory they occupied after 24 February 2022;
- Russia must restore to Ukraine all territory occupied after February 2014.

For the war to end, Russia must be defeated and know it is defeated. Any outcome short of this will prolong the conflict.



Aylin Matlé

Research Fellow in the German Council on Foreign Relations Security and Defense Program



First and foremost, NATO allies ought to preserve the political unity they have showcased since Russia's heinous, renewed attack on Ukraine that began on February 24th, 2022. It is not only about the Alliance's support of Kyiv; restructuring NATO's defense organisation, a process that began at the Madrid summit in 2022, is equally important.

To that end, it is crucial to animate NATO's New Force

Model (NFM), which is said to comprise a force of 300,000 high(er) readiness troops.

Germany, in particular, must live up to the promises it made in connection to the NFM if Berlin wants to assume a (military) leadership role in and for Europe. Multiple high-ranking politicians proclaimed this, including Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Defense minister Christine Lambrecht.



Justyna Gotkowska

Programme coordinator of the Regional Security Programme at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, Poland



In the absence of an agreement on increasing allied troops on the eastern flank, NATO needs to implement the compromise reached at the Madrid Summit in July 2022. First, the pre-assigned forces to the existing NATO battlegroups need to be combat-ready at short notice. They should also be complemented by the repositioning of ammunition and military equipment, investments in military infrastructure and military mobility.

Second, NATO needs to deliver on the development of the new generation military plans, including the regional defense one, underpinned with intensified training and exercises, strengthened NATO Command and Force Structure, and a faster decision-making process. Third, the Allies need to take their pledges seriously to the new NATO Force Model to create a much larger pool of higher-readiness forces.

Beyond that, every NATO member state should invest in a speedy modernisation of the national armed forces and the fulfilment of NATO capability targets. In the months and years to come, NATO will be faced with a highly volatile and unpredictable situation in NATO's eastern neighbourhood, with Russia posing the most significant challenge and threat to Europe. Hence, NATO eastern flank countries should continue discussing the need for more considerable reinforcements of the hitherto allied military presence.



Eoin Micheál McNamara

PhD researcher, University of Tartu, Estonia



Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has transformed our thinking on NATO's eastern flank. In addition to the post-2014 focus on allied defense and deterrence, NATO's Eastern members, Poland in particular, have been vital in facilitating the military logistics allowing NATO members to support Ukraine's high-performing military.

With its military options continuing to narrow, Russia will

become ever more desperate in 2023. It is likely to target the supply chains linking NATO with Ukraine. It is therefore crucial for NATO's Eastern members to lead in strengthening existing supply connections while working to open new supply options with Ukraine to ease any disruptions. That is important to ensure Kyiv receives the Western weapon systems necessary for this war approaching its reckoning.

We Can't Expect a Dramatic Change in Belarus until Changes Come in Russia



A Conversation with Artyom Shraibman

The interview was conducted by Dorota Sokolovska, Project Assistant at the Eastern Europe studies center, a think-tank in Vilnius, Lithuania

– *Artyom Shraibman, an expert on Belarus and a political analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, talks with LFPR's Dorota Sokolovska about Russo-Belarusian relations, the so-called Union State, and the deepening of Minsk's dependency on Moscow.*

How would you describe the essence of the Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus, which was signed in 1999? What does it mean in practice now, more than 20 years after the creation of the so-called 'Union State'? In which fields are the two countries integrating the most?

There is a difference between what was signed and what was actually implemented. 23 years ago, Lukashenko and Yeltsin signed a very ambitious Union treaty, which provided for the establishment of a confederation of two states

with functioning supranational bodies like parliament, the council of ministers, the rotating presidency, and the single currency with some kind of a national or federal bank, so that the integration would be deeper even than what exists in the European Union.

Institutionally, this system was unworkable from the very beginning. It is impossible to imagine two countries of such different scales, weights, and power being equal in terms of their formal relationships. It is definitely unpalatable for Minsk, which is why Article III, speaking about the sovereign equality of the state, exists in this union state treaty. Belarus can always refer to it when it wants to delay or not do something. Russia disagrees with this parity for apparent reasons; this was



In essence, this union state was never created; it always remained an abstraction.

Artyom Shraibman

is a political analyst, and founder of Sense Analytics consultancy. He is also a non-resident scholar of the Carnegie Endowment for international peace. Artyom holds an LL.B. in International Law (Belarusian State University) and an MSc in Politics and Communications (London School of Economics). His research interests include Belarusian domestic politics, media freedom and the broader human rights situation in the country, Belarus–EU, and Belarus–Russia relations. Artyom worked as a political correspondent for the BelaPAN news agency (2013–2014), as political editor for TUT.BY (2014–2019), and as political advisor to the UN in Belarus (2016).



📷 Official ceremony of signing Treaty on Establishing Russian-Belarusian Union at St. Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko sign the document (RIA Novosti archive, image #141088 / Vladimir Rodionov / CC-BY-SA 3.0)

always a stumbling block, and it remains so today. In essence, this union state was never created; it always remained an abstraction.

However, as a framework of bilateral relations, cooperation has developed in several areas, with the most progress achieved in the military: so-called joint grouping of forces, joint air defense, joint military training centers that were established in 2021, and dozens of joint military exercises such as Zapad. This framework gave birth to the current level of military integration, which is basically an absorption of Belarusian military sovereignty.

Institutionally, the union state is not progressing much, but on the ground, I would say military integration trumps all the other lags and delays.

● ●
Institutionally, the union state is not progressing much, but on the ground, I would say military integration trumps all the other lags and delays.

– *In terms of economics, the Belarusian and Russian economies are tightly interconnected. What does the situation look like now, when not only Belarus but also Russia is under severe sanctions? Does Belarus provide a loophole for Moscow to circumvent sanctions?*

What I want to convey here is that there is nothing within the

union state arrangements that would have made economic integration deeper. Cheap gas, duty-free oil, access to markets, import substitution, and other forms of Russian support are not part of the union-state integration process.

Bilaterally, the Belarusian economy is heavily dependent on Russia's economy; needless to say; this dependency grows

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Belarusian economy is heavily dependent on Russia's economy; needless to say; this dependency grows as we speak.

Table: Belarus and Russia are members of the Eurasian Economic Union

Members	Observer members	Prospective members
Armenia (Since 2 Jan 2015)	Cuba On 11 December 2020, Cuba became an observer member. Cuba becomes the first country outside Eurasia and the first country from the Americas to be granted observer status.	Mongolia
Belarus (1 Jan 2015)		Syria
Kazakhstan (1 Jan 2015)		Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan (12 Aug 2015)	Moldova On April 14, 2017, Moldova became the first observer member.	Uzbekistan
Russia (1 Jan 2015)		


as we speak. Traditionally, Russia occupied about 40% of Belarusian export and about 50% percent of general foreign trade. The apparent reason for this is Belarus’s isolation, thanks to Lukashenko’s continuous

repressions and sanctions. Lukashenko is now stuck with Russia as the primary market for Belarusian goods and logistics. Russia can still sell its main exporting goods – oil and gas – while Belarus cannot. Belarusian

trade with the EU, including the main export goods – fertilizers, wood, and metals – has been stopped. Trade with Ukraine has also been blocked since the day the war started. All of this makes Russia a window

Conversations

☒ Belarusian-Russian military cooperation intensifies (Threat Assessment Report 2022 by Lithuania’s State Security Department and the Second Operational Services Department)



for the bottleneck for Belarus in terms of its trade with other countries.

Between 2015 and 2021, Belarus was indeed the territory on which some of the sanctions, as well as Russian counter-sanctions on food could have been evaded. Still, since Belarus fell under nearly the same amount of sanction pressure, it is tough to imagine what sorts of goods or types of financial services you can still get or buy in Belarus but not in Russia itself. Russian businesses tend to rely on Kazakhstan, Armenia, Turkey, or China to help with sanction obfuscation. Belarus is no longer helping; the only exception is the elaborate scheme of minimizing the effect of the sanctions against cargo carriers.


– Despite the high economic dependency and military integration level, we have noticed that Lukashenko was reluctant to send his troops to Ukraine. What is the leverage that Lukashenko can hold or holds against the Kremlin? For how long can this leverage sustain itself?

We do not know whether Putin pressurized Lukashenko to let him use the 'Belarusian corridor' to invade Ukraine from the north. Militarily, there are doubts whether he needs this minuscule force; while the troops are still in Belarus, it sort of pins down Ukrainian forces in the north of Ukraine because they are constantly on alert, having to expect some attack.

The leverage that Moscow holds against Minsk is indeed

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The leverage that Moscow holds against Minsk is indeed growing, not only economically but also militarily.

growing, not only economically but also militarily. When you have Russian troops on Belarusian soil, the local ruler is way more agreeable because there is a vile threat: "if you are against us, these troops are there, and they can mess with you and your regime." For now, not many Russian troops are currently stationed in Belarus, but this can change depending on the war scenarios. This eventuality





Politically, his main asset with his remaining supporters is that he provides peace within Belarus's borders.

should therefore not be wholly excluded. So far, engagement in the war seems so contrary to Lukashenko's political interests that I would expect him to fight to his political death against this involvement.

Politically, his main asset with his remaining supporters is that he provides peace within Belarus's borders. His supporters believe that Belarus has not been involved in the war thanks to him, and they appreciate it. Many people who were not very political after 2020, the so-called 'neutral' part of society, have found it essential that Belarus has not joined the war and attributed this to Lukashenko. If he enters the war, he loses all of this support.

The polls also indicate that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians (more than 85%) do not support sending their troops to war. Militarily, he would have spent his best troops, his army would have been badly beaten in this meat grinder, and it is not at all clear whether the bureaucracy, the military, and law enforcement will be as happy to protect him from the public anger after such a defeat, especially since they have been promised throughout the six months of the war that this will not happen. Lukashenko

relies on a consensus within his bureaucracy and society regarding not being involved in the war.

Lukashenko's main leverage vis-à-vis Russia is the absence of alternatives. He can always come to Moscow in every kind of dispute and state the obvious truth that there are no alternatives and no pro-Russian opposition: "if you push too much and destabilize me and my regime, you will lose your ally."



Lukashenko's main leverage vis-à-vis Russia is the absence of alternatives.

– Is there any correlation between democratic processes and the influence of Russia in Belarus? How much has it strengthened since the summer of 2020?

Society is strongly polarized; the two political poles are very hostile towards each other. Sociologists have found that people with opposite political opinions treat each other worse than any other demographic or social group, a new phenomenon in Belarus. Also, there is a sizable part of society in the middle that has different preferences on some issues. They may support the values of the protest of 2020,



The war will dramatically weaken Russia in the middle and long term, which means that Lukashenko will also lose his central pillar of stability – Russia. Sooner or later, by invading Ukraine, Russia has brought this moment closer rather than further.

but after the war started, these people can dislike sanctions against Belarus.

The war has made it lucid and clear to everybody that we cannot expect a dramatic change in the Belarusian regime until changes come in Russia. Until Lukashenko enjoys the support of Putin, and until Putin is willing and able to provide this support, there is no amount of widespread resentment or Western pressure that can undo this regime. That is why the war in Ukraine deflected attention from Belarus but did not decrease the odds of Belarus becoming a democratic state. The war will dramatically weaken Russia in the middle and long term, which means that Lukashenko will also lose his central pillar of stability – Russia. Sooner or later, by invading Ukraine, Russia has brought this moment closer rather than further. ●

The Strategic Imperative of Economic Support for Ukraine



Chris Miller



The West's economic and financial support for Ukraine – for today and for the future – has been comparatively limited, sending a signal of weakness and lack of commitment to Ukraine and, more importantly,

The Russia-Ukraine War will not only be decided on the battlefield in the Donbas and around Kherson. The supply of weapons to Ukraine and the Russians' effort to mobilise additional troops are factors that will shape the war's outcome. But economic policies will impact Russia and Ukraine's willingness and ability to fight. The West has embraced vigorous and costly methods of economic warfare against Russia. The Kremlin, for its part, is trying to strangle Ukraine's economy. But the West's

economic and financial support for Ukraine – for today and for the future – has been comparatively limited, sending a signal of weakness and lack of commitment to Ukraine and, more importantly, to the Kremlin.

Any discussion of economic measures amid the conflict must recognise the primacy of the battlefield, at least at the current phase of the war. No amount of economic aid to Ukraine or punishment against Russia will impact the course of the war over the coming weeks. However, we must prepare for a war that stretches far longer, well into 2023. Depending on how it ends, the war may be followed by an uncomfortable, tenuous peace marked by ongoing and perhaps occasionally violent contestation between Moscow and Kyiv. In this longer-term struggle, economic levers of influence will assume more significance.

The West has already taken dramatic steps to undermine Russia's economy and its defense industrial base. The financial sanctions imposed in spring 2022 will cause Russia's economy to shrink dramatically over the course of 2022 and

Chris Miller

is associate professor at the Fletcher School and Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He has written three books on Russian politics, economics, and history. His most recent book is *Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology*, a geopolitical history of the computer chip.

2023, leaving Russians far poorer. Though the Kremlin has celebrated the fact that the economic slowdown in 2022 has been less dramatic than initially expected, 2023 will not bring a recovery but rather a further slump. Russian government institutions like the Central Bank of Russia now forecast it will take years to return to pre-war living standards.

It's now also clear that the export controls the West has imposed on Russia, which target Russian industry and the defense sector, are also seriously impacting the production of military goods. Russia appears to be facing deficits or impending military equipment shortages, from advanced missiles to drones to artillery shells. Its military will struggle to source many of the component parts it used to buy abroad. Russian defense firms face critical difficulties with component parts, from microelectronics to machine tools. Smuggling components is only a partial solution, given that Russian media have reported increased defect rates of goods purchased on the grey market. Moreover, another round of sanctions has yet to take effect,

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Russian government institutions like the Central Bank of Russia now forecast it will take years to return to pre-war living standards.

given that the European Union's oil embargo will only take force in December 2022.

Despite the cost that the West's tools of economic warfare have imposed on Russia, we must assume that the Kremlin has the capability to pursue the war for at least many more months. Russia's domestic political consensus is brittle but appears capable of withstanding declining living standards for now. Its defense industry faces deep problems, but the Russian military has large stockpiles and has shown a willingness to sustain large-scale casualties, substituting men for machinery.

Russian economic warfare against the West and Ukraine is also costly. Against the West, the Russians have cut supplies of natural gas in an effort to push Europe into a energy price-driven recession. Higher electricity and heating prices have caused political pressure across Europe as inflation has spiked. The gas war has caused pain but has not accomplished Russia's strategic goals. Europe's economy may enter recession, but it will be far shorter and shallower than Russia's slump. Key European countries have thus passed large-scale fiscal packages to shield consumers from some of the costs of higher energy prices. Russia's gamble that cutting gas supply would cause Europe to change tack on Ukraine has thus far not worked. More specific Russian measures, like cutting neon gas exports to disrupt semiconductor production, have had no evident impact.

However, Russia's economic campaign against Ukraine has been far more impactful. The

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Despite the cost that the West's tools of economic warfare have imposed on Russia, we must assume that the Kremlin has the capability to pursue the war for at least many more months.

war has caused large-scale destruction in several major cities and led millions of Ukrainians to flee their homes. Ukraine's GDP will be 35% lower in 2022 as a result, according to World Bank estimates. In addition to trying to seize Ukrainian territory, Russia has restricted Ukraine's access to crucial Black Sea trade routes. Now, it is waging war on Ukraine's infrastructure via strikes on power and water facilities. The aim is further economic disruption.

The logic behind Russia's economic war against Ukraine is that the Ukrainian populace cannot withstand many months of such intense economic pain. Russia has, of course,

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The war has caused large-scale destruction in several major cities and led millions of Ukrainians to flee their homes.



📷 People stay in a yard as smoke rises in the air in the background after shelling in Odessa, Ukraine, Sunday, April 3, 2022. (AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris, Flickr)

dramatically underestimated the willingness of Ukrainians to withstand its pressure. Nevertheless, the West has three reasons to act swiftly to counter Russia's economic pressure campaign against Ukraine. The first, and most obvious reason, is to alleviate the immense suffering that the war has caused. In addition, there are strategic reasons to support Ukraine economically, too.

First, while Russia's bet that economic pain will induce Ukraine to surrender has failed, and while Ukraine's economy cannot be fully restarted until the war ends, we must not let Ukraine's war effort be undermined by economic disruption. Ukraine stands on the brink of hyperinflation, as the government's spending requirements have surged due to the war, even as tax revenue has collapsed. Ukraine anticipates

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Ukraine anticipates a budget deficit of \$38 billion next year – all caused by Russia. If Western aid doesn't help reduce Ukraine's budget deficit, Kyiv will have no choice but to print money to pay for the war, driving inflation higher and living standards lower.

a budget deficit of \$38 billion next year – all caused by Russia. If Western aid doesn't help reduce Ukraine's budget deficit, Kyiv will have no choice but to print money to pay for the war, driving inflation higher and living standards lower.

The Kremlin understands the economic challenges that Ukraine faces – and senses weakness. Russia is almost certainly underestimating Ukraine's willingness to fight, whatever the economic consequences. Yet the fact that the Kremlin thinks its economic warfare methods may work at degrading Ukraine's willingness to fight encourages Russia to fight on. This creates a strategic imperative to aid Ukraine and to signal clearly to Russia that the West is willing to support Kyiv economically over the long run. Western financial aid to Ukraine has been substantial, but the Russians doubt the West's willingness to sustain this. Providing more support, and giving concrete pledges today of funds over the long run, is the best way to disabuse Russia of the notion that its economic strangulation of Ukraine can work. ●

The US Contribution to the Security of NATO's Eastern Flank:

From the Madrid Summit to Vilnius

Lukas Milevski



The United States is the leading member of NATO, with the greatest defense budget, the greatest military power, and the greatest willingness to use it. Its contribution to the security of NATO's eastern flank is paramount; without it, military anemia could threaten the eastern flank. Much of the multidimensional US contribution – its intra-alliance diplomacy – will remain inevitably hidden behind diplomatic secrecy and closed doors, only to be revealed in later decades. This leaves the direct deployment of US military capabilities as the most apparent, even if not necessarily the most important, US contribution to the security and defense of NATO's eastern flank.

This broadly-based US support for the security of NATO's eastern flank cannot be divorced from the contextual relationship of the US with Russia. The pre-2022 history of this relationship demonstrates an interesting pattern: each two-term administration begins on a high note in its relationship with Russia before experiencing a major crisis toward the end of

the second term. The Clinton administration, which had broadly friendly relations with Russia, nearly clashed with it over Kosovo as a result of Russia's 1999 Pristina Airport stunt. The Bush administration saw Russia as a crucial partner in the war on terror, only for the 2008 Russo-Georgian War to sour relations. Obama sought a reset with Russia, but Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine in 2014. The Trump administration sought to repair relations, but made little headway before being replaced by the Biden administration, which bucked the typical pattern of seeing or seeking cooperation and reset immediately in favor of continuing confrontational policies.

NATO enlargement in 1999 (prior to the Kosovo War) and again in 2004, which constituted the first major US-driven developments for the security of NATO's new eastern flank, took place mostly at times of good relations with Russia. Yet these were exceptions, as most, if not all, major subsequent developments were galvanized

Lukas Milevski

is an assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategy on the MA International Relations and BA International Studies programs. He is a Baltic Sea Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has published two books with Oxford University Press, *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought* (2016) and *The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective* (2018).



📷 Pennsylvania Army National Guard soldiers in Pabrade, Lithuania. The Soldiers were deployed to Lithuania in support of Defender Europe 22 and NATO exercise Flaming Thunder (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Staff Sgt. Zane Craig)



NATO enlargement in 1999 (prior to the Kosovo War) and again in 2004, which constituted the first major US-driven developments for the security of NATO's new eastern flank, took place mostly at times of good relations with Russia. Yet these were exceptions, as most, if not all, major subsequent developments were galvanized by crises in US–Russia relations.

by crises in US–Russia relations. The Russo-Georgian War led to the development of defense plans for the Baltic States, which had for years been considered unnecessary; similarly, the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine led to the eventual creation of multinational, battalion-sized NATO battle groups in 2016. The United States is likely to have played a publicly unrecognized leading role in these processes even though it only contributed materially to the battle group in Poland. Indeed, the United States has been the single largest developer of and contributor to the security of NATO's eastern flank over recent decades, particularly prior to Russia's present invasion of Ukraine, while Western Europe still sought non-confrontational relations with Russia.

Responding as it did to the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO's Madrid Summit followed this pattern as the

alliance agreed to take steps to bolster its eastern flank against the Russian threat. This includes setting up four more enhanced forward presence battle groups in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary, to most of which the United States contributes. US post-Madrid contributions to the eastern flank also encompassed plans to set up a permanent forward headquarters for the US V Corps at Camp Kosciuszko in Poland, to deploy an additional rotational Brigade Combat Team deployed to Romania (besides the contribution to the battle group there), to increase smaller-scale rotational deployments across the entire eastern flank, and to deploy more forces throughout Europe, including two squadrons of F-35s to the United Kingdom and an additional two destroyers to Spain. This is part of a wider NATO effort to improve its military readiness to face plausible threats all around its perimeter, including forward-deployed equipment by other NATO states to the eastern flank as well as ambitions to increase the NATO Response Force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops.

Perhaps the United States' most important contribution to NATO's eastern flank security since 24 February has been its material aid to Ukrainian defense. Bolstered by aid from the United States and other NATO members – including many eastern flank countries, who have contributed disproportionately high levels of material aid relative to their GDP – Ukraine



Perhaps the United States' most important contribution to NATO's eastern flank security since 24 February has been its material aid to Ukrainian defense. Bolstered by aid from the United States and other NATO members – including many eastern flank countries, who have contributed disproportionately high levels of material aid relative to their GDP – Ukraine has inflicted substantial losses on the Russian military.

has inflicted substantial losses on the Russian military. These heavy losses include, as of 19 September, 1148 visually confirmed main battle tanks destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured, out of a Russian total of approximately 3,400 in the Russian military's Table of Organization and Equipment (besides up to around 10,000 believed to be in storage, although this number is likely to be far too high). The Russian air forces have also taken substantial losses in both rotary and fixed-wing aviation. With the war not yet over,

Russian losses will continue to climb. Russia will need many years to recover from its poorly considered invasion of Ukraine; optimists estimate decades. Although this is first and foremost the achievement of the Ukrainians, they have been supported by NATO, which has thereby also improved the military security of its own far eastern flank.

A notable side-effect of US and other NATO support for Ukraine during the war is demonstration of Western military technology in real war circumstances. This has already led all three Baltic States to seek to procure HIMARS for their own defense, having witnessed in Ukraine their disproportionate value for national defense by way of threatening Russian rear echelon forces and logistical and command infrastructure almost with impunity.

The main threat to this strong US position regarding the security of NATO's eastern flank is the Trump-supporting MAGA wing of the Republican Party, which is vociferously isolationist, usually outright pro-Russian, and seems to have disproportionate influence among the base of the Republican Party through like-minded views spread by Fox News and other pseudo-news outlets. This is an extreme edge of a broader but shallower isolationist, albeit not typically pro-Russian, undercurrent in portions of US politics and the US public which Washington has thus far largely resisted. Fortunately, at present the United States seems unlikely to continue the past pattern of high expectations followed



📷 Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis meets US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in Washington, D.C. on September 15, 2021 (Photo US Department of State)



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by end-of-administration confrontation unless the MAGA camp makes a truly substantial political breakthrough – and even then, given their pro-Russian proclivities, they might not undertake the confrontational stage.

The main security threat for NATO's eastern flank is Russia, a threat which at this present time is understood in predominantly military terms. Since the end of the Cold War, despite Russia's consistent feeling of victimhood, neither the West in general nor the United States in particular has ever desired confrontation with Russia – and the eastern flank countries, rightfully never trusting Russia, always only hoped for a normal

neighbor, rather than a reviving and unrepentant imperial aggressor. Major developments in eastern flank security – especially defense – have always emerged after a Russia-instigated confrontation with the West. The developments after the Madrid Summit continue this pattern. Putin's speech of 21 September 2022, threatening nuclear action, hardened the Russian position toward Ukraine and the West and will only contribute to a continuation of the pattern. Yet simultaneously the damage to Russian military power as a result of the war will give NATO increasing amounts of time to prepare and enhance its insurance policy against Russia. ●

NATO Summits back to the Eastern Flank: Prognosis for Summit in Vilnius

Justinas Kulys



The NATO summit in Madrid will find its place in the history books. Unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine shocked security architecture in Europe, leading to tectonic changes in defense policies all around the continent and above. The Vilnius summit will be the fifth (out of twenty-six) NATO summit since 1990 that is taking place on the Eastern flank.

All previous NATO summits in NATO's Eastern flank had their history. Some were historical for the region, and some discussed divisions caused by military operations in the Middle East. The next NATO summit on its Eastern flank will take place in Vilnius, Lithuania, during the Summer of 2023. Looking at the current political state (in the early Autumn of 2022), at least seven key topics might be discussed during the Vilnius summit.

First, the implementation of decisions made at the Madrid summit needs to be reviewed and evaluated. The latest NATO summit presented many changes for the Alliance, followed by decisions on practical actions.

All those functional goals from the Madrid summit need to be reflected on, and their implementation should be evaluated. Nevertheless, the ever-changing situation in Ukraine is altering the security dynamics in Europe, forcing the Allies to look at a wide range of topics, from nuclear deterrence to the protection of critical infrastructure. Lessons from the latest developments need to be learned and the plans from Madrid should be upgraded accordingly.

Secondly, the topics of military spending, strengthening military capabilities and increasing NATO's presence in the Eastern flank would be the subjects that Lithuania will look forward to as a host nation. For a long time, Vilnius and other regional capitals tried to warn



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Justinas Kulys,
Project Manager, Eastern
Europe Studies Center,
Lithuania.

Justinas Kulys is an experienced project manager who led the implementation of more than a dozen national and international projects with Lithuanian and foreign partners and contributed to organising numerous high-level events and conferences. As a policy analyst, he is focused on Southeast European affairs, NATO, and security policy topics. He is also a Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Germany) Fellow in Lithuania.



📷 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg receives official letters of application to join NATO from Klaus Korhonen (ambassador of Finland accredited to NATO) and Axel Wernhoff (ambassador of Sweden accredited to NATO) (Photo by NATO)

the Allies of the Russian threat, yet only a few took it seriously enough. Now, the focus of regional capitals is shifting towards the need to strengthen NATO's military capabilities and its preparedness to defend Allied states. The Baltic States and Poland are trying to lead by example by spending 2.5% of their GDP on defense and by going beyond it, hoping for other Allies to follow. Moreover, as the end date of the pledge made by the member states at the NATO summit in Wales to spend 2% of GDP on defense by 2024 is closing in, discussions on the spending topics could be at the top of the agenda.

The third possible topic for the NATO summit in Vilnius is Ukraine's membership in NATO.



The Baltic States and Poland are trying to lead by example by spending 2.5% of their GDP on defense and by going beyond it, hoping for other Allies to follow.

As nations on NATO's Eastern flank and in the Western Balkans (the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, Montenegro, Romania and others) are already expressing their support for Ukrainian membership in NATO, this topic could be hard to avoid. Eastern and Central European Allies will probably try to put



As nations on NATO's Eastern flank and in the Western Balkans (the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, Montenegro, Romania and others) are already expressing their support for Ukrainian membership in NATO, this topic could be hard to avoid.

Ukrainian membership, or a clear perspective towards it, as one of the priorities of the Vilnius summit agenda. Yet,



As Russia is always looking for cracks in transatlantic relations, NATO leaders must be cautious and wise while debating the question of Ukraine's membership in NATO.

with more cautious Allies from other countries – especially in Western Europe – this question might cause some tensions. As Russia is always looking for cracks in transatlantic relations, NATO leaders must be cautious and wise while debating the question of Ukraine's membership in NATO.

The fourth topic for the agenda of the Vilnius summit is the membership of Finland and Sweden. Membership of Sweden and Finland would drastically change the power dynamics in Northern Europe. Membership of Finland would significantly increase the length of the NATO–Russia border. Membership of Sweden would make a naval dimension more important for the Baltic States as the NATO reinforcements could come much faster via sea than before. This topic also goes well with the broader context of discussions on strengthening the Alliance's capabilities on the Northern and Eastern flanks. As Justyna Gotkowska rightly mentioned, NATO membership of Sweden and Finland will: "(...)

significantly raise the level of deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic region"¹.

The fifth topic is China. China is named as a security challenge in the new NATO Strategic Concept. China is identified in this way because of its hybrid and cyber operations, and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation focused on NATO; Beijing's common attempts with Russia to undercut the rules-based international order. This is the first-ever reference to China as a strategic challenge and a declaration that developments in the Indo-Pacific region affect the security of the NATO member states. The question of Taiwan could also be difficult to avoid as some member states – namely Lithuania and the Czech Republic – are staunch supporters of this island nation's integration into international organizations and broader cooperation with Taipei.

The sixth topic to be discussed are changes inside NATO. The term of the Alliance's secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg as head of the military alliance was extended by another year in March; he will now serve until September 30, 2023. At the beginning of 2022, there were many discussions on who will take the lead. Maybe the Alliance will have a first female secretary-general? Will we see the first secretary-general from the Eastern flank? We should know all the answers



☒ US President President Joe Biden met with President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan on the sidelines of the NATO Summit (Photo by Kantei.go.jp)

¹ Justyna Gotkowska, "Sweden and Finland on the threshold of NATO membership", OWS Commentary, accessed 2022 10 06, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2022-05-24/sweden-and-finland-threshold-nato-membership>



At the Eastern Europe Studies Center, we are proud to take the lead in organizing the NATO Public Forum that will work as a common ground for leading decision-makers and experts to talk about our shared history, present and future.

during Vilnius summit, where the agenda will most probably be impacted by the new secretary-general.

The seventh topic for the Allied leaders to discuss is stability in the Western Balkans, Northern Africa, and the Middle East (MENA). Although the NATO summit is taking place in the Eastern flank, the topics that are important to the neighbors in Southern Europe and Southeastern Europe should not be forgotten. Reoccurring tensions in Kosovo and fears of instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina show the need for continuous NATO attention to maintain stability and peace. As instability and active military conflicts are still present in MENA, resulting in waves of migrants leaving the war-torn countries, the need for NATO to look for peace efforts and other means to increase stability in the region is ever-present. As Thierry Tardy concluded in one of his articles, despite the American pivot towards the Indo-Pacific: "(...) while

other external powers seem to have clear ideas about what they want in the MENA, any disengagement by NATO or Western powers would likely carry enormous risks."²

In Lithuania, we are looking forward to welcoming heads of state, journalists, and leading experts for frank discussions on our shared values, common goals, and the different

challenges we all face. At the Eastern Europe Studies Center, we are proud to take the lead in organizing the NATO Public Forum that will work as a common ground for leading decision-makers and experts to talk about our shared history, present and future. The NATO Vilnius summit might not be historical, but it looks to be a significant one. ●

1990	5–6 July	United Kingdom	London
1991	7–8 November	Italy	Rome
1994	10–11 January	Belgium	Brussels
1997	27 May	France	Paris
1997	8–9 July	Spain	Madrid
1999	23–25 April	United States	Washington, D.C.
2001	13 June	Belgium	Brussels
2002	28 May	Italy	Rome
2002	21–22 November	Czech Republic	Prague
2004	28–29 June	Turkey	Istanbul
2005	22 February	Belgium	Brussels
2006	28–29 November	Latvia	Riga
2008	2–4 April	Romania	Bucharest
2009	2–3 April	France Germany	Strasbourg Kehl
2010	19–20 November	Portugal	Lisbon
2012	20–21 May	United States	Chicago
2014	4–5 September	United Kingdom	Newport and Cardiff
2016	8–9 July	Poland	Warsaw
2017	25 May	Belgium	Brussels
2018	11–12 July	Belgium	Brussels
2019	3–4 December	United Kingdom	Watford
2021	14 June	Belgium	Brussels
2022	25 February	Virtual summit	Virtual summit
2022	24 March	Belgium	Brussels
2022	28–30 June	Spain	Madrid
2023	Summer	Lithuania	Vilnius

Table: All NATO Summits since 1990 (Wikipedia). Summits in NATO Eastern Flank countries bolded.

² Thierry Tardy, "NATO's Sub-strategic Role in the Middle East and North Africa", German Marshall Fund, accessed 2022 10 08 <https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-sub-strategic-role-middle-east-and-north-africa>

Germany's Security and Defense Policy since NATO's Madrid Summit – A Shift in the Making?



Aylin Matlé

Since the beginning of Russia's renewed and full-fledged war of aggression against Ukraine beginning this February, and President Putin's announcement in December 2021 that he intends to reverse the previous European security order, questions about deterrence – and, if necessary, defense – on NATO's eastern flank have increasingly come to the fore of the Euro-Atlantic agenda. The Baltic States, which are particularly exposed from a geostrategic point of view, are the focus of special attention in this context since Estonia and Latvia border directly on Russia. While Lithuania, the third Baltic Republic, is not an immediate neighbor of Russia, it shares a border with Belarus – a country that is in the firm grip of the Kremlin. All three countries on their own would be outnumbered by Russian troops.¹

¹ Ulrich Kühn et. al., "Auf dem NATO-Gipfel spielen strategische Überlegungen eine große Rolle. Hat die Allianz das russische Militär zuletzt überbewertet?", Tagesspiegel, accessed October 4, 2022, <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/russlands-krieg-gegen-die-nato-wurde-mit-sicherheit-anders-aussehen-5431348.html>.

For Germany, as well as NATO as a whole, those circumstances bear political-strategic as well as military implications. If Moscow were to attack one or more of the Baltic allies militarily, German troops would be directly affected and would have to reinforce militarily since soldiers of the German armed forces, among others allies, currently secure NATO's eastern border. In a Russian attack scenario, a fait accompli cannot be ruled out if Moscow, using the specter of nuclear threats, discouraged NATO countries from rushing to the aid of their allies in the Baltic region. Such blackmail attempts, based on the combined use of conventional and nuclear means, could disrupt NATO and thus achieve a strategic success for Russia without a protracted war.²

Such a situation could severely damage and undermine Germany's credibility and cohesion within the alliance. Moreover, President Putin's

² Heinrich Brauß, "The Need for the Alliance to Adapt Further" in: John Andreas Olsen (ed.): "Future NATO – Adapting to new Realities", RUSI Whitehall Paper 95 (2020), <https://www.routledge.com/Future-NATO-Adapting-to-New-Realities/Olsen/p/book/9780367534721>.

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☒ Defense Ministers of Lithuania and Germany, Arvydas Anušauskas and Christine Lambrecht, discuss the assignment of German brigade to Lithuania (Ministry of Defense of Lithuania photo)

● ●

The battle groups are intended to signal to Moscow that even in the event of a limited military incursion into the territory of one of the four allies, Russia would immediately be at war with NATO as a whole, including the three nuclear powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

ideas for a future European security architecture presented last December should not be forgotten. In ultimatums addressed to the U.S. and NATO, the president demanded, among other things, the reversal of NATO enlargement since 1999 and a de facto American withdrawal from Europe.³

For this reason, the allied and bilateral troop strength along the entire eastern border of the Alliance was increased shortly after the war against Ukraine began, but it was expected that this reinforcement would only be the first step as the current multinational force presence

would not be sufficient to prevent a Russian fait accompli in the Baltics.

The core of the presence until Russia's attack on Ukraine consisted of the deployment of four multinational battle groups in the size of a reinforced battalion (1,200 to 1,500 servicemen and women) as part of NATO's "enhanced Forward Presence" (eFP). At the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, member states agreed to deploy eFP forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland on a six-month rotation to help improve allied deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia. The battle groups are intended to signal to Moscow that even in the event of a limited military incursion into the territory of one of the four allies, Russia

would immediately be at war with NATO as a whole, including the three nuclear powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Thus, since 2017, eFP forces have been the core of NATO's deterrence strategy in a regional framework. Germany has led the Battle group in Lithuania since 2017, the UK in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, and the U.S. in Poland.

In order to reflect the upended security order in Europe and the consequent need to bolster its defense – and not only deterrence – posture, NATO allies agreed at their annual summit in Madrid this summer to return to the Alliance's roots. Clearly emphasizing the necessity for an increased focus on collective defense,

³ Sabine Fischer, "Moskaus Verhandlungsoffensive, SWP, accessed October 4, 2022, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/moskaus-verhandlungsoffensive>.



In order to reflect the upended security order in Europe and the consequent need to bolster its defense – and not only deterrence – posture, NATO allies agreed at their annual summit in Madrid this summer to return to the Alliance's roots.

NATO's New Force Model (NFM) was announced. The NFM is supposed to replace the current NATO Response Force by 2025 and will consist of 300,000 troops as a rapid reaction force at different alert levels. Germany has committed itself to contribute 30,000 troops in addition to 85 ships and aircraft to further ramp up NATO's collective defense task.⁴ Furthermore, and already prior to the summit in Madrid, German chancellor Olaf Scholz held out the prospect of ramping up German commitment in Lithuania by ways of providing a combat brigade for the defense of the Baltic country. Very recently, the first elements of that force have arrived in Lithuania.

At the gathering in Madrid in late June this year, member states decided to follow

4 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "New Force Model: Wie Deutschland sich ab 2025 in der NATO engagiert", accessed October 4, 2022, <https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/new-force-model-wie-deutschland-sich-ab-2025-in-nato-engagiert-5465714>.

Germany's example, announcing in the summit communiqué: "Allies have committed to deploy additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units, where and when required."⁵ Seeing that NATO has followed Germany's lead in this regard should inspire Berlin's decision-makers to assume a greater leadership role, not only vis-à-vis Lithuania, but rather in and for European security and defense at large. A stronger and more prominent focus on securing



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northeastern Europe is another step in the right direction, given that Russia's threat and risk potential vis-à-vis Germany's allies along NATO's eastern flank symbolizes the greatest worry for the time being and in the near future.

5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Madrid Summit Declaration", accessed October 4, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.



Clearly committing politically and militarily to the security and – if necessary – defense of the northeastern parts of the Alliance would help to flesh out and underpin Germany's self-asserted leadership role in Europe.

Clearly committing politically and militarily to the security and – if necessary – defense of the northeastern parts of the Alliance would help to flesh out and underpin Germany's self-asserted leadership role in Europe. Very recently, German defense minister Christine Lambrecht stipulated in a keynote address that "Germany effectively leads even when it does not want to (...) its heft makes it a leading power (...). And that includes the military domain."⁶ Only days later, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz corroborated his minister's proclamation when he declared that "Germany is ready to assume a leadership role in securing our continent."⁷ Talking about leadership does not automatically

6 Federal Ministry of Defense, "Policy Speech by Federal Minister of Defense on the National Security Strategy", accessed October 5, 2022, <https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/policy-speech-on-the-national-security-strategy-5497180>.

7 Die Bundesregierung, "Rede von Bundeskanzler Scholz bei der Bundeswehrtagung am 16. September 2022", accessed October 5, 2022, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/rede-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-bei-der-bundeswehrtagung-am-16-september-2022-2127078>.



While the appraisal that the country needs to become much more active in Euro-Atlantic security and defense is commendable (and well overdue at that), Germany must now take a next step and put flesh on the bones of how exactly it envisions to take on a leadership role.

transform a country into a leader, however. While the appraisal that the country needs to become much more active in Euro-Atlantic security and defense is commendable (and well overdue at that), Germany must now take a next step and put flesh on the bones of how exactly it envisions to take on a leadership role. Concentrating the bulk of its (military)

resources on and investing political capital in the protection of its allies to the Northeast could help close the gap between asserting a leadership role and indeed assuming one. If Germany could manage to bridge the currently existing chasm between words and deeds, a true and hopefully lasting shift in Berlin's security and defense policies could take place. ●



☒ Military presence on NATO's Eastern flank has increased since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (NATO map as of July 2022)

The Russian Gas Bridge into a Climate-neutral Age has Collapsed – Is there a Plan B for Germany?

Kevin Oswald



Since the end of September, 2022, there has been final certainty: the acts of sabotage against the Nord Stream I and II pipelines turn the two pipes between Wyborg in Russia's Leningrad Oblast and the German seaport Lubmin into a billion-dollar investment ruin. Whereas before, the demand to open the Nord Stream II pipeline or to push Kiev into negotiations with Moscow in order to reestablish gas flows to Europe had been voiced only by the political fringes and an inconvincible minority that seems indifferent to the fate of Ukraine, it is now very clear that Germany as the rest of Europe will have to manage largely without energy supplies from Russia for this winter, next winter and probably many winters to come. Although it is not conclusively proven that the Kremlin is behind the attacks, the blowing up of the pipelines stands symbolically for a severing of the last remaining links with the West. The almost simultaneous annexation of 15 percent of Ukraine's territory also makes it clear that Moscow is continuing to escalate, and seems to be settling for an

indefinite period of time with a pariah role in the international community of states.

For the world's fourth-largest economy in particular, this raises a number of pressing questions. First and foremost, there must be the painful admission that Germany has become fatally dependent on fossil fuel imports from Russia and has blindly ignored the justified concerns of its Eastern European partners. Second, after having wasted precious time over the summer with ideologically driven discussions



First and foremost, there must be the painful admission that Germany has become fatally dependent on fossil fuel imports from Russia and has blindly ignored the justified concerns of its Eastern European partners.


Kevin Oswald

currently works as a policy advisor in the field of energy and resources in the department 2030 agenda of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin. From August 2020 to December 2021, he served as deputy head of the foundation's Brazil office based in Rio de Janeiro.

Mr. Oswald completed a transatlantic double degree master's program in International Relations at Syracuse University in New York and the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. He also holds a bachelor's degree in European Studies from the University of Passau. Various internships took him to the German Embassies in La Paz and Washington D.C., among others, before he gained further professional experience as a visiting associate at the energy policy think tank Agora Energiewende and as an assistant to the planning group of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag.

Output losses

A Russian gas supply shut-off has varying impacts across Europe.
(percent of GDP)




Source: IMF staff estimates as of July 2022

about a potential stretch-out-operation of the remaining three nuclear power plants

and a not very successful travel diplomacy by leading politicians in order to find new

gas suppliers, the German government is now confronted with manifold challenges that



☒ The pipeline infrastructure in Europe

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 The German government is now confronted with manifold challenges that could even threaten the German economic model as such and thus cause a lasting decline in economic power and political influence.

could even threaten the German economic model as such and thus cause a lasting decline in economic power and political influence.

Before the war, Russia was Germany's most important import partner for natural gas, crude oil and hard coal. More than half of all German natural gas imports in 2021 came from Russia and Germany thus obtained around one third of all Russian EU gas imports. In order to fill the electricity gap

caused by the combination of the nuclear phase-out announced after the 2011 Fukushima catastrophe and an accelerated coal phase-out to be completed by 2038 at the latest, the German government considered gas as a crucial bridging technology – at least for a transition period of ten to fifteen years – for the transition to a climate-neutral era from 2045 onward. In addition, the high demand for gas to supply heat to private households (44%

of the total domestic demand for natural gas¹) is particularly problematic, as it is much more difficult to switch quickly to other energy sources for heat generation than in the electricity sector (15% of the total domestic demand²). Gas also plays an important role as a feedstock in the German chemical industry, where it is unlikely to be replaced in the short term. The same holds true for the energy-intensive glass, steel and paper industries, for instance, where gas is used in order to generate high temperatures.

When starting to think about different approaches to a solution, it is paramount to distinguish between the short-term and the medium to long-term perspective. Since an increase in the supply of electricity – for example by extending the operating lives of nuclear power plants and bringing coal-fired power plants back from the reserve – is only feasible to a limited extent in the short term and almost impossible in the case of gas, energy saving is the order of the day. In addition, there will be no way around the need for the state to provide comparatively large sums of money to relieve the burden on companies and private households, which are facing massive price increases. The expansion of renewable energies must be

1 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, "Natural gas supply in Germany", accessed October 1, 2022, [BMWK – Natural gas supply in Germany](#).

2 Agora Energiewende, „Die Energiewende in Deutschland: Stand der Dinge 2021“, accessed September 30, 2022, [A-EW_247_Energiewende-Deutschland-Stand-2021_WEB.pdf](#) ([agora-energiewende.de](#)).

accelerated, and planning and approval procedures must be shortened significantly.

The key challenge for the future is that with the phase-out of Russian energy imports, new unilateral dependencies on fossil energy must of course be avoided and diversification has to be a priority. Furthermore, it is crucial to prevent lock-in effects in investments in new gas infrastructure such as the planned very first German LNG terminals, because although natural gas will continue to be in demand as a bridging technology for quite some time, a complete switch to green energy sources will be necessary in the long term in order to achieve the ambitious climate targets on the path towards climate neutrality until 2045. On the other hand, recent examples of difficult negotiations with potential LNG exporters such as Canada or Qatar show that these countries are very much interested in long-term contracts, in view of the investments that have to be made to explore new gas fields, ramp up production or install new liquefaction plants and terminals.

The only way to break out of this dilemma is to adopt a two-pronged strategy that, on the one hand, acknowledges the existing need for large-scale LNG imports and, at the same time, already thinks one step ahead and takes into account the key role of green hydrogen in the energy system of a not-so-distant future. It is of vital importance to take the interests of the new energy partners seriously, because with many of these potential



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suppliers, the current gas problems can be solved and joint future projects regarding the development of a green hydrogen economy can be realized. While it will doubtless be possible to exchange




Beyond that, Germany's and the EU's dependence on fossil energy imports from Russia can only be overcome sustainably and cost-effectively if European solutions are sought and potentials, which are often complimentary, are exploited in the spirit of achieving European, instead of national, energy sovereignty.

views openly with like-minded democracies such as Australia and Canada, the necessary respect should also be shown to difficult partners such as the Gulf states in order to translate long-term concurrent interests into concrete agreements: While Germany could directly benefit from an increase in gas supplies that could be replaced by green hydrogen supplies at some point, rentier states like Qatar, Saudi-Arabia and others with almost optimal conditions for solar and wind power generation are in dire need of a post-oil and -gas perspective and new business models that will help create jobs for a predominantly young population.

Beyond that, Germany's and the EU's dependence on fossil energy

imports from Russia can only be overcome sustainably and cost-effectively if European solutions are sought and potentials, which are often complimentary, are exploited in the spirit of achieving European, instead of national, energy sovereignty. This concept is central, and at the same time it is still relatively unclear which goals are concretely associated with it and at what cost they are to be achieved. Beyond dispute is that the geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects of the energy transition are becoming considerably more relevant for Germany and virtually all EU member states, and we have been made more than aware of our own vulnerability through the use of energy as a weapon – the gigantic leaks in the Nordstream pipelines are emblematic of this. ●

Russia's War and NATO's response



Map showing the location of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines near Bornholm. The two run close to each other most of the way, but deviate near the sites of the leaks (Map FactsWithoutBias1)

The Three Seas Initiative: New Breathing for North–South Connectivity in the Context of Current Geopolitical Shifts in Europe



Gediminas Varvuolis

Lithuania has been part of the Three Seas Initiative since its inception back in 2016. The widely known core objective of this regional framework, which is approaching its 10th anniversary, has been to improve infrastructure among its member states and to close the economic gap between Western and Eastern Europe. After all, the 3SI countries, Lithuania included, were perfectly aware of the huge infrastructure needs in this part of Europe, with the International Monetary Fund estimating € 1.15 trillion in total infrastructure costs for the Three Seas region¹.

However, one should recognize in all honesty that the Three Seas initiative until quite recently hasn't been fully internalized in Lithuania and across the region, already saturated with numerous other frameworks and platforms of cooperation. Neither has it been the first choice when the authorities of Central

Europe gather to tackle the most pressing priorities of regional development. European Councils, the NATO agenda and like-minded formats, such as Nordic Baltic and others, have traditionally been stealing the show, so to say, and this is for understandable reasons.

However, the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Riga, which took place in June 2022, marked a pivotal moment. Russian aggression against Ukraine not only created a new sense of purpose among the countries of the 3SI, but most importantly, it put a firm end to the East–West paradigm, which has been dominating the region for decades, hindering North–South infrastructure development. It is quite clear that before the Russian war against Ukraine and subsequent sanctions by Western countries, East–West connectivity has been prioritized and even fostered by the 3SI members as the most profitable trade axis, while North–South connections have been left relatively overlooked, also within the EU's infrastructure development plans.

With the Russian onslaught on Ukraine and indeed on

Gediminas Varvuolis

is Ambassador at Large for Connectivity and the Three Seas Initiative at the Europe Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania. HeHe served as the Ambassador of Lithuania to Japan (2018–2021; also accredited to New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines as well as ASEAN & Asia Europe Foundation). Before coming to Japan, he served as ambassador of Lithuania to Belgium (2013–2018, also accredited to Luxembourg and Algeria).

His other assignments in Lithuania's diplomatic service included positions of Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO and Director of the Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy Department, Head of Crisis management and NATO divisions, Lithuanian Embassy in France. Mr Varvuolis is awarded with Medal for the civilians „for merits“ of the Ministry of Defense of Lithuania (2011), Order for Merits to Lithuania, the Cross of the Knight (2004) and French National Order of Merits, (Chevalier de l'ordre national du Mérite) (1997).


¹ Anil Ari et al. (2020), Infrastructure in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe: Benchmarking, Macroeconomic Impact, and Policy Issues, International Monetary Fund, p. 15, footnote 7, <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/DP/2020/English/ICESEEBMIPIEA.ashx> [accessed 08-05-2022].



In fact, while being a politically inspired platform, the 3SI actually focuses on economic areas that are highly relevant for the purpose of improved resilience along the entire North–South perimeter of the East fringe of the Western World.

the established world order, leaders of the 3SI countries have suddenly realized that what they created almost 10 years ago, with the establishment of this unique framework, perfectly fits the bad weather situation in which the world found itself after February 24, 2022. In fact, while being a politically inspired platform, the 3SI actually focuses on economic areas that are highly relevant for the purpose of improved resilience along the entire North–South perimeter of the East fringe of the Western World.

Moreover, the 3SI turned out to be extremely relevant in terms of support to Ukraine, a country geographically enshrined in the 3SI region, fighting for its independence and territorial integrity, and which is, moreover, in a way shielding its neighbors of Central Europe and indeed the continent as a whole from paranoid and dangerous Russian colonial convulsions.



 Three Seas Initiative (together with Ukraine; Wikipedia)

President Zelensky addressed the 3SI Riga summit as a special guest, and the declaration that was adopted by the 12 heads of the 3SI states is unambiguous: Ukraine was invited in Riga to begin the process of participating in the 3SI. The Riga declaration also stipulates that the 3SI sees itself as a platform for supporting Ukraine's recovery and is ready to involve Ukraine in the implementation of the 3SI regional infrastructure projects². This very strong expression of regional solidarity with Ukraine has a potential of consolidation and reinvigoration for the 3SI format itself, provided that concrete actions ensue.

Speaking of the future of the 3SI, this format should also be looked at through the lens of the major shifts in energy policy that Europe is currently witnessing. One

² <https://3seas.eu/about/joint-declaration-of-the-seventh-three-seas-initiative-summit?lang=en>

of the three priority pillars of the 3SI connectivity, energy has become a top issue in the context of Russian aggression on Ukraine. European dependence on Russian energy resources and the drive for diversification could also be addressed through close cooperation and regional solutions within the 3SI, fostering neighborly and European solidarity.

To better understand the evolution of Lithuanian positions on the 3SI we have to look to the past, and its record of participation in this initiative³:


While the 3SI comprehensively focuses on fostering transport, energy and digital infrastructure, investments in energy infrastructure and energy diversification were

³ Based on the article by Gediminas Vitkus & Gediminas Varvuolis "Lithuania; the search for synergies" in the publication by the Latvian Institute of International relations (LIIA): "Three Seas Initiative: Mapping national perspectives", Riga, 2022.

generally viewed as higher for Lithuania in the beginning. After all, Lithuania's accession to the 3SI coincided with its drive for energy independence and deliverance from Russian gas supplies, which had long been used as political weapon in trying to coerce Lithuania (dependent on Russian resources until then) to alter its values-based foreign policy. Synchronization between the electricity grid of the Baltic States and Continental Europe's TSO's (European Transmission system operators) was also finding its way to the political agenda around those years, attesting to the pioneering role that Lithuania was playing in the Three Seas region in energy diversification.

However, energy security was not the only priority of Lithuania in terms of infrastructure development. In the area of transport, Lithuania started out by adhering to the logic of East–West transport infrastructure, which remained more developed as part of a Soviet legacy. With the accession to the EU and the appearance of the 3SI, this logic started to be replaced with a greater emphasis on North–South linkages. Evidently, all Lithuanian transport projects singled out in the framework of the 3SI were aiming at reinforcing the North–South vector and at increasing the collective connectivity of the Baltic States with Poland and the wider Central European region.

With energy and transport projects clearly taking center stage in Lithuania's posture within the 3SI, the absence



The objective of economic growth of the Three Seas region and greater interests among the investors has also been positively perceived by Lithuania, as in January 2020 it has formally adhered to the 3SI Investment Fund (3SIIF) by making a 20 million euro contribution via its Public Development Agency (VIPA).

of digital connectivity projects was somewhat salient in the beginning. However, Lithuania's attention has gradually started shifting to digital and cyber security. Led by Lithuania, the EU's Cyber Rapid Reaction Team was founded in 2020 by a handful of like-minded EU member states, most of them part of the 3SI. A regional cyber security center was created in Lithuania's second biggest city of Kaunas, with strong involvement from the US and with the participation of Ukraine and Georgia. Moreover, several events dedicated to cyber security were organized in close cooperation between Lithuania and Poland, in the run-up to the Riga summit.

The objective of economic growth of the Three Seas

region and greater interests among the investors has also been positively perceived by Lithuania, as in January 2020 it has formally adhered to the 3SI Investment Fund (3SIIF) by making a 20 million euro contribution via its Public Development Agency (VIPA). Lithuania has been taking part in all the governing bodies of 3SIIF and encourages its companies and business entities to seek opportunities with this capital fund as an alternative financing instrument to foster growth and connectivity in the Three Seas region.

However, while adhering to the formula that the 3SI is an economically driven and politically inspired framework, Lithuania has always put a stronger emphasis on the geopolitical nature of this unique sub-regional format.

From the outset, one of the recurrent elements in the position of Lithuania vis-à-vis the 3SI has been the prominence given to the role of the European Union in this project. Indeed, Lithuania sees this intra-European connectivity initiative, with all 12 members belonging to the EU, as a great opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation and deepen EU integration. Therefore, it has always been of utmost importance for Lithuanian authorities that the Initiative operates in accordance with EU policies. As long as this criterion is met, Lithuania expects the Initiative to positively contribute to the EU market and increased connectivity among EU



☒ Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda speaks during the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Riga, Latvia, in June, 2022 (Photo Office of the President of Lithuania, Robertas Dačkus)

Analysis

countries. After all, whether desirable or not, the main vehicle to address the connectivity gaps within the 3SI region and to implement large-scale strategic interconnection projects will be EU instruments and the funding avenues they offer, be it through Trans-European Transport and Energy Networks, the Connecting Europe Facility, the Recovery and Resilience Fund, or others.

Another strong political point in the attitude of Lithuania within the 3SI was the emphasis on the transatlantic dimension. It should be noted that fostering strong transatlantic ties has always been at the core of Lithuanian foreign policy across all international formats and is equally prominent in the

context of the 3SI. Lithuania has been in favor of more active US involvement in regional projects and the 3SI activities, be it bilaterally or through a US financial contribution to the 3SI Investment Fund.

In terms of geographical reach, Lithuania has also advocated for the convergence of the 3SI with other like-minded partners across the globe, who have similar approaches to values-based connectivity and aim to offer quality infrastructure to various regions in the world. Therefore, a closer association between the 3SI framework and the United Kingdom, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Canada and others has always been strongly supported by Lithuanian authorities. The

investment potential embedded in some of the leading financial institutions of those major world economies would certainly be able to significantly contribute to increasing the overall capital value of the 3SI Investment fund. Moreover, involvement of those countries in the 3SI could contribute to the consolidation of the emerging, worldwide Trusted Connectivity Alliance, through the deployment of initiatives such as the EU's Global Gateway and G7's new global infrastructure plan.

As already stated in the beginning, Ukraine receives a very special treatment in the framework of the 3SI for obvious reasons, and the integration of this pivotal country in Europe has become one of the 3SI priorities after the Riga summit.



Ukraine receives a very special treatment in the framework of the 3SI for obvious reasons, and the integration of this pivotal country in Europe has become one of the 3SI priorities after the Riga summit.

Broadly speaking, a very clear priority for Lithuania has always been its closest vicinity, and in particular the three associated partners of the EU from the Eastern Partnership Countries (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). From Lithuania's perspective, the assistance that the 3SI could offer to those three countries as well as other aspirants from the Balkans, by extending the connectivity projects, could help to better anchor those states physically with the EU and would allow for better mobility and connectivity of the North-South axis of Central and Eastern Europe. In this regard, Lithuania has been showing initiative by undertaking practical steps, such as the creation of the above-mentioned regional cyber security center with the participation of Ukraine and Georgia.

Cooperation within the framework of the 3SI opens new opportunities and perspectives for Lithuania,

not only to further strengthen energy security, but also to profitably participate in the regional energy market. On the other hand, with significant progress in the realm of energy security already achieved, the other 3SI objectives – transport connectivity, economic growth, and digital and cyber security – are also naturally receiving more attention.

Lithuania, along other countries in the region, is also gradually realizing that in the current geopolitical context this initiative has the potential to positively affect its national security. For Lithuania, the 3SI should follow national security aims and strengthen the defense capabilities of the region through the reinforcement of physical and digital infrastructure interconnected between the 12 countries of this format and with the western part of Europe. The 3SI projects may become increasingly relevant from the perspective of the regional security architecture, since they include infrastructure projects that can contribute to the strengthening of the military logistical capabilities of the NATO forces deployed to some of the 3SI countries and the improvement of overall infrastructure resilience.

Innovation, further involvement of women in science, technology engineering and mathematics, and an emphasis on enabling and making better use of certain parts of society such as youth; all those are topics that could also be successfully promoted in the



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framework of the 3SI in the future, with the consistent support of Lithuania.

All in all, geopolitics seems to be the main stimulus that drives Lithuania's posture vis-à-vis the 3SI. Russian aggression and the war in Ukraine are changing the entire regional paradigm. The 3SI and the North-South axis is becoming a backbone of sub-regional dynamics. Furthermore, the Three Seas Initiative reveals itself as geopolitically very relevant in the context of Lithuania's withdrawal from the ever-diminishing 16+1 – later 14+1 – format of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries, and the resolute determination of Lithuanian authorities to pursue a foreign policy based on values and democratic standards. ●

The Present and Future of Lithuanian-Latvian Cooperation

Neris Germanas, Gints Jegermanis

The report “Strategic Commitment and Choices for Latvia and Lithuania in the Age of Disruption and Great Power Rivalry” was published in August 2022. It aims to discuss the key areas of cooperation between Latvia and Lithuania.

The authors of the report are Neris Germanas and Gints Jegermanis. The summary was made by Jurgis Vedrickas, Project Manager at the Eastern Europe Studies Center.

This report was prepared while Russia launched and continued its war against Ukraine. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shaken numerous previous assessments and will continue to affect international affairs for decades. We are witnessing the first signs and arrival of a different world order. Multiple factors will shape it; however, great power competition will dominate the agenda.



Neris Germanas

Ambassador Neris Germanas left Lithuanian diplomatic service in December 2020. From 2012 to the end of 2020, he was Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. He started his diplomatic career in 1998 when he became Lithuania's ambassador to Finland. However, he has been actively involved in Lithuanian foreign policy since 1992, when he was elected to the Seimas (Parliament of Lithuania); Neris Germanas was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Presidium of the Baltic Assembly. He held multiple other diplomatic positions, including Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe. He is decorated by France, Poland, Denmark, Finland, and Lithuania. Neris Germanas has also received the highest award of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, “For Merit in the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Lithuania.”



Gints Jegermanis

Ambassador Gints Jegermanis left Latvian diplomatic service in December 2021. During 27 years of service, he was posted as Counselor to the Latvian Embassy to Russia (1995-98), Ambassador to Estonia (1998-2001), Permanent Representative to the UN in New York (2001-05), Ambassador to Denmark (2009-13) and Sweden (2013-17). He served as the Head of the Policy Planning Unit at the Foreign Ministry (1994-95 and 2005-09) and was part of the team which worked out first Latvia's foreign policy concept in 1995. In July 2022, he joined the Latvian Institute of International Affairs as an associate researcher. His primary research focuses on the Nordic-Baltic neighbourhood, geopolitics, and technological transformation. Gints Jegermanis is decorated by Estonia, Latvia, Denmark and Sweden.

Existing cooperation and options for Latvia and Lithuania



Politics and Foreign Policy

As the existing global order is going to be gradually reorganised over the next decade, our countries' primary task is to make sure and work hard to safeguard and further develop liberal democracy, democratic institutions, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and credible information space in the West. We must keep our house in order and make it fit to withstand numerous internal challenges and external threats.

From our history, we know the importance of political signals and commitment. Dialogue and cooperation programs with the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkan countries will remain a principal part of foreign policy objectives.

Recommendations

To better assess and counter China's growing influence and threats, our countries should continue to develop and deepen dialogue and cooperation with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand.

To reach the next level in the NB8 cooperation, the Baltic countries should seriously discuss the creation of a permanent structure like the Nordic Council of Ministers Secretariat.

The Baltic countries must continue promoting and supporting jointly nominated candidates to international bodies.

The painful experience of explaining the Baltic history and the consequences of the Soviet occupation to allies and partners in the West requires measures to educate our young diplomats, civil service, and decision-makers in our countries.



Security and Defense

Irrespective of the outcome of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, our countries' primary task is to adopt all possible measures to defend the NATO eastern flank against Russia's threats, clandestine actions, and military operations. It's safe to assume Russia will remain a hostile and unpredictable power for many decades to come.

It took too many years and casualties before the Western partners realised what NATO has been confronted with. Western leaders ignored various signals and facts and continued to build cooperative relations with Russia. Therefore, we think the Baltic countries must continue dialogue with and guide the political leadership and decision-makers of NATO countries.

Recommendations

The rapid development of military technologies and weapons, the constantly changing security environment in our region, the size of the Baltic economies and a few other factors require intensified cooperation among the Baltic countries with a focus on joint procurement.

Finland and Sweden will soon become members of NATO. This will affect many things in the region. The new situation will have to be carefully analysed and discussed among the Nordic and Baltic allies to develop the most effective regional defense system at NATO's Northeast flank.

Nordic-Baltic countries could eventually become a zone of NATO where the concept of total defense is carried through.

Think-tank communities in the Nordic and Baltic countries must rediscover old contacts and set up a new forum to discuss and compare the security context in the Baltic Sea and High North to see the whole picture.

III

Economy and Trade

Many global factors will affect the prospects of the Latvian and Lithuanian markets. The US-China rivalry, growing inflation, high energy and food prices, the Russian war against Ukraine, Western sanctions against Russia, disruption of trade systems and supply routes, and increasing competition for available natural resources and critical minerals are on top of the list. To withstand these and other difficulties over the next decade, Lithuania and Latvia need to strengthen existing contacts and expand cooperation in strategically important domains both bilaterally, regionally, in the EU, NATO, and with our democratic partners globally.

Recommendations

Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland should consider setting up an intergovernmental body to work out long-term regional solutions for developing additional energy infrastructure to guarantee an environmentally safe and economically sound combination of energy production and consumption on a regional level.

To increase growth and promote talent in the Baltic countries, our governments, universities and business communities should reach a new cooperation model by establishing a joint business incubator.

Continuing the Rail Baltica construction and adjusting Via Baltica infrastructure, the Baltic governments must deepen dialogue with Finland and Poland to increase the strategic importance of the project.

The Baltic countries are frequently seen as one entity. This aspect should be more often exploited. Relevant institutions should coordinate their efforts to promote our countries abroad more calculatedly.

IV

Culture, Science, Education

Over the past ten years, Latvian and Lithuanian cooperation in many areas of culture has significantly deepened. We are glad to recognise that this cooperation has been taking place on all levels – between ministries, municipalities, institutions, NGOs, private sector – in joint projects both bilaterally and regionally. Even though Lithuanian statehood has a much longer history, celebrating the centenary of the Baltic countries was marked by a number of spectacular projects.

However, having recognised the lack of knowledge about one another in Latvia and Lithuania, our governments must take several practical steps during the next decade. Even though the positive experience and achievements of previous decades give great satisfaction, without permanent funding and cultivation of these relations, the way forward might not be so smooth.

Recommendations

The Science Councils of the Baltic countries should launch a long-term program for joint history research projects.

The Baltic Assembly has started a debate on establishing the Baltic Science Fund to assist in developing regional projects. This initiative must be supported and further advanced by the governments of the Baltic countries.

The Baltic Film Foundation should be established to advance further and adequately finance the Baltic film co-production. The longstanding success of the Nordisk Film and TV Fond could serve as inspiration.

Over the past ten years, the volume of books on the political history of our countries has significantly grown. Very few people abroad can read in Latvian or Lithuanian. Therefore, our governments should be seriously considering establishing a permanent funding scheme for the translation and publication of books and research materials in English.



☒ The Baltic states are staunch supporters of Ukraine. In the picture, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, met with the President of the Republic of Poland, Andrzej Duda, the President of the Republic of Latvia, Egils Levits, the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda and the President of the Republic of Estonia Alar Karis who were on a visit to Ukraine in April 2022 (Photo The Office of the President of Ukraine)

Sum Up

Latvia and Lithuania are close neighbours with Baltic roots, strong allies and partners in foreign policy, defense, economic, cultural, and other vital domains. This is even more important in today's dynamic and complex geopolitical situation.

The next decade will present many challenges – Russia's hostility, energy crisis, climate change, digital transformation, changing job markets, high inflation and many more. These and numerous other issues will require substantial funding and shrewd decision-making.

Latvia and Lithuania have usually found common ground on the most critical issues. However, this success cannot be taken for granted. All relationships require permanent attention, goodwill, and political tenacity. Our countries, therefore, need to continuously invest both politically and financially to maintain and further develop ties between the people of Latvia and Lithuania. ●

Amid Growing International Uncertainty, US and Taiwan Strengthen Security Ties



Marshall Reid

On the evening of August 2 of this year, US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi¹ touched down at Taipei's Songshan Airport. The visit, part of a longer Indo-Pacific swing, represented the highest-level US diplomatic visit to Taiwan since then-Speaker Newt Gingrich led a congressional delegation in 1997. While undoubtedly significant in its own right, the Pelosi visit was far from an isolated incident. Instead, it was the culmination of a multi-year expansion of the US-Taiwan relationship, which has evolved from a limited, exclusively informal arrangement to a far more expansive, comprehensive partnership. In the face of mounting aggression from the People's Republic of China, the United States and Taiwan have substantially upgraded their ties, particularly from a defense and security standpoint. In a time of mounting uncertainty and unprecedented threats, such cooperation is more vital than ever.

1 Amy Chang Chien et al., "As Pelosi departs Taiwan, China gears up for military drills," The New York Times, published August 2, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/02/world/pelosi-taiwan>

Evolving US-Taiwan Security Cooperation


In response to the Pelosi visit, the PRC initiated a series of naval and air drills in the vicinity of Taiwan, touching off what many have described² as the "fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis." Beginning on August 4, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) engaged in what has been widely interpreted as a show of force, launching 11 missiles into the waters surrounding Taiwan, sending numerous planes into Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and deploying a carrier group and several submarines to the Taiwan Strait. Notably, the missile launches and accompanying naval operations appeared designed to simulate a potential blockade of Taiwan's main island, a scenario feared³ by many stakeholders. While the PLA has long pushed Taiwan's boundaries in the

2 Christopher P. Twomey, "The fourth Taiwan strait crisis is just starting," War on the Rocks, published August 22, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis-is-just-starting/>

3 Gabriel Dominguez, "China begins massive drills around Taiwan amid fears of blockade," The Japan Times, published August 4, 2022, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/08/04/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-drills-blockade/>

Marshall Reid

is a program manager at the Global Taiwan Institute, a Taiwan-focused think tank in Washington, DC. Previously, he worked as a program assistant with the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He has also worked as an office assistant at Marymount University in Arlington, Virginia. Prior to moving to Washington, DC, he served as an English instructor in Taipei, Taiwan, where he lived for just under a year. Marshall received his M.A. in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and his B.A. in History and International Relations from Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is proficient in Mandarin.



Notified US arms sales to Taiwan, 1990–2022 (Source: Taiwan Defense)

Taiwan Strait – as shown by its well-publicized predilection for ADIZ incursions⁴ – these drills represented a remarkable escalation. For military planners in Taipei and Washington, the message was clear: the time for complacency has passed. Now more than ever, US-Taiwan defense cooperation is crucial to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.

Despite their lack of official diplomatic relations, the United States and Taiwan have a long history of security ties. This relationship has primarily consisted of US arms sales to Taiwan, which have been a

4 Thomas J. Shattuck, "Assessing One Year of PLA Air incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ," Foreign Policy Research Institute, published October 20, 2021, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/10/assessing-one-year-of-pla-air-incursions-into-taiwans-adiz/>

standard feature of US policy towards the island democracy since the Carter Administration. In fact, US arms sales to Taiwan form a key part of the 1979 Taiwan Relation Act⁵ (TRA), which continues to govern US Taiwan policy. Specifically, the TRA mandates that the "United States shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character," while leaving the exact definition of "defensive" up to interpretation. This ambiguity has given successive US administrations wide discretion⁶

5 Congress.gov, "H.R.2479 – Taiwan Relations Act" October 10, 1979. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479>

6 Jacques deLisle, "The Taiwan Relations Act at 40: Political Entrenchment of Foreign Policy through Law," Foreign Policy Research Institute, published April 8, 2019, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/the-taiwan-relations-act-at-40-political-entrenchment-of-foreign-policy-through-law/>

In the face of mounting aggression from the People's Republic of China, the United States and Taiwan have substantially upgraded their ties, particularly from a defense and security standpoint. In a time of mounting uncertainty and unprecedented threats, such cooperation is more vital than ever.

in determining what sorts of weapons systems they provide to Taiwan.

As Scott Harold⁷ points out, US arms sales to Taiwan have long enjoyed remarkably durable bipartisan support. Since 1990, the US has approved over USD \$67 billion⁸ in arms sales to Taiwan, with an average of over USD \$2 billion per year. Critically, these numbers have largely been unaffected by the political ideology of the current administration, as numbers have remained relatively consistent⁹ between Democratic and Republican administrations. Even as the United States has grown increasingly polarized domestically, congressional and executive support for Taiwan has only grown stronger.

While US arms sales to Taiwan are relatively uncontroversial in US policy circles, the content of arms packages has become a matter of some debate. This dissension is primarily a product of a longtime disconnect between Washington and Taipei over what sorts of armaments would provide Taiwan with the most effective defense against a potential Chinese invasion. As numerous commentators¹⁰ have noted, Taiwanese leaders – particularly those within Taiwan’s Armed Forces and

7 Scott W. Harold, “Making Sense of US Arms sales to Taiwan,” Institut Montaigne, published July 23, 2019, <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/making-sense-us-arms-sales-taiwan>

8 US Taiwan Business Council, “Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress 1990-2022,” Taiwan Defense, published September 2, 2022, <https://www.usaiwandefense.com/taiwan-arms-sales-notified-to-congress-1990-2022/>

9 Ibid.

10 Michael A. Hunzeker, “Taiwan’s defense plans are going of the rails,” War on the Rocks, published November 18, 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/taiwans-defense-plans-are-going-off-the-rails/>

While US arms sales to Taiwan are relatively uncontroversial in US policy circles, the content of arms packages has become a matter of some debate.

Ministry of National Defense (MND) – have historically lobbied for the purchase of larger, more visible weapons platforms, such as F-16 fighter aircraft¹¹ and M1A1 Abrams¹² main battle tanks. While such platforms are certainly valuable as symbols of Taiwanese military power and prestige, their value as military assets has long been questioned by defense experts¹³ due to Taiwan’s cramped geography and the PLA’s growing quantitative and qualitative advantages over the ROC military.

In light of these concerns, US experts have increasingly pushed Taiwan to adopt a more realistic and cost-effective asymmetric approach to national defense. Rather than investing in large, easily targetable platforms,

11 “US seeks to speed up delivery of new F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan,” Aljazeera, published January 21, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/21/us-seeks-way-to-speed-delivery-of-new-fighter-jets-to-taiwan>

12 Inder Singh Bisht, “Taiwan to Receive First Two Abrams Tanks in June,” The Defense Post, published March 17, 2022, <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/03/17/taiwan-to-receive-abrams-tanks/>

13 Hunzeker, “Taiwan’s defense plans.”

scholars such as Michael Hunzeker¹⁴ argue that Taipei should instead purchase large quantities of smaller, more easily concealed weapons systems, including “coastal defense cruise missiles, short-range mobile air defenses, naval mines, and drones.” While less flashy and prestigious than the aforementioned tanks and fighters, such armaments could make an invasion of Taiwan¹⁵ perilously difficult for the PLA.

Notably, some elements of Taiwan’s defense establishment have acknowledged these concerns in recent years. This shift was perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the Overall Defense Concept (ODC)¹⁶, proposed by then-Chief of the General Staff of the ROC Armed Forces Adm. Lee Hsi-Ming (李喜明) in 2017. At its core, the ODC reflected many of the aforementioned concerns and placed heavy emphasis on asymmetric deterrence and maximizing Taiwan’s unique geography. Upon its announcement, the strategy was welcomed by US defense analysts¹⁷, who applauded its realistic and organized approach to national defense. However, this optimism has been tempered in the years

14 Ibid.

15 “What is Taiwan’s porcupine defense strategy?,” The Economist, published May 10, 2022, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/05/10/what-is-taiwans-porcupine-defence-strategy>

16 Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained,” The Diplomat, published November 3, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/>

17 Drew Thompson, “Hope on the horizon: Taiwan’s radical new defense concept,” War on the Rocks, published October 2, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/>

since, as Taiwan's leadership – once again, primarily the MND – has gradually pulled back from the ODC¹⁸.

Changing Geopolitics, Changing Expectations

As previously mentioned, the US-Taiwan security relationship has historically been relatively stable and consistent. Even as administrations have come and gone, the economy has waxed and waned, and norms have shifted, the partnership has remained largely unchanged. However, two events in 2022 have fundamentally altered this dynamic, potentially permanently: the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the PRC military drills in the wake of the Pelosi visit.

Almost immediately after Russian troops first crossed into Ukrainian territory on February 24, commentators around the world were quick to draw comparisons¹⁹ between the conflict and a potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait. While such equivalences were largely reactionary and incomplete²⁰ – Ukraine and Taiwan differ in a variety of respects, as do Russia and China – the war in Ukraine has nevertheless provided powerful lessons for US and



☒ US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was the most senior US politician to visit Taiwan in 25 years (photo Flickr)

Taiwanese military planners. In contrast to early projections of Russian battlefield dominance, Ukrainian forces have more than held their own. After repulsing Russia's initial push towards Kyiv, Ukraine has steadily pushed the invaders back²¹, culminating in a stunning counteroffensive²² in September that has reversed much of Moscow's territorial gains. The manner in which they have accomplished this has been of great interest to the US and Taiwan.

Rather than relying purely on high-value, high-profile weapons platforms, Ukraine's forces have deployed a wide array of smaller, cheaper, and mobile systems, such as man-

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portable air-defense²³ systems (MANPADS) and drones²⁴.

18 Hunzeker, "Taiwan's defense plans."

19 Marc Santora and Steven Erlanger, "Taiwan and Ukraine: Two crises, 5,000 miles apart, are linked in complex ways." The New York Times, August 3, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/03/world/europe/china-russia-taiwan-ukraine-analysis.html>

20 John Wagner Givens, "Taiwan is Not Ukraine; it is its Opposite," Global Policy Journal, April 13, 2022, <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/13/04/2022/taiwan-not-ukraine-it-its-opposite>

21 Cristian Segura, "Ukraine turning the tide of Russia war as defense turns to attack," El País, published October 13, 2022, <https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-10-13/ukraine-turning-the-tide-of-russia-war-as-defense-turns-to-attack.html>

22 "Ukrainian army continues successful counter-offensive on southern front, says UK intelligence," Yahoo!, published October 13, 2022, <https://www.yahoo.com/how/ukrainian-army-continues-successful-counter-110900906.html>

23 Alexandria Chastenot de Gary, "The West Needs to Keep Supporting Ukraine with MANPADS," The German Marshall Fund of the United States, published April 20, 2022, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/west-needs-keep-supporting-ukraine-manpads>

24 Vikram Mittal, "The Ukrainian Military Is Changing Its Tactics With Bayraktar TB2 Drones," Forbes, published June 23, 2022, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2022/06/23/ukrainian-military-is-changing-its-tactics-with-the-bayraktar-tb2-drones/?sh=349cc9a41ec0>



Already, US officials have begun urging their Taiwanese counterparts to follow Ukraine's lead in reforming their own military.

Through strategic use of these armaments, Kyiv has been able to wear down a quantitatively – and ostensibly, qualitatively – superior Russian force, inflicting devastating casualties and forcing Moscow to resort to a politically risky partial mobilization²⁵. In doing so, Ukraine has helped to validate proponents of asymmetric responses to traditional military invasions.

Additionally, the conflict in Ukraine has provided a highly visible display of the value of Western-sourced military equipment. While Ukraine's armed forces were far from helpless²⁶ in the lead-up to the invasion, their efforts have been exponentially strengthened by a steady flow of weapons, ammunition, and advisors, much of which has come from the United States²⁷. In contrast to Russia's equipment, which has

25 Mark F. Cancian, "What Does Russia's 'Partial Mobilization' Mean?," CSIS, published September 26, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-partial-mobilization-mean>

26 Amy Mackinnon, Jack Detsch, "Ukraine's Military Has Come a Long Way Since 2014," Foreign Policy, published December 23, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/23/ukraine-russia-military-buildup-capabilities/>

27 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine," U.S. Department of State, published October 14, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/>

been exposed as woefully out-of-date and poorly maintained, these foreign systems have performed exceptionally.

For the United States and Taiwan, these lessons have not gone unnoticed. Already, US officials have begun urging their Taiwanese counterparts²⁸ to follow Ukraine's lead in reforming their own military. Specifically, experts have sought to draw attention to the success of smaller, asymmetric weapons systems, including the FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missile and the FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile. In addition to these suggestions, the US has also taken more concrete steps to reform Taiwan's approach to national defense. In May, the US military sent a letter to Taiwan²⁹ in which it rejected Taipei's request for anti-submarine helicopters and instead recommended the purchase of a smaller mobile artillery system. Increasingly, it seems that Washington is taking a more forceful, proactive tone as it works to push Taipei towards asymmetry.

In the wake of China's aggressive response to the Pelosi visit, these lessons have only gained increased salience. While the exercises were just that, they nevertheless demonstrated the PLA's vastly improved capabilities in the

28 Lara Seligman, "Deadly serious: U.S. quietly urging Taiwan to follow Ukraine playbook for countering China," Politico, published May 19, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/19/deadly-serious-u-s-quietly-urging-taiwan-to-follow-ukraine-playbook-for-countering-china-00033792>

29 Sara Seligman, Alexander Ward, Nahal Toosi, "In letters, U.S. tries to reshape Taiwan's weapons requests," Politico, May 10, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/10/u-s-taiwan-weapons-request-00031507>

air and sea domains. Through coordinated missile launches, naval maneuvers, and air incursions, the PRC displayed its power for all to see. As discussed during a recent Global Taiwan Institute event³⁰, the drills have fundamentally altered the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Through its repeated incursions across the long-observed median line in the strait, the PLA has effectively rewritten the rules in the cross-Strait relationship and pushed the standoff perilously close to the edge. For military planners in Washington and Taipei, this has not gone unnoticed.

In the United States, the drills have added additional urgency to the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022³¹, a bipartisan bill first introduced in June. Described³² as "the most comprehensive revamp of US-Taiwan policy in more than four decades," the Act notably calls for the United States³³ to provide "billions of dollars in military financing for Taiwan, fast-track weapons sales, and increase military coordination." Significantly, the

30 "September 9: Lessons Learned from the Aftermath of the PLA's August 2022 Military Exercises," Global Taiwan Institute, published August 31, 2022, <https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/08/september-9-lessons-learned-from-the-aftermath-of-the-plas-august-2022-military-exercises/>

31 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "Taiwan Policy Act of 2022." [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SBS%20Taiwan%20Policy%20Act%20FINAL%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SBS%20Taiwan%20Policy%20Act%20FINAL%20(1).pdf)

32 Andrew Desiderio, "U.S.-Taiwan bill sails through Senate panel despite White House misgivings," Politico, published September 14, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/14/taiwan-bill-clears-senate-panel-00056769>

33 Katharine Jackson, "Factbox: Support for Taiwan included in massive U.S. defense bill," Reuters, published October 12, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/support-taiwan-included-massive-us-defense-bill-2022-10-11/>



While the expansion of the US-Taiwan security relationship primarily concerns Washington and Taipei, it could be augmented by the actions of like-minded partners, particularly in Europe.

bill includes USD \$6.5 billion in grant assistance intended to strengthen Taiwan's defenses. However, these grants would be contingent on Taiwan bolstering its own military spending. As commentators have noted³⁴, such conditions could allow the United States to exert additional pressure on Taipei and perhaps encourage greater investment in asymmetric systems. While the Act remains somewhat controversial – the Biden Administration has reportedly balked³⁵ at its more hawkish statements – much of its body was included in the proposed 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Though it remains to be seen just how much the Taiwan Policy Act will impact US military policy towards Taiwan, its mere existence

34 Ibid.

35 Andrew Desiderio, "White House resists Congress' bipartisan bid to overhaul U.S.-Taiwan relations," Politico, August 7, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/07/white-house-resists-congress-overhaul-u-s-taiwan-relations-00050163>

suggests an evolution in US thinking regarding Taiwan's defense.

Support from Like-Minded Partners

While the expansion of the US-Taiwan security relationship primarily concerns Washington and Taipei, it could be augmented by the actions of like-minded partners, particularly in Europe. In recent years, Europe has emerged as a hotbed of support for Taiwan. As skepticism of Chinese influence has grown, so too has interest in engaging with Taiwan. This is especially true in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where states such as the Czech Republic³⁶, Slovenia³⁷, and – most visibly – Lithuania³⁸ have proven increasingly willing to push back against PRC narratives and expand their ties with Taiwan. Given the US' long-held desire for increased transatlantic coordination³⁹ on China and Taiwan, these developments have been

36 Marc Santora, "The Broken Promise of a Panda: How Prague's Relations With Beijing Soured," The New York Times, published November 23, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/23/world/europe/china-prague-taiwan.html>

37 Start Lau, "Slovenia to bolster trade ties with Taiwan, wading into row with China," Politico, published January 18, 2022, <https://www.politico.eu/article/jansa-slovenia-to-follow-lithuania-for-new-office-in-taiwan/>

38 Erin Hale, "Lithuania Deepens Relations With Taiwan Amid China Tensions," VOA, published September 13, 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/lithuania-deepens-relations-with-taiwan-amid-china-tensions-/6745292.html>

39 Peter Stano, Nabila Masralli, "EU-U.S.: Joint Press Release by the EEAS and Department of State on the Second High-Level Meeting of the EU-U.S. Dialogue on China," EEAS, published December 2, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-us-joint-press-release-eeas-and-department-state-second-high-level-meeting-eu-us-dialogue_en

welcome news⁴⁰ in Washington. Already, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has expressed his support⁴¹ for Lithuania, while also condemning China's efforts to bully Vilnius. For policymakers in the United States, such support for Taiwan strengthens Washington's hand in confronting the PRC and confirms the necessity of maintaining the US-Taiwan relationship.

For all countries with an interest in safeguarding democracy and combating autocracy, the growth of US-Taiwan military relations should be heartening. As Russia's invasion of Ukraine has made perilously clear, the rules-based international order is increasingly fragile. Long-held conceptions of international norms and understandings appear to be fraying at the edges, while malign authoritarian influence continues to eat away at institutions. In the face of these challenges, it is critical for the US to continue its efforts to strengthen Taiwan's defense. While doing so may necessitate uncomfortable conversations about asymmetric defense and military acquisitions, the time for complacency is over. ●

40 Min-Hua Chiang, "As China Sabotages Its Own Economic Interests in Europe, U.S. Should Take Advantage of the Opportunity," The Heritage Foundation, published June 17, 2022, <https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-sabotages-its-own-economic-interests-europe-us-should-take-advantage-the>

41 "China lashes out at U.S. for supporting Lithuania in feud with Beijing over Taiwan," NPR, published January 6, 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/06/1070856065/china-lashes-out-at-us-for-supporting-lithuania-in-feud-with-beijing-over-taiwan>

Lithuania's Confrontation with China Over Taiwan: Lessons from a Small Country

Analysis

The ongoing Sino-Lithuanian diplomatic standoff has already demonstrated how China might use its economic leverage to coerce countries into submission. It shows that a joint response by the European Union is the best way to counter China's bullying. In Lithuania, Taiwan is seen as an increasingly important partner that could help to offset the politically motivated costs. Still, both sides must work to ensure the sustainability of the relationship.

Thus Lithuania has provided one precious lesson: sooner or later, uncomfortable decisions regarding economic dependence on China will have to be made. Lithuania's decision to stand against China and its growing regional ambitions was possible due to its insignificant bilateral trade volumes. According to 2020 trade statistics, Lithuania had weaker economic links to China than almost every country in the region. [...]

Given the increasing number of cases in which China has employed its economic leverage as a weapon, reducing dependence on China should

be one of the most important long-term goals for the EU. Economic diversification would ensure that China will lose significant leverage against the EU. The war in Ukraine is already showing how reliance on an authoritarian regime can result in dire economic consequences for the whole bloc.

Practically speaking, it would be better to cut off the most sensitive links with China now so as not to suffer painful consequences later. And most importantly, the potential fight against China will require the entire EU's concentrated efforts and the support of all democratic partners. China is a large country, but it is primarily alone. The consolidation and unity of many countries, even small ones, is the most effective way to withstand bullying by authoritarian regimes like the PRC. ●

An excerpt from analysis by Lithuanian analysts Tomas Janeliūnas and Raigirdas Boruta for the Global Taiwan Brief (published by Global Taiwan Institute on July 27, 2022).



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