
Adventure into Peacetime Intra-Alliance Espionage: Assessment of the America-Germany Saga

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Abstract

Peacetime espionage is often employed by states as a means of acquiring information about competitor states in the international system. However the practice is not limited to competitor states. In a world where security concerns are an ever-present consideration for state action, acts of espionage normally reserved for use against enemies are also used against ally states. The basic premise is that while alliances are able to foster mutual trust and cooperation, they do not conclude that an ally will always be trust-worthy and faithful, most especially, when it involves issues of national interest. The international system and a need to safeguard one's own interests and population mean that espionage, even against an ally, will remain a necessary state function and all states should therefore remain vigilant against attempts at infiltration of their state secrets. The question of peacetime intra-alliance espionage and the consequences thereof has yet to be answered and it is the purpose of this research to fill that intellectual gap. This research will look at traditionally allied countries, with a long record of cooperation, and not competing states. To achieve this, the case from 2013 of two North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, Germany and the United States (US), are our main focus. Lessons worth drawing from this, by NATO small states members, shall be discussed.

Keywords: Peacetime espionage, Intra-alliance espionage, Edward Snowden, Germany, United States (US), NATO.

Introduction

In June 2013, former American National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, Edward Snowden, leaked to various media outlets information detailing large-scale Internet surveillance programmes undertaken by the NSA. The purpose of these

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surveillance programmes was to acquire Internet-based communication of foreign nationals, ostensibly to identify and prevent terrorist attacks against the United States of America (USA).

However, of concern to diplomatic relations were revelations that, “The National Security Agency monitored the phone conversations of 35 world leaders after being given their numbers by an official from the US government departments, according to a classified document provided by whistle blower, Edward Snowden”¹.

Furthermore, in October of the same year, it was brought to light that “The US has been spying on German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone since 2002”². It was also divulged that the American Embassy in Berlin had been used as a listening station capable of intercepting German government tele-communications. It was reported that an elite surveillance unit run by the NSA and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), known as the Special Collection Service (SCS), “operates its own sophisticated listening devices with which they can intercept virtually every popular method of communication: cellular signals, wireless networks and satellite communication”³. The SCS in Germany “works undercover in shielded areas of the American Embassy and Consulate offices, where they are officially accredited as diplomats and, as such, enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities to look and listen to people’s conversations unhindered”⁴.

The German political establishment reacted with much anger once details of the spying against them were uncovered. An immediate response by then German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, was to summon the US ambassador to a meeting in order to discuss the spying allegations.⁵ Following the publication of details about her personal mobile phone being the target of NSA surveillance, Chancellor Merkel and her foreign minister observed that America’s “spying on

¹ “NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after government official handed agency rolodexes of numbers, claims latest Snowden leak”, *The Daily Mail*, October 24, 2013, <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2475535/NSA-monitored-calls-35-world-leaders-government-official-handed-agency-rolodexes-numbers-claims-latest-Snowden-leak.html#ixzz38HhgJzs9>>, 23 07 2014.

² McGuinness D., “US bugged Merkel’s phone from 2002 until 2013, report claims”, *BBC News*, October 27, 2013, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24690055>>, 10, 06 2014.

³ “Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin”, *Der Spiegel*, October 27, 2013, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html>>, 10 06 2014.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Irvine C., “Germany summons US over Angela Merkel phone spying row”, *The Telegraph*, October 27, 2013, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/10401565/Germany-summons-US-over-Angela-Merkel-phone-spying-row.html?fb>>, 10 06 2014.

close friends and partners is totally unacceptable. This undermines trust and this can harm our friendship”⁶.

Despite international law spreading its tentacles to some issue areas such as business transactions, health issues, the environment, the maritime arena and even warfare, it has had little impact on intelligence gathering⁷. Peacetime espionage and intra-alliance intelligence in particular lacks any type of regulation within the international system. Diplomacy in respect of *acta de jure imperii* (government public activities) is often directly at odds with espionage and intelligence gathering, which are by their very nature, operations that are undertaken under a cloud of secrecy between states⁸.

While it is an ‘open-secret’ that most, if not all, states undertake espionage activities, whenever a state is formally identified as employing covert means to obtain information about another state, it often raises issues which require a diplomatic reaction from both states in order to proffer a solution. When the target of such espionage is an ally, this adds more confusion because there is no regulation to peacetime espionage on what can be spied on⁹. The intersection between diplomatic communication, modern tele-communications capability, security, counterterrorism and intelligence gathering is becoming more complex for states to navigate in the maintenance of positive diplomatic relations.

There exists a tense relationship between the intelligence gathering objectives of states and the maintenance of diplomatic relations in the international system, particularly between nations that have alliances with one another. Peacetime espionage and spying on of allies within the ambit of international relations is a matter which contemporary stakeholders within the international community have to grapple with in order to harmoniously integrate 21st century technology

⁶ Arcega M, “NSA Spying Could Complicate US-Europe Trade Talks”, *Voice of America*, October 25, 2013, <<http://www.voanews.com/content/nsa-spying-could-complicate-us-europe-trade-talks/1777428.html>>, 10 06 2014; Embassy Espionage, (note 3).

⁷ Sulmasy G and Yoo J., “Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law”, *Michigan Journal of International Law* 28 (Spring), 2007, p. 625-638.

⁸ Boas G., *Public International Law*, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012, p. 270; Detter I., *The Law of War*, Farnham Surrey: Ashgate, 2013, p. 458. Also see Dugard J., *International Law: A South African Perspective*, Cape Town: Juta, 2005, p. 239.

⁹ Kapp M., “Spying for Peace: Explaining the Absence of the Formal Regulation of Peacetime Espionage”, A Paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the M.A. degree in the Committee on International Relations, University of Chicago, 2007, <<http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CBsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fresearch.policyarchive.org%2F8193.pdf&ei=Pqvku4yXLEfy7Abxm4CICw&usq=AFQjCNFN5HWTBto-2hJyaEN8DSrejX8zzg&bvm=bv.72676100,d.ZWU>>, 10 06 2014.

and capabilities, with 20th century norms and practices which continue to inform diplomatic practice.

We intend to look into the place of espionage in international politics based on realist, liberalist and constructivist theoretical frameworks. Employing these theories, hopefully, will shed more light on espionage and international law. We shall also present data in the form of various responses to the exposition of NSA espionage in Germany. Lastly, this paper shall present the findings of the research and provide a list of recommendations that is generic for small NATO member states as well.

1. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework situates the theoretical to locate a theoretical basis for espionage and integrates a theoretical basis for international law, which is a companion aspect to this study. It stands to reason that the performance of espionage or any other activity has to have some legal ramifications irrespective of whether espionage itself is regulated or not by the law. Most of the activities, which are part and parcel of conducting espionage, have legal consequences. Based on this, it is the intention of this section to interrogate realist, liberalist and constructivist theories vis-à-vis the US espionage adventure in a NATO member state.

Realism in international relations is one of the preeminent theoretical perspectives that inform the study. This theory is not a homogenous group with scholars agreeing about everything. In particular two schools of realism are present in the approach, namely “classical realism” and “neo-realism”, with a number of scholars (Raymond Aron, EH Carr, Robert Gilpin, John Hertz, Henry Kissinger, Stephen Krassner, Hans Mongenthou, Susan Strange and Kenneth Waltz) at the forefront of those particular schools. Realist thought contains much variety from Thucydides to Waltz¹⁰.

This approach to international relations is of the opinion that states spy on one another according to their relative power positions in order to achieve self-interested goals¹¹. For this school, one of the defining characteristics of the

¹⁰ Amusan L., “International Relations and the Concepts of Liberal Democracy: A Critique”, *UNIOSUN Journal of Politics and Society* 2 (1-2), 2011, p. 188-208.

¹¹ Armstrong D., Farrell T., and Lambert H., *International Law and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Also see, Baker C. D., “Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach”, *American University International Law Review* 9 (5), 2003, p. 1091-113.

international system is the state of anarchy under which all states ought to ensure their survival and pursue their interests. Such anarchy often forms the basis for the belief that espionage is a necessary state function. Realists do not argue that espionage is morally justified; but rather that states do not need to morally justify it in the first place in a state of 'nature' where power politics is the prime objective of actors¹². Under the anarchic conditions of the international system, states have a self-responsibility to prioritise the survival of their population's territorial integrity and government survival. In a state of nature, nations cannot appeal to any reliable source of support outside themselves¹³. To this end, realists do not consider 'moral' virtue when taking action, or rather; moral virtue is not an explicit consideration when carrying out an action. This explains why "It is naive to expect that a stable international order can be erected on normative principles embodied in international law"¹⁴. A state that eschews espionage to comply with a moral duty puts its interests at risk, and this, given the nature of the international sphere, could be fatal¹⁵. Viewed according to this perspective, the information garnered through acts of espionage justifies the actions, when carried out towards the guaranteeing of state security and advantage.

However, liberalism emerged as a challenge to realism, which came to dominate international relations post-World War II. It has also undergone an evolution similar to that of realism, and can thus be characterised under the broad categories of classical liberalism and neo-liberalism. Some of the proponents of this school are Normal Angel, Michael Doyle, Francis Fukuyama, David Held, Stanley Hoffman, Richard Rosecrance, and Woodrow Wilson among others¹⁶.

Differing with their realist counterparts, liberals do not fundamentally believe that the international system is anarchic. Rather, the international system is currently mutually dependent and interconnected to such a high degree that the world no longer resembles a proverbial wild west where one can do as they please in the name of security. It is the basis of Keohane's and Nye's (1987) interdependence theory, which is of the position that changes or events in any single part of a system will

¹² Bitton R., "The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations", *American University International Law Review* 29 (5), 2014, p. 1009-1070; Mongenthau H. J., *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2012.

¹³ de Mesquita B., *Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions*, Washington DC: CQ Press, 2003, p. 520.

¹⁴ Krasner S. D., "Realist Views of International Law", *American Society of International Law*, 96, 2002, p. 265-268, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25659786>>, 12 11 2014.

¹⁵ Bitton, (note 12) p. 1009-1070.

¹⁶ Amusan, (note 10) p. 190.

(sensitive effect) produce some reaction from, or have some significant consequence for, other actors in a system, whether they like it or not¹⁷. Liberals foresee a slow but inexorable journey away from the anarchic world the realists envision, as trade and finance forge ties between nations, and democratic norms spread¹⁸. The worldview is also one where states have a collective responsibility in ensuring prosperity and safety. Thus it is not only left to affected states to ensure their own, limited, security. Liberalism highlights the cooperative potential of mature democracies, especially when working together through effective institutions¹⁹. In this light, cooperative states operating with transparency could be seen as not fundamentally requiring espionage. However an explicit liberal position either endorsing or condemning espionage is lacking in the available literature. Some of the liberal positions with regard to cooperation and global governance suggest a conflict between espionage and the goals of transparency and cooperation which liberals champion. Many liberals also believe that the rule of law and transparency of democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation, especially when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions as opined by liberal internationalists²⁰. It can be said that liberals place value in the ability of international organisations to provide the required stability within the international system and thus the need for espionage in such a setting would be less pertinent amongst states. However it should be noted that an organisation that deals with matters pertaining to peacetime espionage does not as yet exist.

On the other hand, constructivism is a relatively more recent addition to international relations theory. At the crux of the theory is the belief that foreign policy is and should be guided by socio-ethical standards²¹. Norms form a central

¹⁷ Keohane R. O. and Nye J. S., "International Interdependence and Integration" in Viotti P. R. and Kauppi M. V., eds., *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1987, p. 361-398.

¹⁸ Snyder J., "One World, Rival Theories", *Foreign Policy* November/December, 2004, p. 52-62.

¹⁹ Amusan, (note 10) p. 188-208.

²⁰ Keohane and Nye, (note 17) p. 394-395.

²¹ For more information on constructivism school, see the following scholars position on the theory: Adler E., "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (3), 1997, p. 319-363; Carlsnaes W., "The Agency-Structure Problems in Foreign Policy Analysis" in Carlsnaes W. and Stefano G., eds., *Foreign Policy Analysis Volume IV*, London: Sage Publications, 2011, p. 165-198; Fierke K. M., *Critical Approaches to International Security*, London: Polity, 2015; Fierke K. M., "Constructivism" in Dunne T., Kurki M. and Smith S. eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 166-184; Houghton D. P., "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivists Approach" in Carlsnaes W. and Stefano G, eds. *Foreign Policy Analysis Volume IV*, London: Sage Publications, 2011, p. 133-161; Nau H. R., *Perspectives on International*

part of this theory and according to constructivists; norms have a critical role in the affairs of states in the international system. Constructivists believe that debates about ideas are the fundamental building blocks of international life (Houghton, 2011)²². In this regard, constructivists distinguish themselves from their realist and liberal counterparts, who tend to be more concerned with pursuing power and global democracy respectively. Constructivists contend that their theory is deeper / more critical as opposed to the problem-solving realist and liberalist position because it explains the origins of the forces that drive those competing forces. Of relevance to this study is the adoption of this theory that is described as a “journey without a map”. The theory further explains the organic relationship between conservative and 21st century security discussions. The same brought about the emergence of critical security studies with the intention to widen academic discussion on some security issues that were not covered before. This position is aptly placed in a proper perspective by Fierke, as he is of the opinion that:

Emergence of critical security studies (CSS) signalled a further deepening of the debate, raising questions about the relationship between the traditional theories and methods of security studies and the security practices of states, on the one hand, and highlighting the politics of security, on the other²³.

Security, in line with constructivist theory, is a property that a state may have or not expressed in a quantifiable material perspective. Politics is perceived as an open-ended process of contestation of what security is all about. Hence this school considers security as property and social construction. With regard to espionage, the importance that constructivists attach to norms and values during state interactions informed some of the earlier views held by constructivists regarding espionage. For example: “[US] Secretary of State Henry Stimson denigrated espionage on the grounds that ‘gentlemen do not read each other’s mail’”²⁴. This reflects the constructivist notion that norms and values play a critical role in international relations. In accordance with a constructivist perspective, the prevailing norms of the international system would therefore inform the permissibility of espionage or whether it is deemed inappropriate in the international system. However it should be noted that norms are not fixed. They go through changes all the time. What

Relations: Power, Institutions, Ideas, Washington DC: CQ Press, 2012; Wendt A., *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

²² Houghton, (note 21).

²³ Fierke, 2015, (note 21) p. 1.

²⁴ Snyder, (note 18).

was deemed acceptable behaviour 100 years ago; may not be the case today. Thus a concrete position on espionage from a constructivist is always in flux, reflecting the normative preferences of the day.

2. Espionage in international politics

Espionage on its own is a subject within the study of strategic studies, an integral part of international relations, which has been analysed in a countless number of scholarly investigations. However, its related cousin, namely peacetime espionage and the exercise thereof towards allied nations, does not appear to have found the same volume of expression in scholarly output. This could have made it a complex adventure as the three theories espoused above fail to capture the problem under consideration. In perusing the literature available on peacetime intra-alliance espionage, one quickly recognises that the subject is for the most part broken down into two component parts: peacetime espionage and spying between allies. This is based on the realist position that argues that the end justifies the means.

Literature on peacetime espionage tends to initially focus on its permissibility and legal status. This subject is important because while espionage carried out during times of war is clearly regulated by The Geneva Conventions (1949, 1977) and Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), espionage during peacetime is less clearly defined or addressed by an international law. On this matter one finds that, almost unanimously, authors remain puzzled as to the lack of explicit legal expression or rather regulation of peacetime espionage. An example of this is articulated by David Perry²⁵ as he observes that there is no body of rules in the law of nations that focus on the legality (or illegality) of espionage. This equally affects the coding system on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) (drones), which can be employed both during war and peacetime.

UAV are an advanced means of collating information about other states, as has been newly introduced in journalism. Militarily, it is a reconnaissance strategy against friendly and unfriendly states. At the same time, though argued by a UAV-adherent that it was a means of self-defence, which is permissible under international law; at the same time it violates all known laws of war such

²⁵ Perry D. L., “‘Repugnant Philosophy’: Ethics, Espionage, and Covert Action”, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Spring, 1995, <<http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/Perry/repugnant.html>>, 28 08 2015.

as protection of non-combatants and territorial integrity. Questions that are left unanswered are whether the use of drones is consistent with the twin principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*²⁶.

A survey of the literature related to peacetime intra-alliance espionage will often begin with a review of the work of Alexander (2008)²⁷. His work features prominently in the work of other authors and serves as a launching point for an introduction on the subject. Alexander identifies a significant lack of in-depth examination of intra-alliance espionage and the consequences thereof within the study of international relations. He refers to the lack of study as “the missing dimension to the missing dimension”²⁸. Reasons posited by him for the lack of scholarly attention to the subject are two methodological challenges the subject presents. “The first is that the most sensitive types of collection operations – and this must largely be operations against allies or domestic targets in one’s own country – often leave no written record for the scholar to trace”²⁹. The second is that the most sensitive types of assessments – against allies – are more likely to be destroyed after use, weeded later or at least withheld from declassification for extraordinary lengths of time. This reflects concern that writings about the subject will jeopardise the alliance in question³⁰. However, despite the methodological challenges, new studies such as this have to be undertaken in order to advance the study of intra-alliance espionage for geo-political and economic interests.

The Edward Snowden, 2013 leaks are a rare occasion when the classified records of intelligence operators become available for scholars to look at and interrogate without any government censorship.

Peacetime espionage is the subject of various investigations related to its justification or reasons why it remains a state endeavour irrespective of its ill-defined legal nature. Security features prominently amongst the works of various authors as a reason why peacetime espionage is necessary and ‘normal’ in a realist global system³¹, offering security as the primary reason for peacetime espionage.

²⁶ Byman D., “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice.” *Foreign Affairs* July/August, 2013, p. 42; Cronin A. K., “Why Drone Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs* July/August, 2013, p. 54; Kaag J. and Kreps S., *Drone Warfare*, London: Polity, 2014, p. 78-79.

²⁷ Alexander M. S., “Introduction: Knowing your Friends, Assessing your Allies - Perspectives on Intra-alliance Intelligence”, *Intelligence and National Security* 13 (1), 2008, <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432460>>, 19 11 2014.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Pfaff T. and Tiel J. R., “The Ethics of Espionage” *Journal of Military Ethics*, 3 (1), 2004, <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15027570310004447>> 13 06 2014.

They make the point that intelligence gathering is an ongoing, necessary function for states to engage in and thus attempts at espionage are to be expected all the time, particularly by those participants in the intelligence services irrespective of whether it is peacetime or otherwise. According to them “what gives a nation a right to possess information that the other side regards as secret is that if it did not possess it, its national security would be severely compromised and its citizens would be placed at great risk”³². However, when referring specifically to intra-alliance espionage they observe that certain acts specifically; incitement, bribery and blackmail, of the most extreme nature are clearly out of bounds with allied nations.

Conceptualising the problem from a neo-liberal perspective, a further survey reveals a recurring justification of peacetime espionage as an instrument that encourages cooperation between nations by being a means through which states can achieve transparency during interactions with other countries. Espionage is a means by which a state’s true intentions or rather actions can be established³³. It creates a cooperative opportunity for parties with similar functional interests to negotiate mutually beneficial outcomes³⁴. However Baker does not refer to intra-alliance espionage and therefore his writings and findings are premised on competitor states, which make his position less relevant to our discussion.

There seem to be a number of authors who agree with the view that espionage is not simply a means to unscrupulously attain secret information, but rather it is a tool used in the international system to build mutual trust. Kapp³⁵ argues that espionage allows states to determine and verify the intentions of other states for the purpose of trust building and promotion of cooperation. Espionage thus, despite having negative connotations, is actually according to some authors, an instrument for stability and peace to satisfy the national (core) interest of a state. At any given time from the 1940s, America has been critical of her allies in Europe and hardly considers their interests despite their much publicised “special relationship”.³⁶

Bitton³⁷ equally views peacetime espionage as a tool that assists in fostering cooperation by bringing about transparency between states. He observes that

³² Ibid.

³³ Baker, (note 11); Kapp, (note 9); Bitton, (note 12); Golan U., “Relying on a Splintered Reed? Intelligence about Allies and Partners”, *Strategic Assessment* 4 (3), 2011, p. 71-90.

³⁴ Baker, (note 11).

³⁵ Kapp, (note 9).

³⁶ Chomsky N. and Vltchek A., *On Western Terrorism: from Hiroshima to Drone Warfare*, London: Pluto Press, 2013, p. 161-162.

³⁷ Bitton (note 12).

“true peacetime espionage...is driven by the fear that a seemingly unthreatening neighbour is a proverbial wolf in sheep’s clothing.” The security threat that is an ever-present fixture of considerations about peacetime espionage also makes up part of Bitton’s assessment as to the need for the activity. In Bitton’s view, the inability to verify what a competitor state is up to can lead to a serious preoccupation with security, which may border on state paranoia. Unawareness and inability to predict with precision a neighbour’s intention necessitates continuous, paralyzing defensive readiness at the border and the use of all available defence systems³⁸. To avoid such a scenario, states resort to espionage in order to establish whether there ought to be a reason for concern or not, as it serves as a transparency-enforcing device that resolves an otherwise irresolvable political conflict between liberal and non-liberal nations³⁹. However, once again the ‘missing dimension’ as referred to by Alexander is evident in this study. There is no direct investigation about allied states conducting peacetime espionage against one another. Studies such as Bitton’s and others similar to it, focus on competitor nations rather than states which are part of an established alliance with one another.

However, some authors are aware of and make reference to the potential pitfalls that spying on an ally can potentially come with. It should not be taken for granted that all states will appreciate espionage as a means towards verification and building of mutual cooperation. Pelican⁴⁰, with reference to states seeking information and employing peacetime cyber-espionage, observes that “information comes at a cost, however, whether in manpower, treasure, or the potential loss of amicable relations with fellow countries”. Although it is argued that some states may change their attitude towards others if they are found to be spying, this possible consequence is hardly ever mentioned by most authors. This is perhaps because all states are believed to spy on other states and therefore such a reaction would be seen as extremely hypocritical.

Golan⁴¹ views espionage directed at allies as a common phenomenon in the world of intelligence and statecraft; however, Golan offers a unique perspective on the peacetime intra-alliance espionage subject by making a distinction between alliances themselves. According to Golan, there exist ‘traditional’ alliances and ‘newer’ alliances. The distinction is made by observing “allies/partners that do not

³⁸ Bitton (note 12).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Pelican L., “Peacetime Cyber-Espionage: A Dangerous but Necessary Game”, *Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology*. 20 (2), 2012, p. 363-390.

⁴¹ Golan, (note 33).

represent a threat and are unlikely to become an enemy, though there is an interest in conducting relevant surveillance, as opposed to allies/partners that are liable to become future enemies". This signal to the tradition of German's foreign policy of the Aryan race that contributed to the two World Wars, and the need for America to pre-empt such may lead to espionage and undiplomatic conduct. Therefore the latter make up allies against whom it is important to continue intelligence gathering irrespective of peacetime or alliance. This is a work that represents an attempt to further the study of peacetime intra-alliance espionage.

Easley⁴² is another study on intra-alliance espionage. His study is perhaps one of the most pertinent pieces in terms of spying on allies as it refers directly to the exposition by Edward Snowden of the US NSA's activities. First and foremost, Easley⁴³ argues that espionage directed towards allies is necessary based upon the premise that an alliance does not imply blind trust. Thus, according to him, countries, even allies, should spy on one another. Easley further makes a distinction between two types of betrayals illustrated by an incidence of spying by an ally being exposed. Firstly, in a bid to actualise a state's national interest, an undiplomatic conduct may take place in host states. The other he refers to as political betrayal, which, according to him, is less a matter of national security and more an issue of one government causing embarrassment to the leaders of another, especially in the eyes of their domestic audience.⁴⁴ This distinction infers that where cases of espionage only detected by the intelligence personnel of a state and the information was then confined to only government and the intelligence services, the levels at which such incidents would become a diplomatic issue would be greatly reduced, if they at all become an issue. The reason, presumably, is the fact that all states routinely conduct espionage against one another despite alliances.

Therefore, it is less a surprise that there is a need for the NSA to embark on information gathering on political elite of other states. It is apt, then that decision makers in any state can expect to be spied on.

In a world where espionage is seemingly ubiquitous, it does stand to reason that the highest and most important of decision makers ought to anticipate that competitors will make attempts at gathering the information they hold. Thus

⁴² Easley L., "Spying on Allies", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 56 (4), 2014, p. 141-156.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Boyd-Barrett O., Herrera D., and Baumann J., "Hollywood, the CIA and the 'War on Terror'" in Freeman D. and Thissu D. K., eds., *Media & Terrorism: Global Perspectives*, London and Los Angeles: Sage, 2012, p. 116-133; Easley, (note 42).

the intelligence agencies of every state have to make certain that they protect the information held by its most senior citizens.

A search through the literature on peacetime intra-alliance espionage does not yield a significant amount of works, pointing to a serious lack of study on the subject. The consequences of such activities are not articulated in a scholarly manner and thus the subject has been left vacant in the aisles of studies of international relations. The overwhelming number of studies focusing on peacetime espionage suggests that it is an instrument through which states are able to verify each other's actions and levels of adherence to agreed upon behaviour. However, these are often arrived at from studies that look at peacetime espionage between competing states or states with differing orientations, such as liberal states versus non-liberal states. Alliances on the other hand are established on the basis of shared values and interests. They are also premised upon an understanding that cooperation and transparency are necessary to ensure the success of the alliance. Therefore the use of espionage as a tool fostering cooperation, trust and transparency is redundant, when allied countries can simply inquire their allies about particular information they require.

3. American espionage saga in Germany: any lesson for NATO's small states?

Based on the above interrogation of peacetime intra-alliance espionage, it is essential to look into the need for the US to plant surveillance in Berlin, as the two states' security understanding is beyond any equivocation. Though, as discussed under the likely theoretical positions on the need for spying on friendly states, realists are of the view that because of the nature of the international system of a Hobbesian approach, every state needs to jealously guide and guard its national interest. Though the concept of national interest remains misty in the study of international relations, at the same time, there are immutable issues that should be protected irrespective of the system of government in place. These are territorial integrity, protection of citizens both at home and abroad, and if the economic situation permits, there is a need to protect economic development. Based on the series of security, economic and social relations between the US and Germany, it was expected that the two should be natural allies as displayed in a release by the US European Command (USEUCOM). The publication describes Germany as a trusted friend that always protects American interests, and Berlin provides a

military base for both the Africa Command and European Command of the US Army. The state also housed America's largest Department of Defence medical facility outside America. The hospital cares for American soldiers wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only this, as their trust goes beyond a mere military base, but Germany also plays host to the largest military training centre outside the US. The two also cooperate in the war against terrorism: because of joint military training in American bases in Germany, they always work hand-in-hand in peace operations.

Liberal and neo-liberal students of international relations are of the opinion that democratic states hardly go war against each other. At the same time, liberalists are of the view that a high degree of economic interdependence in neo-liberal society brings peace and tranquillity⁴⁵. This, by extension, is believed to have gingered mutual respect, observation of the rule of law and basic tenets of international law. From this observation, it is difficult to locate the need for espionage conduct by the US in Germany. Analysis of US actions in Germany may not be understood when situating the same through liberal theory as pushed forward by students of Washington Consensus.

Though the CSS contends that what determines a state's behaviour is far away from the liberalist and realist's school, as the two are perceived as relations based on wealth and power respectively⁴⁶. The theory sees a state action through social norms and that there is need to reflect critically on the historical conditions of a state's actions and reactions. Also worth looking into in this theory are the material and ideological conviction of a state. Constructivist could be viewed as a middle ground that explains social facts as against the static world of *apriori* and social egoists that focus on material interest as if other intangible ingredients of power such as prestige, cultural domination and psychological pre-eminence were not part of a state interest's at the global level⁴⁷. Therefore, for academic interpretation of America's spying enterprise in Germany, there is a need for interrogation of both anarchy and economic hierarchy among social classes. As mentioned above, the concept of the Aryan Race that led to World War II and the economic power of the Berlin government is a source of concern for America. The state is the most developed country in Europe, followed by France, in terms of financial and military powers. As a "uni-polar moment", America may not trust Germany as

⁴⁵ Amusan L and van Wyk J. "The Complexities of Bilateral Relations: the Nigeria-South Africa Relationships (2000-2006), *Politeia* 30 (1), 2011, p. 38-55.

⁴⁶ Griffiths M., *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 107.

⁴⁷ Fierke, 2007, (note 21) p. 171.

pushed forward by the realist school. At the same time, the economic base of the country together with its level of research and development in the post-Cold War period after the unification of the two Germanys is a miracle for America. Despite the complex nature of the two states' relations, and in spite of the constructivist school's ability to explain "the climate of fear" displayed by the US on the future of Germany's development, the theory could not explain the clandestine surveillance against the Berlin government.

If Germany could experience this from the US, the question worth asking concerns the future of the small states in Europe that are members of NATO. Many of these states were formally under the umbrella of the Warsaw Pact under the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Besides the fact that America will see these states and their political and economic elites as spies for the socialist world, they will be closely monitored and compromise their security settings. The need for economic and military assistance from America will compromise their security power over their territory. Former communist states such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland need not doubt their state porosity towards America's surveillance. Turkey, a member of NATO, should not always expect *perfect* relations with the US, though its import on the security of the West is invaluable, at the same time, being an Arab state and the proliferation of terror attack at the global level may increase Washington's spying activities in the state. A majority of NATO members from Eastern Europe are developing states that are undergoing structural adjustment policy, political precariousness and social imbalance. Nearly all of them rely on politico-economic hand-outs from the US. Technologically, they are recently coming out of the communist hangover with all the ramifications of dependency syndromes. The question now is, where is the sovereignty and equality in NATO? Worth asking also is the relevance of the Article 5 trigger clause of the organisation's charter in an international regime of unequal exchange and power relations between developed and developmental states? As long as technological innovation, by extension, the knowledge economy, as opposed to the agrarian and manufacturing sectors, dominates the 21stst century, the small states of the military regime will look towards America for development for the next decade⁴⁸.

Based on the above statements that were released by decision makers of both states, the American ambassador, John Emerson, was summoned on 24 October

⁴⁸ Williams M., "Rethinking the Developmental State in the Twenty-First Century", in Williams M., ed., *The End of the Developmental State?* Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014, p. 1-29.

2013 to meet the then German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle to explain how the saga would not lead to a permanent mistrust between the two states. In March 2014 the German government established a parliamentary board of inquiry, which submitted a set of questions to the American government for a response. However a year later, the American government had yet to reply to the questions. Thirdly, the German government then went on to establish a parliamentary investigation committee on NSA surveillance. The hearings were established in order to thoroughly probe the information leaked within two years. Fourthly, the German government took the extreme step by declaring the station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) *personal non-grata*. This action followed the arrest by German police of a German intelligence operative who was passing information over to the NSA. The expulsion was later described by Hans-Christian Strobele, an official in Germany's Green Party as a necessary symbolic act to show our friends on the other side of the Atlantic how serious this matter is⁴⁹.

If we are to refer back to Easley's distinction between two types of betrayals by an ally, we have 'strategic defection' (which is when an ally takes action they know will seriously harm the other parties national interests) and 'political betrayal' (which is more a case of one government embarrassing the other in front of their domestic audience). It would appear that in the beginning Angela Merkel did not view the matter as a strategic defection. When it seemed as though the NSA's greatest crime was monitoring the Internet and phone traffic of citizens, the reaction of the government was subtle. However, the strategic nature of the betrayal was later impressed upon the government when Germany realised that even their own equipment had been targeted. The matter also took a political twist when Merkel was accused of showing concern when personally involved. The Spiegel reports, "the German website Der Postillon published a satirical version last Thursday of the statement given by Merkel's spokesman, Steffen Seibert: The chancellor considers it a slap in the face that she has most likely been monitored over the years just like some mangy resident of Germany⁵⁰. These sentiments though do not appear to have lasted as Merkel took a consistently hard stance against the Americans throughout 2014. In a survey conducted by *YouGov* a polling institute, sixty-two percent of Germans approved of Merkel's stance to the matter⁵¹.

⁴⁹ Miller G. and Kirchner S., "Germany orders CIA station chief to leave over spying allegations", *The Washington Post*, July 10, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany-expels-us-intelligence-station-chief-over-spying-allegations/2014/07/10/dc60b1f0-083c-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story.html>, 6 11 2014.

⁵⁰ Embassy Espionage, (note 3).

⁵¹ Ibid.

During the course of events surrounding the Snowden revelations it was mentioned on a number of occasions that Germany would like to become a part of the “5 eyes” intelligence sharing network comprising of the US, England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The “5 eyes” is a network of English speaking countries that routinely share intelligence amongst each other. However, no progress has seemingly been made in this regard. This came after Germany had unsuccessfully attempted to bargain a no-spy agreement with the US. But the Obama administration made it clear that the U.S. did not have a no-spy agreement with any country, so that would not be an option⁵². The scandal led to a short self-introspection by the government and the intelligence community pondering whether it had been too trusting of the Americans by being too naïve. The level of overall surprise by the Germans would suggest that they were very surprised and, therefore, had not anticipated this type of action at all. “A year ago (2013), there was already debate between the agencies, the Interior Ministry and the Chancellery over whether Germany should be taking a harder look at what American agents were up to in the country. But the idea was jettisoned because it seemed too political⁵³.”

When one observes the reaction of the Americans to the matter, it appears that once the espionage was exposed, they were taken aback by how betrayed the Germans felt. The American position towards espionage is a general assumption that everyone is doing it and therefore no one’s feelings will get hurt when it is revealed that an ally has been spying on another. However, from personal apologies by Obama to Merkel and a fundamental restructuring of the data retention capabilities of state intelligence agencies, the United States seemingly appreciates that some of its actions were excessive particularly towards an ally.

Actions such as wiretapping and surveillance from an embassy are clearly not permissible according to the Vienna Conventions and are illegal in terms of international law. The monitoring of the personal cell phone of Angela Merkel is also excessive when considering the close levels of cooperation that had been prevalent between Germany and the US. Such actions in particular seem to have embarrassed the US and hence it quickly withdrew, apologised and restructured its data retention policies.

A number of American tech companies experienced declines in their user base owing to fears that user privacy laws are not being respected. The distrust

⁵² Epstein J., “Obama: No ‘no spying’ agreements”, *Politico*, November 2 2014, <<http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/nsa-spying-foreign-countries-103382.html>>., 10 06 2015.

⁵³ Embassy Espionage, (note 3).

for Americans also manifested in a general scepticism towards the Trans-Atlantic Trade Agreement, which was being heavily negotiated at the time. Prior to the revelation of spying, polls indicated a generally favourable attitude towards the agreement amongst most Europeans, including Germans. However, once the news about the spying was revealed, most Europeans attitude towards the agreement had changed.

Conclusion

Peacetime espionage is an activity that all states currently perform with the objective of intercepting any threats against the state and protecting its population. It would appear that part of the trick in successful espionage is knowing who to keep tabs on in the first place. The German political and intelligence communities believed, in line with the liberal perspective, that because they were allies with the United States, they would not be a target of American spying. The fact that both countries are members of NATO (an international regime that ought to ensure stability between the two) further provided Germany with a sense of security against being spied on by a fellow alliance member. The post-9/11 America has been preoccupied with a realist view of the international system in maintaining its security, so Germany should have not been as passive with its own surveillance. However, it should be noted that the Americans have to date have not been seen to have maliciously used any information they have gathered from their German allies. Through NATO and USEUCOM, US being the arrowhead of the military alliance, the use of drones and other intelligence gathering methods during peacetime seems to be more than enough for America to spy on Germany unnoticed as opposed to unilaterally stationing information collating equipment on the soil of Berlin in the guise of self-defence and early warning motives. Not only that this is against any known explanation by liberal internationalists as discussed above, it is a source for concern among small member states. The question that remains obscure is whether the small states such as Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia can challenge America's hegemonic power over them considering their linkages with the *uni-polar moment*. As discussed above, there is no doubt that security of the small states has been compromised based on the Westphalian sovereignty paradigm because of Washington's preponderant power over these states. Turkey, a link between the Arab world and Europe, is a state that is strategically located but always at the mercy of the US. America's ambition to remain *primus inter-pares* in the comity of nations will continue gingering its security concern in Europe.

This would have explained the on-going political capriciousness in Ukraine based mostly on the rivalry for sphere of influence between the Soviet and the US.

The high levels of betrayal expressed by the German political establishment at the height of the scandal reveal a distrust, which will likely never go away. The trust, which America once had, as evidenced by the low levels of suspicion towards American activities in Germany, will never be attained again. This is in line with Boyd-Barrett *et al.*⁵⁴ when they observe that “covert operations, thriving on secrecy, are deeply problematic for democracy, regularly counterproductive to public interest and frequently amoral and/or criminal”.

Therefore, as NATO allies, it would appear that they still have the same, shared values and that has not been changed by the exposure of spying activity. Going by the CSS position, security is an integral part of politics and the concept of norms and values are not static, they change with time based on technology and political development and history. This could have inspired America to engage in security surveillance of a trusted partner. The relationship has not been negatively altered, although less trust exists between the two allies. Spying on a close ally can therefore be seen to instil a level of awareness in your ally that they must always be vigilant. Trust but verify. One should not believe simply because they are allies that their partner will not turn against them; the international system is based upon self-interest and states should not suspend that awareness and vigilance.

⁵⁴ Boyd-Barrett et al., (note 44) p. 117.

On the Clausewitzian Challenge in Eastern Europe

Andrius Bivainis*

Abstract

This article evaluates contemporary growing tensions to geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe. The current Eastern European geopolitical situation is labelled as a crisis that has been generated by the Ukrainian conflict for more than one year already. In light of the described crisis, the military option has been discussed as a meaningful political tool. This notion has provoked the necessity to evaluate growing tensions in the region through the lens of a traditional Clausewitzian challenge that should define a solution for effective force tasking aimed at the achievement of firm political goals. More than that, the analysis of this article is based on theoretical notions of neoclassical realism suggesting that foreign policy is dependent on international incentives and on domestic evaluations of political entities.

Introduction

War-fighting capability has been a topic of growing interest in Eastern Europe since March 2014. This is due to changes in international relations and power postures in the named region. These changes are defined by the aggressive foreign policy attitude by the Russian Federation. Voices suggesting that the Cold War has never stopped have been rising recently, suggesting the necessity to re-evaluate the international order and security environment. Besides, an intensifying military build-up and international exercise events around the Baltic Sea in 2014 and 2015 have facilitated significant changes in regional affairs.

This article analyses the necessity to observe and evaluate contemporary power distribution and war-fighting capabilities in Eastern Europe. A series of sharp foreign affairs have been shaping regional tensions in this part of Europe. By stating “sharp” one should bear in mind the hasty military build-up in Crimea, annexation of that part of Ukraine and the developing military build-up by NATO

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on the Alliance eastern frontier. This situation might seem like a Cold War period scenario. That is why a more detailed evaluation of current foreign affairs is needed. Second, this article uses an approach based on classical warfare notions that Carl von Clausewitz described in the 19th century.

Neoclassical realism is the basic theoretical approach applied for analytic purposes in this article. Neoclassical realism is usually defined as the mind-stream following neo-realism. This mind-stream does not highlight the single outstanding role of material power to influence foreign policy decisions. Instead, neoclassical realism offers a unit-level power's close association with indirect institutional power and its possessions in international surroundings¹. This suggests an overwhelming promotion of the multi-polar international system and its suggested capabilities by implementation of collective foreign policy initiatives. However, this article is based on a more complex assessment of foreign policy initiatives. Neoclassical realism serves as the best approach for the analytic base of current foreign affairs in Eastern Europe because one of the leading authors, Gideon Rose, has stated that: "scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities"². As it is shown in the article, this theoretical approach could find sound reflections to multiple warfare notions described by Clausewitz.

The term "material power" is replaced by the definition of a structural power in this article due to its direct association with internal power factors that usually lead to gains of external influence. In other words, a structural power assessment should highlight the importance of key gains as dominating factors of each entity's, collective or national, foreign policy but through the prism of facilitation of internal power capabilities that are associated with foreign policy perception at the entity's level. The dominant "key gains" of national or collective entity should be associated with material power elements such as economical benefits, development of power and influence or maintenance of strong trade relations. The difference is that the term "structural power" is based on a broader definition suggesting that the entity's internal facilitation of material power elements should be developed, as significant tools in pursuit of strategic objectives, through the definition of political will, alienation of popular support and the development of multiple tools of foreign affairs. Following that logical path, it should be stated that tensions at the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict should have served the interests of at least

¹ Guzzini S., "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis", *International Organization* 47 (3), 1993, p. 443-478.

² Rose G., "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics* 51 (1), 1998, p. 145.

one of the regional players, the Russian Federation. Provocation of tensions and promotion of different interests has been serving as the latest example of gaining and employing Moscow's structural power in the Ukrainian conflict. Further on, this article aims to highlight the key elements of facilitated structural power that have been employed in the escalation of the current conflict.

The Ukrainian conflict has brought on an outstanding precedent regarding the fragility of the European security system. Significant promotion of Eastern Neighbourhood initiatives by the European Union has been sharply overrun by the aggressive foreign policy intentions of the Russian Federation that led to the annexation of Ukrainian territory and escalation of the destabilizing internal conflict in that country. This is an alerting scenario that is asking for a broader contemporary analysis of power factors and war-fighting notions.

Hence, the main objective of this article is to assess the structural power capabilities of the opposing geopolitical players in Eastern Europe and to evaluate utilization of traditional war-fighting notions in the wake of the currently developing regional crisis. In order to achieve the main objective, contemporary structural power elements of the named region will be discussed in the first part of the article. The second part will shift attention to the analysis of traditional war-fighting notions that are being applied once again in the course of history in Eastern Europe.

This goal is supported by the principal methodology of neoclassical realism as unit-level internal power factors and systemic incentives are correlated in order to analyze war-fighting initiatives. In fact, regional power escalation in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict has been leading to military build-up efforts evidenced not only by the ambitiously aggressive Russian Federation, but by collective Western powers under the framework of NATO as well. This tension in foreign relations has been present within the Baltic Sea region and the broader Eastern European context for more than a year already. That is why any possible military reaction to systemic incentives based on the employment of structural power instruments is considered an important factor of this analysis. Additionally, the definition of the "Clausewitzian challenge" should be emphasized in order to define possible military build-up initiatives and relevant effects to structural changes in the geopolitical arena of Eastern Europe³. Hence, this article offers an overview of geopolitical reality in Eastern Europe that is based on structural assessment and comparison with traditional war-fighting notions that have been historically important in the region.

³ John R. Ferris, *Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays*, Routledge, 2005, p. 282-283.

1. Structural power elements in Eastern Europe

The term “structural power” includes not only unit-level material power capabilities but also emphasizes the ability to gain superior dominance over neighbouring players and execute its dominance in certain areas, usually by employing favourable preconditions for this. If this sounds like a grim abbreviation, more common examples should be mentioned. The example of Russia’s attitude to the development of internal tensions in Ukraine is the most recent and relevant example. As tensions in Kiev have been rising, Moscow has started to act as an active provoker of these internal tensions.

The seizure of momentum and involvement in Crimea has become another outstanding example of how boldly the sovereignty of a European country can be disrupted. This is a modern precedent of how advantages in structural power were employed in the most brutal form. More than that, the current conflict offers the opportunity to assess what structural power elements have been decisive in forming hasty and aggressive Russian foreign policy in the region. In this part of the article, the most decisive power elements are highlighted in order to focus attention on enabling factors of militarized strategy.

As the recent Ukrainian conflict highlights a rapid employment of dominance over internal tensions, external factors leading to this dominance should be discussed too. According to the neorealist assessment, dominant elements of structural power are economical capabilities, trade relations, holding an energy monopoly and, of course, military capabilities. It is obvious that these four power elements could be defined as elements of *Innenpolitik* that are the leading factors in shaping entities’ foreign policy ambitions⁴. In that sense, sovereign countries are acting in order to implement and facilitate their economical benefits, strong and effective trade relations, and stable energy supplies. These are interconnected preconditions for rapid and stable development. In the case of the Russian Federation, these preconditions are leading directly to the build-up of strong military capabilities⁵. Additionally, neoclassical realism is paying attention at how the political elites of each entity are able to facilitate structural power at the internal level. Here one could define the fundamental difference between contemporary Western collective entities representing democracy and the Russian authoritarian regime. The latter one is able to employ an institutionalized power structure in the mobilization

⁴ Rose, (note 2) p. 154-155.

⁵ Petraitis D., *Russian Military Reform 2005 – 2020*, lecture conducted at Lithuanian Military Academy, November 2014.

of complex structural power elements to serve the national hegemonic interests defined by a narrow governing group.

The previously mentioned geopolitical entities that are making a decisive influence in Eastern Europe could be defined by plotting contemporary structural power entities in Eastern Europe. The region could be defined by two structural powers: the Western Alliance with the dominance of the US and a common definition of NATO versus the Russian Federation that has gathered the Eurasian Union under its influence. There are several territories of still undefined influential dominance in between those two powers. Today these potential territories could be defined as Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans and South Caucasus⁶. Being even more critical, Samuel Huntington's definition of the "clash of civilizations" could be applied in the understanding of this contemporary situation as well⁷.

A significant difference should be stated concerning the structural power elements of the Russian and Western powers. All the power elements of the Russian Federation are in the possession of the same political regime. The Kremlin has considerable energy dominance in Eastern Europe, and has developed significant economical and trade relations with neighbouring entities. More than that, it is able to accumulate significant financial sources and stimulate selected political players over the range of political entities in Eastern and Western Europe. Accumulation of structural power elements in Moscow has provoked a significant modernization of armed forces. The best illustration of these efforts could be taken as the project to acquire modern naval assets and the modernization of various technologies or structural reforms of the Russian armed forces⁸. Although these modernization efforts are highly dependent on economical wealth and the rise of GDP in the Federation, their benefits are already in effect despite recent declarations of Russian economical shortages⁹.

On the other hand, Western countries are lacking solid possession of all structural power elements as individual entities. Dispersed military power assets are identified as NATO assets in the military power structure. The same should be applied to common economical policy and energy market initiatives in the framework of the EU. That dispersion or collectiveness of structural power does not mean ineffectiveness. Contrary, collectiveness leads to the spread of a common

⁶ Friedman G., "A Net Assessment of Europe", *Geopolitics weekly*, STRATFOR, <<https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/net-assessment-europe?utm>>, 26 05 2015.

⁷ Hoge J.F., ed., *The Clash of Civilizations: The Debate*, Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, p. 1-32.

⁸ Petraitis, (note 5).

⁹ IMF, *Russian Federation. Fiscal Transparency Evaluation*, IMF Country Report No.14/134, May 2014, <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sr/2014/cr14134.pdf>>, 16 05 2015.

political culture and formation of stable power elements based on broad initiatives. A common political culture developed according to Western democratic standards could serve as a preventive measure to minimize the assertiveness of pro-Russian political players. The core difference between these institutionalized power structures is based on achievement of a consensus and ability to provide a rapid powerful response.

2. Power-enabling instruments

The two previously defined powers are creating a confrontation of interests in Eastern Europe. The case of the Ukrainian conflict has become the defining example of the situation when the possible influential outcomes of each of the powers could define a certain path of evolution for one of the largest nations in the region. In that case, the Ukrainian context opens another essential issue – power-enabling preconditions. What are these enabling factors that led to this clash of power and influence? A list of these preconditions might be a changing issue but the most important highlight in the Ukrainian context consists of internal factors that have been utilized to the advantage of a particular external player. Here, neoclassical realism could be applied as it suggests not only internal power facilitation capabilities, but also assesses the capabilities to influence other foreign entities¹⁰. According to that theoretical approach, mobilization of institutionalized power at the unit level is the leading factor in expansion of security and foreign policy interests beyond the entity's internal framework. Hence, the ability to influence foreign players shows up as another key enabling factor that should be highlighted as creating the possibility for bold strategic choices. This has been the exact scenario in the development of Russian foreign policy ambitions over Crimea and certainly over eastern Ukraine.

The theoretic approach and practical development of the Ukrainian conflict suggests that influence over foreign entities could be achieved by taking advantage of certain enabling factors.

First, the popular support of internal communities should be discussed. The enabling factor for internal disputes and open civilian clashes in Ukraine has risen from diversified popular support for pro-European and pro-Russian political paths. More so, Ukraine, prior to the events in Kiev's central square, has been described

¹⁰ Schweller R., *Unanswered Threats. Political Constraints on a Balance of Power*, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 46-67.

as a country of diversified regions with different ethnic majorities and social diversities¹¹. Such a diversified socio-political situation could be a leading factor in forming a favourable precondition for exploitation of pro-Russian popular support seeking an affiliation of goals. In case of the diversified population in Ukraine, the statement of Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski needs to be remembered. In 1994 the famous US National Security adviser stated that “without Ukraine Russia ceases to be an empire”¹².

Second, a wide window of populace vulnerability could be defined in Ukraine just prior the crisis. This vulnerability was caused by a concentration of national minority groups in particular areas and social inequalities provoked by widespread corruption in Ukrainian regions. These social factors were leading to limited governmental response and, of course, decreasing support for governing authorities. One should remember that the regime of president Yanukovich earned definitions such as a “dysfunctional system of sultanistic rule [with] the government and parliament [turned] into rubber-stamp institutions”¹³ during its final governing phase. This definition was a strong uniting factor among the Ukrainian people as tens of thousands started to gather at Kiev central square.

As the crisis evolved, numerous internal destabilization factors were exploited by the neighbouring external player, who had a large interest in exerting influential dominance over Ukraine. In that particular case, all possible means were used to meet the goal of influence and dominance. The opposing power appeared to be slow in reaction as Western capitals could not achieve a firm common position on the growing military crisis. This is the outstanding example of how international and multi-institutional structural power was not able to react properly to sharp changes in the geopolitical reality.

The geopolitical confrontation that has arisen over the annexation of Crimea could be defined as the gain of strategic momentum by the authoritarian Russian regime. This momentum has been gained due to the capability to accumulate unilaterally vast resources of the entity’s institutionalized power elements and to enable a wide range of financial, economic, mass media and, of course, military tools for setting favourable preconditions to engage aggressively on the Ukrainian frontier.

¹¹ Bugajski J., “Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine”, in Volchuk S., Zvighlyanich V. eds., *Ukraine. The Search for a National Identity*, Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p. 171-173.

¹² Brzezinski Z., “The Premature Partnership”, *Foreign Affairs* 73 (2), 1994, <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49687/zbigniew-brzezinski/the-premature-partnership>>, 17 11 2014.

¹³ Motyl A., “Yanukovych Must Go”, *Foreign Affairs*, 11 12 2013, <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140491/alexander-j-motyl/yanukovych-must-go>>, 16 01 2014.

On the other hand, the Western allies who make up the opposing power under the NATO framework have needed to develop reactive preventive measures since the annexation of Crimea. These reactive measures have been facilitated on NATO's eastern frontier in the Baltic region over 6 or 7 months. This period has been defined mostly by initialization of collective structural power elements. Western preventive capabilities were slow but constant: from the start of the operation "Atlantic Resolve" to strengthening the Baltic airspace police mission, boosting collective military presence in the Baltic region and declaration of the development of NATO reaction forces. Although the later initiative still needs to be materialized, the overall preventive response of the Western power has been effective because of two reasons. First, the Alliance has shifted firm strategic attention to eastern neighbouring geopolitical areas, which is what the initial purpose of NATO's creation was based on. Second, a reactive stand-up to Russian aggressiveness in foreign policy has provoked wider public support for strategic choices of the Western alliance, not only inside Western entities but among the societies of previously defined clash zones of interests as well¹⁴. Thus, since February 2014 it has been obvious that a passive strategic stance would lead to a geopolitically lost *terra nullius* on the Western alliance's frontier. Ukraine, unfortunately, has become the case with challenges of proper security policy options emerging once again in European history.

3. On the Clausewitzian challenge

The time frame of the Ukrainian conflict that has been lasting for longer than a year already opens a possibility to re-evaluate the outcomes of this crisis. The situation in this country has quickly evolved into an armed conflict. The evolution of the conflict could be described by the principle "actions – reactions – counter reactions", as it is usually evaluated by military mindsets. This principle should be applied not only to military decisions but diplomatic initiatives as well. It is important to highlight that the traditional warfare notions that have been introduced in European political culture in the 19th century meet with reality again. These notions could be described by the classical "Clausewitzian challenge" definition that offers insights of war-fighting means and purposes¹⁵.

¹⁴ Simmons K, Stokes B., Poushter J., "NATO Public Opinion: Wary of Russia, Leary of Action on Ukraine", Pew Research Center, 10 06 2015, <<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/1-nato-public-opinion-wary-of-russia-leary-of-action-on-ukraine/>>, 21 06 2015.

¹⁵ Rose G., *How Wars End*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 278-280.

The contemporary Eastern European geopolitical arena is the clash zone of power and influence where coercive and constructive war-fighting aspects should be assessed once again¹⁶. Power enabling instruments of national and social differentiations have previously been highlighted as possible coercive war-fighting means. There is a broader variety of coercive and constructive warfare means that the two opposing powers could possess in Eastern Europe. Hence, the second part of this article offers a discussion leading to evaluation of more active military initiatives that have been gaining a new role in changing the geopolitical environment.

War-fighting traditionally has an association of a coercive act or will to act. It is a powerful factor that brings degradation, collateral damage and leaves many social groups affected by atrocities. The second aspect of war is the constructive one. It is strongly related to extended capabilities to gain desired effects of foreign and security policy initiatives without employing a decisive power engagement. The mantra of collective security suggests that war-fighting capabilities bring the key of success in assurance of collective deterrence and promotion of regional stability¹⁷. Certainly, the constructive role of war-fighting is the most effective if an actual fight has not been provoked.

Carl von Clausewitz stated that war is never an isolated act and that it provides perceptions of coerciveness and constructiveness in many different forms in various spheres of social life¹⁸. Now is the exact moment to evaluate coercive and constructive aspects of war in the context of the contemporary geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe. First, coercive war-fighting has been evident in continuous news coverage from Crimea and the Donbas Region. The initial phase of the Ukrainian crisis has revealed a wide variety of coercive warfare methods: employment of socio-political fragmentation, covered and intensive support to the separatist movement or even utilization of military assets during operations of “silent engagement”¹⁹. The growing evidence of “silent engagement” by Russian forces without declaring *casus belli* is another coercive factor that brings precedents of disagreement, misbehavior and unreliability into international relations. To some extent, the current “silent

¹⁶ Rose G., *How Wars End*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 3-11.

¹⁷ Morgan P., “The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today”, *Contemporary Security Policy* 33 (1), 2012, p. 91-92.

¹⁸ Clausewitz, C., *Selections From On War*, Sweet Water Press, 2006, p. 21, 55-56.

¹⁹ The term “silent engagement” has not been defined by any active think-tanks or official declarations. This is the term that could be defined as the opposing notion to the widespread definition of “hybrid warfare”. “Silent engagement” is meant to define active provocation of local or regional tensions by providing military assistance, logistic or weaponry support and, what is obvious in Ukraine, deploying military units on the ground without any announcement of war-fighting intentions.

engagement” has become the *casus belli* itself for growing economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation towards Moscow from numerous Western states.

On the other hand, coercive factors of warfare initially have been implemented more effectively by Moscow. This was achieved due to the exploitation of unpredictability at the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. The rapid use of coercive power has made important gains in annexation of the Crimea peninsula and maintenance of separatist control in the Donbas Region. That is why the successful coerciveness of war-fighting should be associated to initially unpredictable tactics of “silent engagement” that were employed by the Russian Federation. Contrary, after the loss of initial war-fighting momentum in Crimea, the Western powers could provoke coercive warfare acts by providing military support for selected war-fighting groups inside Ukraine. The fact is that any decisive military support for fighting Ukrainian forces has initially been mentioned only in December, 2014 by the US government²⁰.

The second Clausewitzian notion would lead to the assessment of possible constructive war-fighting aspects. A non-bias approach to the contemporary Ukrainian conflict requires the need to assess strategic war-fighting aspects that opposing power vectors are facing in Eastern Europe. Regarding the US interested NATO, it is quite easy to identify constructive war-fighting aspects in this confrontation. As it was mentioned above, collective defense capabilities could be named as a growing uniting factor for the large coalition forces. In the face of ongoing conflict in Ukraine Western countries are gaining a common understanding of what the Russian coercive power factor is. Additionally, sound opinions of leaders of the Baltic States and Poland have initiated a broader assessment of how to deal with coercive actions employed by Moscow’s decisions. That is why a current NATO military build-up in Eastern Europe should be assessed as the constructive cooperation initiative enabling more foreign and security policy options. These options are related to a wide variety of war-fighting capabilities, including such non-kinetic capabilities as cyber security, information operations or spread of civil resistance and, of course, growing kinetic capabilities in terms of joint operational development. All these trends provide a contemporary illustration of the Clausewitzian idea that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means”²¹.

²⁰ Baker P., “Obama Signals Support for New U.S. Sanctions to Pressure Russian Economy”, *New York Times*, 16 12 2014, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world/europe/obama-signing-russia-ukraine-sanctions-bill.html>>, 17 12 2014.

²¹ Clausewitz, (note 18) p. 40-42.

Contrary to NATO collective initiatives, constructive war fighting capabilities of the opposing power should be discussed as well. From Moscow's perspective, the main gain of this power and influence collision on the Ukrainian frontier could be defined as the effort to establish and maintain its own geopolitical area of influence²². This goal could be established by consolidation and maintenance of strong structural power capabilities. Moscow's requirement to assure that NATO would cease any plans of expansion into Eastern Europe has clearly highlighted the need to maintain a defined pro-Russian area of geopolitical influence²³. In that case, a constructive aspect of war-fighting becomes the demonstration of war-fighting capabilities itself. The foreign policy attitude that is based on war-fighting initiatives serves in favour of several objectives.

First, Russia is able to develop expeditionary military capabilities that are essential for contemporary Moscow. This is the tool that keeps the Belorussian military closely integrated, and military bases in the Baltic and Black sea regions highly operational in order to maintain active promotion of regional power and influence. Second, this military build-up leads to a certain restructure and check of war-fighting capabilities. It is obvious that Russian military involvement in Georgia in 2008 and today's involvement on Ukrainian soil differs in equipment, integration of forces and tactics²⁴. Third, promotion of regional influence serves well for the legitimacy of the Kremlin's regime as the tool to alienate public support and to consolidate efforts to disperse unity of the Western powers.

The initial assessment of Clausewitzian challenges in the contemporary Ukrainian conflict reveals some important trends. A constructive role of war-fighting capabilities is essential for both powers that are active in Eastern Europe. NATO countries are experiencing an essential time of common military build-up in the area that was a clash zone during the Cold War. On the other hand, Russia is promoting its own interest of dominance and structural power by developing warfare capabilities as one of its strongest tools.

Coerciveness of war-fighting has been effectively implemented by the Russian side due to fast and precise "silent engagement" that was initially unpredictable to Western players. Many reports and satellite images provided by different institutions or agencies have confirmed the actual involvement of Russian Federation armed forces. Due to this engagement without declaring an actual war,

²² Mankoff J., "Russia's Latest Land Grab", *Foreign Affairs* 93 (3), 2014, p. 64-66.

²³ "Putin's War of Words", *New York Times*, 4 12 2014, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/world/europe/vladimir-putin-war-of-words.html>>, 14 12 2014.

²⁴ Petraitis, (note 5).

the campaign is gaining the name of “hybrid warfare”. The question is whether this is really a new phenomenon. Conduct of expeditionary military campaigns without declaring *casus belli* is a well-known option usually used during the Cold War period. The offensive posture of Russian Military doctrine has a well-defined path towards a systemic engagement utilizing a lot of different power tools through various escalation steps²⁵. All this offers to re-evaluate war fighting notions that are officially declared and have already been practically applied by the Russian Federation.

Hence, the definition of the “Clausewitzian challenge” should be closely associated with the strategic choices of security policy development. It is obvious that since the rise of the Ukrainian conflict, the military option has become a leverage tool among foreign and security policy decision makers. In this context the “Clausewitzian challenge” re-emerges with renewed concern as to whether coercive or constructive factors of war-fighting initiatives should be promoted in order to find the best way towards crisis solution. As the brief analysis of utilization of war-fighting factors suggests, both opposing powers are adjusting military capabilities to meet the changing geopolitical realities in Eastern Europe. Indeed, any sound declaration of using direct military action is not a bold strategic choice in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian conflict has caused a serious crisis in Eastern Europe that needs to be dealt with in constructive and complex ways.

4. Preventive steps ahead

The contemporary situation in Eastern Europe and especially in Ukraine suggests that the ongoing military build-up in the region should be viewed as a necessity. On the NATO side, a declared creation of rapid reaction military force should serve as a solid tool of institutionalized structural power²⁶. It is worth mentioning that the current military build-up in Eastern Europe was initiated as a reaction to initial bold steps made by the opposing power vector in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The potential success of the dominance of the Western powers in the region would depend on their capabilities to gain the preventive

²⁵ *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, approved by Russian Federation Presidential edict on 5 February 2010.

²⁶ More details on NATO Reaction Force could be obtained on Alliance official website: *The Readiness Action Plan*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm?selectedLocale=en>, 19 06 2015.

initiative and apply constructive decisions on foreign and security policy agendas. In this case, the identification of some essential lessons from the opposing decisive player's *modus operandi* could be helpful.

The Russian perception of war-fighting could be evaluated through notions of the Military Doctrine published in 2010 by the Ministry of Defence²⁷. Planning and reaction in advance to any possible “silent engagements” in the future could lead to winning efforts in this grand chess game. Effective preventive steps in Eastern Europe would be gained only if two strategic preconditions are met: potential aggressive courses of action would be evaluated and dealt with in advance and, even more importantly, the strategic interests of opposing power would be understood and deals of mutual constructive assurance would be achieved.

First, the preventive dealing with any potential aggressive course of action needs to be assessed. This is the real challenge in the wake of the contemporary crisis that requires complex decisions based on the opponent's capabilities. The nature of war-fighting initiatives consists of three main preconditions that Carl von Clausewitz has named as “a wonderful trinity”²⁸. These three outstanding elements are: a) passion for actual engagements, b) courage of conduct and c) a political will to initiate the act of war. Each of these elements could be associated with the populace, armed forces and political elite respectively. An effective prevention of war-fighting initiatives should be based on the degradation of adversaries' “wonderful trinity”. In that way preventive steps to decrease popular support, political will and courage of conduct should be discussed by paying attention to the identified *modus operandi* of the current Ukrainian conflict.

The scenario in Ukraine has already highlighted that Russian forces have been promoting enabling preconditions and escalating tactical engagement in the conflict without any clear declaration and anticipation of this move by other entities. This silent engagement on a foreign frontier once again could be explained by the notions of the Russian Military Doctrine, to some extent. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation has a definition of potentially offensive campaigns that should be conducted in 5 different phases²⁹. All these phases should be associated with escalation of a conflict that grows from potential social or political disagreements to an active, full-scale warfare campaign. More than that, the latest Russian Military Doctrine, most probably influenced by the Ukrainian conflict in its final drafting

²⁷ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (note 25).

²⁸ Clausewitz, (note 18) p. 46.

²⁹ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (note 25).

phase, has introduced a reference to non-nuclear deterrence³⁰. In other words, the strategic perception of war-fighting declared in the pages of this document have highlighted a potential will to act and courage to conduct. More than that, the will and courage have also been demonstrated by increasing military budget allocations in the Russian Federation. During the period of 2007–2013, military spending in the Russian armed forces has increased more than twice³¹.

On the other hand, the Western nations have only come to realize the potential of growing warfare courage in Russia quite late in the game. Initial momentum was lost during the annexation of Crimea in March, 2014. A finalized political will to act was declared only in September, 2014 during the NATO Summit in Wales. The reactive decision has declared broader regional preventive measures of military force that followed a logical escalation after initiation of economic sanctions. The reactive path of the Western powers provides a practical example of how slow in response institutionalized structural power really becomes when meeting an influential opposing power. The initial momentum of the Ukrainian conflict has already been lost once. There is no assurance that in another potential scenario like this, an initial loss of momentum could be avoided. In order to prevent this, the Western countries should implement longer-term preventive steps to target “a wonderful trinity” of Moscow’s power.

Contemporary military campaigns are based on strong influence of information operations that carry the military definition of INFOOPS. The Ukrainian crisis has shown an active role of information operations on both opposing sides. NATO has solid experience in this field that was achieved during prolonged military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The key of dealing preventively with targeted audiences and key leaders on the field could be based on counter-insurgency experience. To make this clearer, multiple streams of experience in dealing with the civilian interests of Mesopotamian villagers or multiple groups of mountain peasants should be shaped in line with the contemporary realities and socio-political requirements of the East European, Balkan and Caucasian nations. There is a wide range of national and ethnical entities in the named regions that could be alienated by pursuing their local demands and interests. Of course, all this should be done effectively by the local governing authorities. The key here is that those authorities need to maintain legitimacy through their legal establishment and proper governance. That is the field where counter-insurgency experience should be applied to the

³⁰ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (note 25).

³¹ Russian military expenditure data, information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database>, 15 12 2014.

regions of Eastern Europe, the Balkans or the Caucasus. Currently two groups in the Ukrainian nation can be identified: the social extremists supporting separatist initiatives and a more united, proactive civilian majority that has been strongly influenced by the ongoing conflict³². Dealing with the social and political issues in between these groups throughout the country would be another demanding task for the legitimate government.

Popular support could have a strong impact on the political will to act. This is evident in democratic societies. In the case of a developing democratic society, assurance of the main requirements, enforcement of stability and peace serves to grow popular support. And vice versa – intolerance or a corruptive form of governance would lead to socio-political fragmentation that decreases the legitimacy of the governing authorities. This entire logical path reveals that the political will to act should be closely associated with popular support. The prevention of possible silent engagements in the future should first of all be orientated to decreasing efforts of potential socio-political fragmentation in countries located in the geopolitical area of interest of Moscow's power.

The courage to conduct could be prevented only through long-term decisive initiatives to build military capabilities and develop operational interoperability. Despite the growing operational presence of the opposing powers in the Baltic region, the military factor is a constructive choice as well. The widening military cooperation between the NATO allies serves as a preventive measure in a few ways.

First, accumulation of joint military assets demonstrates a clear will to act. By doing this, the Alliance strengthens capabilities to react to any initiatives of potential opponents. And this would serve as a success on the NATO side in gaining strategic military momentum. Further on, the momentum should be empowered by continuous development of collective capabilities. A smart defence initiative in the framework of NATO could serve this purpose, especially as military expenditures by new NATO members are set to rise. Second, a proper information campaign should incorporate the precedent of military build-up to the local populace in order to promote ideas of stability and development in societies. That would be a way towards stable environment secured from power enabling factors that played a destructive role in Ukraine.

The second preventive precondition in Eastern Europe points to a capability to understand opposing strategic interests and to establish mutual reassurance of non-

³² Brzezinski Z., "Putin's Three Choices on Ukraine", *Washington Post*, 08 07 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-putins-three-choices-on-ukraine/2014/07/08/ba1e62ae-0620-11e4-a0dd-f2b22a257353_story.html>, 24 10 2014.

violent conduct. This precondition depends on a multitude of initiatives: political, diplomatic, economic ties and military incorporation as well. It is difficult to suggest that the military option could be ruled out in future relations between the two opposing powers in Eastern Europe. Current geopolitical trends clearly suggest that war-fighting capabilities will remain as the active option of security policy initiatives. The root of geopolitical confrontation in the current Eastern European crisis could be defined by different perceptions of opposing interests. Contrary to Moscow's interests in defending and maintaining its areas of geopolitical interest, the US is seeking to prevent any formation of a single hegemonic power in Europe as a grand precondition for stable and prosperous foreign relations in the future³³.

Any preventive success of the Clausewitzian challenge in that confrontation would depend on the potential opponent's behaviour, or course of action, that could be defined in accordance with international treaties, bilateral agreements and standard operational instructions. In other words, the defined and anticipated *modus operandi* applicable during peace-time and expected in case of conflict is the constructive war-fighting aspect that would help to establish mutual reassurance of non-violent foreign affairs. In that regard, the current foreign affairs conducted by the Western allies and the Russian Federation are shifting in-between realism and idealism, providing a developing scenario to test competing theoretical approaches of international relations.

The current Ukrainian conflict and Russian military activities in the Baltic region illustrate a shift to realistic notions being implemented on foreign and security policy agendas. There are no proper defined procedures in the reported Russian land force engagement in Ukraine or even air force or navy operations from Kaliningrad in the Baltic Region. That is why countries on the geographical frontier of the Russian Federation are facing increased tensions regarding how to avoid becoming part of the geostrategic influence zone managed from Moscow. The implementation of mutual reassurance would require common willingness to conduct multiple efforts over a prolonged period of time. This is the moment when the named Clausewitzian challenge could strongly play as the constructive power-enabling instrument in the hands of Western capitals. As Edward Lucas has stated on the Eastern European crisis, "we are losing not because we are weak but because our will part is weak"³⁴. To sum up, the active engagement by all necessary means in the framework of the Western powers governmental organizations and

³³ Friedman G., "Viewing Russia from the Inside", *Geopolitical Weekly*, STRATFOR, <<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/viewing-russia-inside>>, 20 12 2014.

³⁴ Edward Lucas' speech at the conference "Civil Defence in Hybrid Warfare", conducted by Lithuanian Armed Force Riflemen Association, Vilnius, 21 11 2014.

institutions would form decisive steps in preventing any power enabling factors that proved to be so coercive in Ukraine and should be avoided anywhere else in the current Eastern European crisis.

Conclusions

The Eastern European crisis has been chosen as the dominant geopolitical focus point in this article. The epicentre of current geopolitical shifts in the region is located between Moscow and the separatist districts in eastern Ukraine. This trend has resulted in the active and agile conflict on Ukrainian soil. This conflict is influencing a broader regional crisis as the prevention of any additional agile foreign policy initiatives is at stake. Hence, the hundred-year anniversary of World War I has brought the reality of militarized political choices into the backyard of Europe once again.

The choice of neoclassical realism as the favourable theoretical approach to the named conflict serves the purpose of shifting attention from the previously dominant US – European Union – Russia dialogue possibilities to the re-emerged national ambitions and decisions based on structural power in the region. The contemporary reality of growing regional tensions suggests that Eastern European foreign policy has been affected by war-fighting perceptions. War-fighting initiatives in the foreign policy agenda in Eastern Europe have been provoked by offensive moves of the Russian Federation in Crimea. Offence has been chosen as the favour of warfare and practically applied to foreign policy. This outstanding example of offensive policy conducted in Europe's backyard suggests that offence has been chosen after evaluation of the domestic variables and systemic incentives. This article provides an analysis of the dominant structural power elements as well as a reasonable definition of power enabling instruments. Analysis of this article has proved that the Kremlin has calculated all the favourable preconditions for the execution of an offensive foreign policy on the Ukrainian frontier. More than that, there is still a possibility that the same calculations might be conducted once again if the opposing institutionalized structural power does not take preventive measures in Eastern Europe.

Every offensive action should be followed by the opponent's reaction. This is a bold truth of military thinking. That is one of the reasons why in terms of military engagement, competition between the operational presence of the Russian Federation and NATO forces has been growing in Eastern Europe. This tendency could be associated with theoretical notions of neoclassical realism as implication of

military force in foreign policy is dictated by rapid changes in geopolitical initiatives and reactive internal policy adjustments. The positive side of these initiatives is that the widening military cooperation between the NATO allies is accumulating the constructive aspect of warfare. And this is serving not only as a powerful crisis solving option but also as the unification factor of collective decision makers. To put it in other words, the necessity of rapid and solid collective decisiveness is currently being evoked through military initiatives.

Promotion of military initiatives in foreign policy stands as the core reason of the re-assessment of the classic Clausewitzian challenge in this article. The Clausewitzian challenge is about stating clear goals and defining efficient political as well as military means to meet these goals effectively. The goals of the current military build-up are quite clear. These build-ups are serving in favour of expansion of geopolitical influence and reassurance of effective collective defence. The core issue is that the effectiveness of the militarized option would depend on the effective exploration of traditional competing warfare aspects, coerciveness and the constructive role of power. Both of these aspects have been discussed in the previous pages. Indeed, coerciveness has played a primary role in the Ukrainian conflict. Any ongoing broader military initiatives would require a longer-term engagement that could lead towards constructive implementation in seek of national or regional political objectives.

To sum up, a geopolitical confrontation in Eastern Europe could be defined by the clash between two different structural power elements: the institutionalized, multi-polar Western power and Moscow's ambitious regime seeking expansion of regional power. Both powers are conducting reactive initiatives in various fields of structural power: from economic sanctions and trade embargos to demonstration of military capabilities. Despite the fact that Moscow has not initiated a large-scale invasion into Ukraine, the sponsorship of separatist groups was not terminated after running self-proclaimed elections in the eastern regions of Ukraine. In that way even more coerciveness has been conducted in foreign affairs on Moscow's behalf. The Western allies at that point have been responding in a more constructive way by consolidating their military power capabilities to assure the security of NATO members. The NATO Alliance is facing a renewed Clausewitzian challenge with a collective task to prevent any possible invading initiatives by the opposing power. This should be considered as an operational and strategic shift from missions conducted in Afghanistan or other far-away frontiers. Time flowing beyond the one hundred year anniversary of World War I has yet to reveal if the Clausewitzian challenge has been properly met to prevent escalation of another crisis in Eastern Europe.

Turkey's Security Dilemma on the Border With Syria: Situation Assessment and Perspectives of the Intervention

Simonas Dapkus*

Abstract

Employing the concept of the security dilemma, the article aims to assess the situation on the Turkey-Syria border and discusses perspectives of Turkey's humanitarian intervention in northern Syria. In the first section of the article an analysis of Turkey's foreign policy and its implications on Syria's crisis is provided. The second section deals with arguments for and against the intervention. Later on, international law and military provisions are discussed as well as the possible implications of an intervention. The main thesis of this article is that if Turkey chose to solve its security dilemma by means of a humanitarian intervention, the UN Security Council's approval would greatly enhance the chances of its success. Otherwise, unilateral intervention could even further diminish the possibility of finding a faster solution to the Syrian crisis and regional peace and stability in general.

Keywords: Turkey, military intervention, safe zone, buffer zone, Syrian civil war, Turkey – Iran relations

Introduction

On the 20th of July in Suruç, a border town near Syria, ISIS conducted a terror act against Kurdish political activists who intended to help rebuild the city of Kobani that was in ruins in Syria. Soon after, PKK (kur. *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, eng. Kurdistan's Workers Party) committed revenge killings against the Turkish police because they perceived Turkey as an ISIS supporter. After these events, Turkey started an active anti-terror campaign in two fronts: against ISIS and the PKK. There have been reports in the media that as a response, the PKK cancelled the peace process with Turkey. A domestic political level is also important in this violent escalation: after the elections on June 7, the ruling AKP party (tur.

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Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, eng. Justice and Development Party) lost its majority in the parliament. Therefore, during the military operations there is still no new government, whereas snap elections seem very likely. Turkey yet again offered to create a “safe zone” near the border with Syria, but the US rejected this offer.

It is easy to notice that the ruling AKP party is trying to consolidate society for possible snap elections. For some time already Turkey has been deploying troops and equipment near the border with Syria. There is a possibility that these troops will cross the border with an objective to unilaterally create a “safe zone” in Syria in order to eliminate ISIS and to disrupt consolidation of YPG (kur. *Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*, eng. People's Protection Units) forces where Turkey sees the YPG as affiliates of PKK. In this paper, the main aim is to answer the question: under which circumstances would Turkey's military intervention in northern Syria be a promising idea? In order to answer this question, Turkey's foreign policy framework and its implications on the Syrian crisis are analysed. Second, arguments for the intervention and against it are weighed. Finally, the military and international law arrangements for the intervention and its possible implications are discussed.

In this article, official documents and the personal opinions of diplomats, media and experts are used. I analyse Turkey's foreign policy using the insights of Meliha B. Altanışık, Lenore G. Martin,¹ Pinar Bilgin,² Pavel Shlykov,³ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis⁴ and Bülent Aras⁵ as well as a structural overview given by Onur Gökçe⁶.

For a deeper comprehension of regional developments, I implement Idrees Mohammed's⁷ extensive analysis of Turkey-Iran competition for influence in Syria.

¹ Altunışık M. B., Lenore G. M., “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40, 2009, p. 169-192.

² Bilgin P., “Securing Turkey through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40, 2009, p. 105-125.

³ Shlykov P., “European Perspectives of the ‘New Turkey’”, Carnegie Moscow Center, December 24, 2014, <<http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=57599>>, 28 07 2015.

⁴ Grigoriadis I. N., “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Working Paper 8/2010, 2010 <http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf>, 30 07 2015.

⁵ Aras B., “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Insight Turkey* 11(3), 2009, p. 127-142; Aras B., “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16(4), 2014, p. 404-418.

⁶ Gökçe O., “The Dynamics of Turkey-Israel Relations”, *All Azimuth* 1(2), 2012, p. 55-68.

⁷ Mohammed I., “Turkey and Iran Rivalry on Syria”, *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations* 10 (2-3), 2011, p. 66 -77.

The regional balance of threats is investigated in the article by three Islamic Azad University authors. Theoretical aspects of the security dilemma are presented in the book by Kenneth Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler.⁸ Turkey's plan for a humanitarian intervention in Syria is not a well-researched topic because the situation is novel and changing quickly. However, the topic is worthy of an analysis, as the humanitarian intervention might bring important changes in the Syrian crisis.

1. Turkey's foreign policy and its implications on the Syrian civil war

Systemic changes in international relations at the end of the Cold War stopped limiting Turkey's foreign policy and allowed the possibility for its reconsideration. New views resulted in pluralism and ambivalence over its foreign policy. Traditional Turkey's foreign policy view is based on the balance of power principles according to which the Middle East is seen as a source of threats. This view was supplemented by new perspectives such as liberal and constructivist thinking, both critical to a traditional realist understanding.⁹ According to critical views, the Middle East is not a source of threats but a source of possibilities. Different approaches also have a different take on Turkey's relationship with the West: according to the traditional view, Turkey is part of the West, while critical perspectives treat Turkey as an actor on its own. Therefore, its interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the West.

In this context, it is easier to understand the AKP's foreign policy. Together with such parties as ANAP (turk. *Anavatan Partisi*, eng. Motherland's Party) and DSP (turk. *Demokratik Sol Parti*, eng. Democratic Left Party), the AKP criticizes the traditional understanding of Turkey's foreign policy position. Among them, AKP (whose roots are in Turkey's Islamic movement)¹⁰ is characterized by an exceptional emphasis on historical and cultural identity.¹¹ This ideology was developed in great detail by the main architect of the AKP foreign policy and

⁸ Booth K., Wheeler N. J., *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 1-41.

⁹ Altunışık and Lenore, (note 1) p. 172.

¹⁰ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Justice and Development Party", Encyclopedia Britannica, June 10, 2015, <<http://global.britannica.com/topic/Justice-and-Development-Party-political-party-Turkey>>, 28 07 2015.

¹¹ Altunışık and Lenore, (note 1) p. 187.

current Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. His “civilizational geopolitics” is characterized not by traditional insights on geopolitics, economic or power politics but on arguments grounded in the belief of historical and religious predestination.¹² Precisely because of these historical and cultural ties, Turkey’s historical, strategic and geographical “depth” is localised in the Middle East.¹³ The AKP party seeks active and autonomous participation in the region, not only to mirror Western interests. In other words, Turkey rejects the passive role of a “bridge between the Western and Islamic world” and seeks to occupy an active “central” state position.

Davutoğlu’s ideas also took shape in strategic documents. The foundations of Turkey’s foreign policy became the “Zero problems with neighbours” strategy, based on civilizational geopolitics, liberalism, soft power principles and the aspiration to have mutually beneficial relations with its neighbours. According to Davutoğlu, if Turkey wants to achieve its global strategic ambitions, first of all, it must solve its domestic problems with the Kurdish people and the conflict among Islamists and secularists. Meanwhile in the international sphere it must clear up all bilateral conflicts with its neighbours, which stand in the way of good mutual cooperation.¹⁴

In this article, we avoid lengthy discussions on whether a new direction in Turkey’s foreign policy caused the abandonment of its Western orientation or whether it was merely a diversification of its policy. Nevertheless, the end of Cold War is considered as the beginning of a tense relationship between Turkey and the West.¹⁵ That is especially obvious after the AKP came to power.¹⁶ However, Turkey’s foreign policy was generally thought to be successful both by foreign and internal observers, until the start of the Arab Spring.¹⁷ Unrest in the Arab states marked the beginning of Ankara’s problems. After the change in the regional *status quo*, Turkey’s position in conflicts and its abilities to mediate them has also changed.

Despite that, Turkey has retained its aspirations to be an important and influential country. It is reflected in bilateral relations with Syria. Turkey’s inclination to have good neighbourly relations in the Syrian case is realised

¹² Bilgin, (note 2) p. 106.

¹³ Altunışık and Lenore, (note 1) p. 188; Aras, 2009, (note 5) p. 127-142.

¹⁴ Grigoriadis, (note 4).

¹⁵ Bilgin, (note 2) p. 106.

¹⁶ Shlykov, (note 3), ; Altunışık M.B., Benli M., and Martin L.G., “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40, 2009, p. 169-192.

¹⁷ Zalewski Z., “How Turkey Went from Zero Problems to Zero Friends”, *Foreign Policy*, August 22, 2013, <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/how-turkey-went-from-zero-problems-to-zero-friends>>, 25 07 2015.

through the idea of changing leaders who have fallen out of favour. Before the beginning of the pro-democracy protests, Turkey tried to keep good relations with the Syrian regime. However, after a brutal crackdown on protesters, Turkey demanded that President Bashar al-Assad must step down. What's more, it started to actively support the political and militant Syrian opposition. By doing that, Turkey perceived two objectives: first, to overthrow the Syrian regime and second, to hinder the Kurdish aim of creating an independent Syrian opposition faction and fostering their efforts to fight the Syrian regime.¹⁸ Already in 2011 efforts were made to create a no-flight zone in Syria, as was done in Libya with the aim of protecting civilians (and also most likely to provide support for rebel forces). However, the plan failed because it was blocked by Russia and China.

So far Turkey has tried to avoid direct military participation. However, July 23, 2015 saw the first exchange of fire between Turkey's military and ISIS (counting from the very beginning of the Syrian crisis).¹⁹ Until then, Turkey's participation in the anti-ISIS coalition was sluggish and full of rumours about links between high-ranking Turkish officials and ISIS.²⁰ Nonetheless, after the Suruç terror attack the situation has changed and Turkey has started an active anti-terror campaign as well as deepened its cooperation with the US.

To sum up, Turkey's ambitions to be a "central state" and actively engage in the region have led to entanglement in the Syrian crisis. After the start of an active anti-terror campaign, Turkey's rigid position in the conflict has become even more visible. From the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey pursued the idea of some kind of buffer/no-fly/safe zone in order to protect civilians and support anti-Assad rebels. In the following section, we look at the arguments for and against the possibility of Turkey's intervention.

¹⁸ Dali K., "Turkey and Military intervention in Syria", *Middle East Monitor*, July 3, 2015, <<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/europe/19635-turkey-and-military-intervention-in-syria%20>>, 21 07 2015.

¹⁹ Walker J.W., Bown A. J., "Erdogans's War", *Foreign Affairs*, July 29, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-07-29/erdogans-war?cid=nlc-twofa-20150730&sp_mid=49217809&sp_rid=c2ltb25hc2RAZ21haWwY29tS0>, 31 07 2015.

²⁰ Bertrand N., "Senior Western official: Links between Turkey and ISIS are now 'undeniable'", *Business Insider*, DATA, <<http://www.businessinsider.com/links-between-turkey-and-isis-are-now-undeniable-2015-7>>, 03 08 2015.

2. The security dilemma on the border with Syria and the possibility of an intervention

Turkey perceives the situation on its southern border as a security dilemma. Booth and Wheeler describe the security dilemma as “a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors, with each level consisting of two related propositions that can be assumed to be valid, which force decision-makers to choose between them. The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others; the second and derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding.”²¹

On the first level, Turkey could choose either to wait and hope that a solution to Syria's crisis would come without its interference or perceive ISIS and YPG as threats to its own security and act against them. YPG is thought to pose a threat to the ethnic composition in northern Syria. More, the victories of YPG could enhance consolidation of the Kurdish territories that might lead to creation of a “Kurdish corridor”²² or some other kind of Kurdish polity. Such a development is greatly unwanted by Turkey, as it might facilitate Turkey's Kurds' aspirations of seeking independence. For a while, it seemed that Turkey had chosen the first option, but now the situation has clearly changed. The Suruç attack worked as a wake-up call for Turkey's decision makers to take action and both ISIS as well as Syrian Kurds are perceived as a threat. As the dilemma of interpretation has been settled, Turkey faces the dilemma of response. Turkey has started an active anti-terror campaign against both ISIS and PKK. Now the question that looms is how far will this campaign go? Will Turkey create a buffer zone in northern Syria? We evaluate this option in light of both Turkey's domestic political structure as well as international constraints.

2.1. Arguments for the intervention

Probably the most important factor, which tells us about the possibility of an intervention, is the active promotion of this idea by the AKP leaders. It is reflected

²¹ Booth K., Wheeler N. J., *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 4.

²² Tastekin F., “Kurds eye new corridor to Mediterranean”, *Al-Monitor*, June 22, 2015, <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-kurdish-corridor-in-the-making-kobane.html>>, 03 08 2015.

in such martial rhetoric as “to bring back Ottoman order and justice”²³ and to not allow creation of a Kurdish state near the southern border.²⁴ Already in 2014 leaked information appeared about the possible intervention plans.²⁵ Recently, new data provided clues about high-level meetings on the question of a potential intervention.²⁶ What’s more, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is organising a World Humanitarian Summit under the auspices of the UN General Secretary in 2016. The president himself recently declared that besides humanitarian support, discussions would be held about humanitarian intervention too.²⁷ Recently some enthusiastic announcements were made that Turkey and the US. had agreed to establish a safe zone but the US. rejected that information.²⁸ Nevertheless, in a recent interview the Prime Minister repeated that “we will try” to establish a safe zone.²⁹

Turkey’s military holds the traditional view of avoiding active participation in regional developments and the Syrian crisis is no exception³⁰ (what’s more, during this period the military is waiting for the formation of a new government).

²³ “Turkish PM promises to bring ‘Ottoman order, justice’”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 17, 2015, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-promises-to-bring-ottoman-order-justice.aspx?PageID=238&NID=85581&NewsCatID=338>>, 01 08 2015.

²⁴ “Erdogan says Turkey not to allow Kurdish State in Northern Syria”, *Today’s Zaman*, June 27, 2015, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-promises-to-bring-ottoman-order-justice.aspx?PageID=238&NID=85581&NewsCatID=338>>, 01 08 2015.

²⁵ MISH’s Global Economic Trend Analysis, “Turkey Plans Military Intervention in Syria, Bans YouTube for Leaked Reporting”, *Global Economic Analysis*, March 27, 2014, <<http://globeconomicanalysis.blogspot.com.tr/2014/03/turkey-plans-military-intervention-in.html>>, 02 08 2015.

²⁶ “Military bolsters presence on border as commanders summoned to Ankara”, *Today’s Zaman*, July 5, 2015, <http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_military-bolsters-presence-on-border-as-commanders-summoned-to-ankara_392902.html>, 02 08 2015.

²⁷ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “World Humanitarian Summit”, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/world-humanitarian-summit.en.mfa>>, 03 08 2015.

²⁸ “No ‘safe zone’ on Turkish-Syrian border, US says”, *Today’s Zaman*, July 29, 2015, <http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_no-safe-zone-on-turkish-syrian-border-us-says_394953.html>, 03 08 2015; Solaken G., “U.S. denies reaching agreement with Turkey on Syria ‘safe zone’”, *Reuters*, August 11, 2015, <<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/11/uk-mideast-crisis-turkey-usa-idUKKCN0QG1UC20150811>>, 15 08 2015.

²⁹ “Turkey PM: Syria no-fly zone needed”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 12, 2015, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-pm-syria-no-fly-zone-needed.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86826&NewsCatID=359>>, 13 08 2015.

³⁰ Gurcan M., “Turkish military edges closer to Syria intervention”, *Al-Monitor*, July 1, 2015, <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-military-intervention-countdown-army-objective.html>>, 02 08 2015.

But despite this long-held position of non-interference, the situation is changing because of new factors. First, the HDP (tur. *Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, eng. People's Democratic Party) was elected to parliament and the military perceives it as an extension of PKK. Second, the military regards PYD as an affiliate of PKK in Syria. Third, after the Suruç terror act, the ISIS threat is even more obvious. Mainly these three factors have weakened the military's opposition towards an intervention.³¹

Another incentive for the intervention is the possibility of the formation of a Kurdish state. It is hard to predict how likely this could be. Nevertheless, the reality is that Kurdish forces are successfully fighting against ISIS both in Iraq and Syria together with Western allies. They are very pro-Western, which makes the Kurds quite unique in the Middle East. They have also long cherished the dream of establishing Kurdistan and the confrontation with ISIS provides the possibility of achieving it. Some sources claim that they have so much determination to form a state that the Kurds would go for it "whether the US likes it, or not."³² Turkey perceives this situation as a threat, which enhances Turkey's Kurdish separatism. However, the US traditionally retains its influence on the Kurds. If Ankara would like to suppress Kurdish national aspirations, it would expect help from Washington in order to stabilise the situation. If Washington could and would help Turkey on this matter, then Turkey should repay the favour with even bigger support in the fight against ISIS (which is at least partly happening right now, with permission for the US to use the Incirlik air base). Without the US's help against the formation of a Kurdish state, Turkey would have to risk unilateral intervention if such a situation would appear.³³

Turkey and the Western states together are experiencing the consequences of a humanitarian catastrophe in Syria and Iraq. If Turkey were to persist with its intervention plans to create a safe zone inside of Syria, it might help to stabilize the situation. This kind of idea is vivid in the Turkish media, some UN officials also promised help if a safe zone were to be created.³⁴ It is important to note that

³¹ "Kurdish gains stimulate Turkish military intervention in Syria", *Ara News*, June 30, 2015, <<http://aranews.net/2015/06/kurdish-gains-stimulate-turkish-military-intervention-in-syria>>, 02 08 2015.

³² Hously A., "Kurds intent on carving new state out of Iraq after ISIS fight 'whether the US likes it or not'", *Fox News*, July 2, 2015, <<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/07/02/kurds-intent-on-carving-new-state-out-iraq-after-isis-fight-whether-us-likes-it>>, 12 08 2015.

³³ Friedman G., "The Turkish Enigma", *Stratfor*, July 21, 2015, <<https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/turkish-enigma>>, 22 07 2015.

³⁴ Hogg J., "UN would offer humanitarian support in Syria safe zones: Amos", *Reuters*, October 20, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/20/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-idUSKCN0I91O7_20141020>, 03 08 2015.

in the UN framework, a humanitarian intervention was already discussed in 2012. At that time, not only Turkey but also France and Britain reminded Assad about such a possibility.³⁵

Turkey is not the only country that has been deliberating on the creation of a safe zone in Syria. Such plans have also been discussed in Jordan. It has plans to create a safe zone in the south of Syria with the aim to block the ISIS advance and to create “a buffer zone” for Syrian rebels and refugees. The safe zone could be created in the Daraa and Suwayda provinces (including Deraa city, the birthplace of the Syrian rebellion). Assad’s regime would be alerted not to attack the area from the air, otherwise it would suffer retaliation.³⁶ According to a report by O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institute, the US and the coalition’s partners should create one or two buffer zones in relatively promising areas such as the Kurdish northeast or maybe in the Syrian south near Jordan.³⁷

History shows that the idea of intervention in Turkey has been pretty much alive during the 20th century (acquisition of the Hatay province in 1937 and 1998). Last and not least, a very old threat was made in 1998, also on the grounds of the Kurdish problem. The Syrian regime was fostering PKK in the Syrian north. At that time, threats were enough and Syria stopped its support for PKK. Now there is no regime that could overthrow YGP’s forces. During Turkey’s anti-terror campaign, there already have been some reports that YGP forces have sometimes been targeted.

To sum up, there are many arguments for the intervention. AKP determination, diminishing army’s resistance, fear of the establishment of a Kurdish state, humanitarian arguments, similar (maybe combined?) plans in Jordan and the relatively fresh threat in 1998 to intervene on the grounds of the Kurdish problem. However, there are also some strong arguments against the intervention and we will discuss them in the following section.

³⁵ “UN: Syria buffer zone plan raises questions”, *The Jerusalem Post*, August 31, 2015, <<http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/UN-Syria-buffer-zone-plan-raises-questions>>, 03 08 2015.

³⁶ Jones S., Khala R., Solomon E., “Jordan to set up buffer zone in southern Syria”, *The Financial Times*, June, 29, 2015, <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ead1961a-1e38-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0.html#axzz3hkVRxTKd>>, 03 08 2015.

³⁷ O’Hanlon M. E., “Deconstructing Syria: Towards a regionalized strategy for a confederate country”, *Brookings Institute*, June 23, 2015, <<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/06/23-syria-strategy-ohanlon?cid=00900015020089101US0001-06291>>, 03 08 2015.

2.2 Arguments against the intervention

Despite all the arguments for the intervention, there are solid contra arguments too. First of all, Turkey has a large army but it lacks battle experience (despite the fight against the PKK). This fact raises doubts about Turkey's abilities to successfully create a buffer zone on its own. Even the US army has suffered setbacks during conventional military interventions in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey's military reluctance to intervene is understandable.

Probably the most important argument against the buffer zone is US disagreement and its support for the Kurds. Turkey's confrontation with Syrian Kurds would create problems in bilateral relations with the US. Recently there was some tension between Washington and Ankara but it was most likely diminished by the US envoy General Allen's visit to Ankara. During it negotiations were held and soon after followed a talk between the US and Turkish presidents via phone.³⁸ According to *Al-Monitor*, one of the biggest sources of anxiety for Turkey is the transfer of ISIS territories to the YPG.³⁹ Yet, it would be against the declared US support for Syrian territorial integrity.⁴⁰ In the Incirlik air base accord, the US is reported to have agreed for partial creation of a no-fly zone above the Turkey-Syria border. In that zone, Assad's aviation would not be permitted. The zone would not be directly against the YPG, but there is a possibility of retaliation if the YPG would pose a threat to Turkey's border.⁴¹ However, the ambivalent US position does not allow the formation of a clear opinion about the US's plans.

Turkey has tried to obtain support for the intervention not only from the international community but also from its own citizens. This is because of an internal struggle between the Islamist and secular parts of Turkey's society. Secularists suspect that Islamists are secretly united with radical Islam, therefore AKP's initiatives are perceived with scepticism. Intervention would not receive united support from the party either because some party members think that

³⁸ Talk between Ambassador of Lithuania in Turkey A. Brüzga and U.S. Ambassador in Ankara John R. Bass, August, 2015.

³⁹ "Turkish military wary of Erdogan plan for Syrian buffer zone", *Al-Monitor*, July 5, 2015, <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkish-military-wary-erdogan-buffer-zone-syria-no-fly.html>>, 02 08 2015.

⁴⁰ "US tells PYD to respect territorial integrity of Syria", *TRT World*, July 2, 2015, <<http://beta.trtworld.com/turkey/us-tells-pyd-respect-territorial-integrity-syria-4056>>, 03 08 2015.

⁴¹ Ergan U., "Partial no-fly zone included in US-Turkey consensus: Turkish sources", *Hurriyet Daily News*, June 11, 2015, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/partial-no-fly-zone-included-in-us-turkey-consensus.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85850&NewsCatID=510>>, 02 08 2015.

intervention would have negative consequences for AKP's chances to remain in power.⁴²

In this respect, religious and historical arguments are also important. An attack on one Sunni group could have negative outcomes for relations with other, more moderate Sunni groups (for example, al-Sham legion). After all, as Friedman notes, invasion into a state which less than 100 years ago was part of the Ottoman Empire could raise anti-Turkish feelings.⁴³

To conclude, the most prominent arguments against the intervention are a lack of battle experience in the Turkish army, the US's rejection of this idea (so far) and its support to the Kurds, and no backing from the secular part of society, as well as from some AKP members. There are also some regional structural constraints, such as the Sunni-Shia divide and the historical Ottoman legacy.

3. Arrangements of military and international law and possible implications of the intervention

Turkey's military intervention might have an important impact on Syria's civil war. In this section, we present a possible military plan for the intervention and analyse its potential implications.

As reported by the pro-government press, the aim of the intervention is to create a safe zone (or "buffer zone") in the area connecting the Kobani and Afrin cantons, to the north of Aleppo, between the cities of Jarablus and Azaz (in some sources – between Karkamis and Oncupinar).⁴⁴ Official objectives are the creation of a safe zone for refugees and the Syrian opposition. However, not only ISIS would be targeted there, but also the Kurds.

In order to intervene and create a safe zone Turkey is planning to use its Special Forces Command, the 5th Armoured Brigade at Gaziantep, the 20th Armoured Brigade at Urfa and the 2nd Tactical Air Force at Diyarbakir, which would spearhead a possible Syrian operation. In total that would be about 18 thousand troops.⁴⁵ The fact that Turkey is capable of taking initiative on its own is reflected

⁴² Friedman, (note 33).

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ "Turkey 'preparing' for military intervention in Syria", al-Araby, June 29, 2015, <<http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2015/6/29/Turkey-preparing-for-military-intervention-in-Syria>>, 25 07 2015.

⁴⁵ Gurcan M, "Turkish military edges closer to Syria intervention", *Al-Monitor*, July 1, 2015, <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-military-intervention-countdown-army-objective.html>>, 02 08 2015.

in the precedent of Suleyman Shah tomb when Turkey organised an expedition deep into the territory of Syria and successfully transferred the tomb to safety.⁴⁶ Turkey has enough military capabilities to achieve this goal; however it would be hard to maintain the security of this zone. According to information from locals who live near the border, even now Kurdish and ISIS supporters are plotting to take advantage of open borders in order to send militants and weapons.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, for the international community, Turkey probably would try to present the intervention as an application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. For this reason, Turkey would have to request the UN Security Council's permission for the intervention apparently pointing at previous precedents, for example, the 2011 Libyan case. In support of this appeal, Turkey could argue that it actively participated in solving Syria's humanitarian catastrophe. What is more, information about the actions of Assad's forces could be described as war crimes and crimes against humanity, therefore the last option of R2P could be used – military intervention. Of course, Turkey could employ other arguments such as the fight against international terrorism and self-defence.

Despite that, the possibility of acquiring the support of the Security Council is very low because Assad is backed by China and Russia (nevertheless, as Russia-Turkey relations are improving, Russia states that it is open to dialogue with the anti-ISIS Syrian opposition⁴⁸ and Erdogan thinks that the Russian position to support Assad could change too⁴⁹). According to R2P, military actions without the approval of the Security Council are against international law. Nonetheless, Turkey's intervention could get support from the UN. According to Valerie Amos, a high-ranking UN official, the UN would provide humanitarian help in the safe zone.⁵⁰ That could at least partly legitimate the intervention. This could also change NATO's position and the buffer zone could become part of the anti-ISIS coalition's

⁴⁶ Orucoglu, (note 46).

⁴⁷ Banco E. "Turkish Military Intervention In Syria Threatens Border Region", *International Business Times*, June 29, 2015, <<http://www.ibtimes.com/turkish-military-intervention-syria-threatens-border-region-stability-1988502>>, 21 07 2015.

⁴⁸ Unal A., "Moscow open to dialogue with anti-ISIS Syrian opposition, says Russian envoy", *Daily Sabah*, July 19, 2015, <<http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/07/19/moscow-open-to-dialogue-with-anti-isis-syrian-opposition-says-russian-envoy>>, 21 07 2015.

⁴⁹ Özer V., "Erdogan believes Putin 'may give up on' Syria's Bashar al-Assad", *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 3, 2015, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-believes-putin-may-give-up-on-syrias-bashar-al-assad.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86320&NewsCatID=352>>, 03 08 2015.

⁵⁰ Hogg J., "U.N. would offer humanitarian support in Syria safe zones: Amos", *Reuters*, October 20, 2014, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/20/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-idUSKCN01910720141020>>, 03 08 2015.

endeavours. Turkey could also support the intervention using the precedents of Kosovo in 1999 and Israel's fight against Hezbollah. According to the Turkish press, if Turkey were unable to achieve diplomatic backing it would implement "plan B – the model of southern Lebanon". In this case, Turkey's troops would stay in the buffer zone for a shorter period of time with the aim to train and equip the Free Syrian Army.⁵¹

As the Syrian regime would hardly be inclined to grant permission for the intervention, it would interpret it as aggression and violation of its sovereignty. Nonetheless, it is likely that no military action would be taken, as happened in Suleyman Shah tomb's case.⁵² This argument is supported by the worsening military situation of Assad's forces.⁵³ But in any case, the situation in that territory is beyond the Syrian regime's control. It is unknown how the intervention would be perceived by the other immediate fighting factions. Recent military attacks were supported by the YPG,⁵⁴ however, some information appeared that Turkey also attacked Syrian Kurds.⁵⁵ The opposition supported by Turkey welcomes such a plan because the battle against ISIS has become even tougher than the fight against Assad.

Looking at the conflict from a broader regional perspective, we can notice competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Syria. If Assad would be removed from power, it would be a harsh blow for Iranian interests. Syria is important to Iran because it is Iran's closest ally in the region and a link to terror groups that fight against Israel. Therefore, it is important for Iran to maintain the Syrian *status quo* while Turkey's end point is to remove Assad from power.⁵⁶ Growing military and economic power (after the removal of sanctions), its geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and an Iran-Syria mutual defence

⁵¹ "Turkey 'preparing' for military intervention in Syria", *al-Araby*, June 29, 2015, <<http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2015/6/29/Turkey-preparing-for-military-intervention-in-Syria>>, 22 07 2015.

⁵² Orucoglu, (note 46).

⁵³ Mohney G., "Assad Admits Syrian Army's 'Shortage of Manpower' — But Vows to Win Bloody Conflict", *Vice News*, July 26, 2015, <<https://news.vice.com/article/assad-admits-syrian-armys-shortage-of-manpower-but-vows-to-win-bloody-conflict>>, 03 08 2015.

⁵⁴ "PYD thanks Turkey for support against ISIS", *Daily Sabah*, July 26, 2015, <<http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/07/26/pyd-thanks-turkey-for-support-against-isis>>, 03 08 2015.

⁵⁵ "Analysis: US-Turkey deal on Syria a big gamble", *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 3, 2015, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/analysis-us-turkey-deal-on-syria-a-big-gamble.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86340&NewsCatID=510>>, 03 08 2015.

⁵⁶ Mohammed I., "Turkey and Iran Rivalry on Syria", *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations* 10 (2-3), 2011, p. 66.

pact⁵⁷ pose a threat to Turkey and its interest in Syria. Despite that, it is unlikely that a limited intervention could lead Iran to attack Turkey. However, if Turkey was to choose to cross the limited scope of the intervention and entangle itself with Assad's forces, military response from Iran is a likely option.

All things considered, Turkey's intervention looks like a promising idea only if it has support from the UN Security Council. As we have seen, without it the principle of R2P could not be implemented. What's more, it could possibly escalate the conflict to an even higher level, as confrontation with prominent Syrian regime supporters seems likely. And in any case, it is unclear how successfully humanitarian help could be provided in a unilateral intervention.

However, if the intervention gained support from the Security Council then Turkey together with the international community could bring much-needed help in this humanitarian catastrophe. It might ease the humanitarian situation in Syria and diminish the flow of immigrants to Turkey and the EU. The intervention could be even more effective if it would be conducted in cooperation with an intervention by Jordan. This coordinated action with Jordan could be a blow to ISIS, which is already losing ground (although slowly).⁵⁸ It would also provide support for the so far not very successful moderate Syrian opposition. If Turkey could obtain support from the Security Council, Iran might be forestalled to act against it.

All in all, Turkey has enough military capabilities and a plan of how to proceed with the intervention. Turkey is likely to justify its intervention on the principle of R2P and such arguments as the fight against international terrorism and the right to self-defence. It also could go ahead with the intervention even without the approval of the Security Council, while pointing at existing precedents. Jordan is also considering an intervention and there might be cooperation between the two countries. Looking from the regional perspective, it is important to note the competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Syria and the fact that Syria and Iran have signed a mutual defence pact. In order to receive successful outcomes from the intervention, the Security Council's support would be greatly beneficial.

⁵⁷ "Iran, Syria sign defense agreement", *Ynew News*, June 16, 2015, <<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3263739,00.html>>, 03 08 2015.

⁵⁸ Beauchamp Z., "Map: ISIS has lost 9.4 percent of its territory this year", *Vox World*, July 30, 2015, <<http://www.vox.com/2015/7/30/9069705/isis-map-10-percent>>, 16 08 2015.

Conclusions

The foreign policy of the ruling AKP is critical of traditional Turkey's non-interference to Middle Eastern matters and seeks active engagement in the region. This view is based on "civilizational geopolitics", which is in turn grounded not on traditional geopolitical, economic or power politics insights but rather on historical and religious arguments, neo-Ottomanism and Islam. AKP describes this new approach as diversification of foreign policy and stresses that Turkey is an independent actor whose interests do not necessarily coincide with the West's position. It is on these grounds that the "Zero problems with neighbours" strategy is based, and it was functioning well until the start of Arab protests.

Turkey's ambitions to be a "central state" and actively engage in the region led to entanglement in the Syrian crisis. After the start of the active anti-terror campaign, Turkey's rigid position in the conflict is even more visible. From the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey pursued the idea of a buffer/no-fly/safe zone in order to protect civilians and support anti-Assad rebels. However, right now in the anti-terror campaign not only an answer to threats is visible but also the AKP party's ambitions to get more support in possible snap elections. Turkey is aiming not only to fight against ISIS but also to disrupt consolidation of Syria's Kurdish territories. Establishment of the buffer zone would help to achieve those aims and also likely to help solve the humanitarian crisis.

While there are many arguments for and against the intervention, the most prominent are the AKP leaders' push for it and weakening Turkish military resistance to the idea. The precarious humanitarian situation also works as an incentive in this regard. The main contra argument is US rejection of an intervention and its support for the Syrian Kurds fighting against ISIS. However, the US position could change as the situation is constantly in flux.

As this article was being written (in the middle of August, 2015) the possibility of Turkey's intervention is a little less than medium. Nevertheless, it rests heavily on the quickly changing circumstances and especially on the US position about Syria's territorial integrity. If tactical firing in Syria's territory and punishing measures for PKK would not be enough for Turkey, it would probably ask for a sitting of the UN Security Council in order to discuss threats emanating from Syria and the legitimization of its humanitarian and defensive actions. The possibility of the UN Security Council's permission for the intervention is small, but Turkey has its own capabilities to conduct a unilateral intervention. Later on it could be justified on humanitarian grounds and existing precedents.

The Syrian regime would condemn the intervention, but it is likely that no military action would be taken against Turkey. If the intervention would be limited in its scope then it is unlikely that Iran would employ its military in order to protect its ally. It is also possible to observe some changes in Russia's position to support Assad.

The UN Security Council's approval would greatly enhance the chances of the intervention to be successful. Double intervention in cooperation with Jordan could be even more successful. Interventions could provide a blow to ISIS positions and might eventually bring nearer the end of the Syrian crisis. However, without the approval of the Security Council, the intervention could even further reduce stability in the region.

US and European Integration prior to 1968

Nguyen Thi Thuy Hang*

Abstract

This paper surveys the history of the United States policy towards European integration from 1945 up to 1968 before President Nixon came into office. Drawing on a detailed analysis of the documents mostly obtainable from the official websites of the US Department of State, the US National Archives, and the EU Historical Archives, the paper argues that it was the European geopolitical and economic context after the Second World War and the United States national interests which moulded this country's pro-European integration policy. Thus, the paper will begin with an analysis of the search for global influence between the United States and the Soviet Union before examining how the United States redefined its core interests in recognition of the Soviet threat. Then, it will explore the role that the United States played in reconstructing Western European economy and defending it physically. Also, it is argued that the United States and Western Europe took concerted action together to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom), the very first supranational institutions which have made the European integration process irreversible. It will be concluded that the vitality of the European integration project depended on US economic and political capital for its success.

Keywords: European integration, the Nixon administration, Western Europe, the Marshall Plan, NATO.

It is of vital importance to the United States that European recovery be continued to ultimate success...If Europe failed to recover the peoples of these countries might be driven to a philosophy of despair - the philosophy which contends that their basic wants can be met only by the surrender of their basic rights to totalitarian control. Such a turn of events would constitute a shattering blow to peace and stability in the world.

Truman, 1947

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I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago.

All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal.

Kennedy, 1962

The US views and attitudes towards European economic and political integration from 1945 up to 1968 before President Nixon took possession of the White House were generally supportive. The Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations' enthusiasm for European moves towards integration were driven by their calculations of US security and strategic interests in the Cold War setting. On the surface, the US's pro-European integration policy appears to be the story of a US foreign policy seeking to promote peace in the world politics. However, a closer examination suggests that the path of this foreign policy was carefully designed by US administrations that always placed US national interests in the first priority in their foreign policy agenda.

To understand changes and continuity in US policy towards European integration in general, it is essential to review US policy in Western Europe from 1945 to 1968. This historical excursion will show why and how the US administrations prior to 1968 had supported Western European integration. Henceforth, this paper will begin with a description of US and Soviet efforts to fill the power vacuums. That the US leadership developed and defined the Soviet threat after the Second World War had a profound impact on European integration. Then, the paper analyses how the economic aid and political supports offered by the US administrations helped to pacify much of Europe. While defending the peoples in Europe not only against the Soviet Union but also against themselves, the United States established a grand alliance with Western Europe and laid European integration as a cornerstone in its foreign policy design. It will be concluded that the United States had been a crucial force to drive the European economic and political integration process. It was undeniable that the European integration process evolved from within Europe; however, such evolution would be hardly smooth without concerted efforts made by US administrations.

1. Filling power vacuums

Apart from a war-weakened Europe, world politics in the post-1945 era was characterised by the search for global influence between the United States and the Soviet Union, popularly termed the Cold War¹. Germany, Italy, and Japan were all defeated. This left vacuums of power in the world politics landscape. The United Kingdom was “nearly bankrupt, dependent and unable to police its empire, was reduced to a resentful second-rate power”; France was suffering from political instability and incapable of mustering international respect². Nationalist movements in the colonial world broke out, seeking independence and struggling to “make the world less Europe-centered³.” The United States and the Soviet Union, equally enthusiastic to realize their universal visions of the post-war world and expand their respective influence, sought to fill power vacuums left by both the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan and the decline of the United Kingdom and France⁴. Nonetheless, the United States and the Soviet Union had many conflicts over occupation policies in Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia, and Korea.

After the Second World War, only the United States and the Soviet Union were able to challenge one another for influence in Europe and for the capacity to establish the parameters of the post-war world. The United States aimed to contain further influence of the Soviet Union in Europe by developing free market capitalism on this continent. From the US perspective, this would contribute to the rehabilitation of West European economies and their political stability. By tying these economies to its economy, the United States would enhance its opportunity to expand its influence in the world⁵.

As the Soviet Union consolidated their control over the territory that had been liberated from Nazi occupation by the Red Army, the relationship between the two wartime allies became worse. The consolidation of Moscow-controlled communist governments in East and Central Europe, the communist coup in

¹ Malone R., “The Contest for World Domination”, *Trumpet*, September/October, 2005, <<https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/1703.20.76.0/middle-east/the-contest-for-world-domination>>, 14 05 2014.

² Paterson T. G., *On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993, p. 25.

³ Ibid, p. 26.

⁴ Ibid, p. 25-26.

⁵ Johnson C., *The Sorrow of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004.

Prague in February 1948, and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin put an end to the Grand Allies established during the Second World War. On the US side, the Truman Doctrine was announced as a bulwark against further Soviet expansion in Europe and elsewhere:

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations⁶.

In addition to that, the United States positively responded to the European initiative to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Parties to this Treaty...seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area...

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or America shall be considered an attack against them⁷.

By 1950 the background for the Cold War had been established: two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, each was supported by groups of allies, confronted each other in the middle of Europe. To recall Dean Acheson's words, then undersecretary of the US Department of State: "not since Rome and Carthage, had there been such a polarization of power on this earth⁸". The multi-polar system of the 1930s was replaced by a bipolar structure. Yet, it should be noted that this bipolar world does not mean that the two poles were equal in power. There were basic asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union from the early post-war years. The United States had unchallenged economic power. To compensate its economic weakness relative to the United States, the Soviet Union sought to sustain its military strength and impose ideological and political dominance in the sphere of influence that it had set up in Eastern Europe. Indeed, in their struggle for global influence, the United States

⁶ "Truman Doctrine": President Harry S. Truman's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, *Avalon Project*, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp>, 30 09 2013.

⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>, 30 09 2013.

⁸ Duiker W. J., Spielvogel J. J., *World history, volumes II: Since 1500*, 6th ed., Boston: Wadsworth, 2010, p. 772.

and the Soviet Union employed a wide range of means such as a massive and expensive arms race, propaganda campaigns and especially the creation of rival alliances and the extension of military and economic aid to client states and would-be client states⁹.

2. Perpetual interests

Lord Palmerston underlined in 1848 that core national interests could be seen as the “eternal” and ultimate justification for national policy¹⁰. With the presence of Soviet power, Washington had considered which regions and issues the United States needed to care about. Miscamble argues Roosevelt’s administration “failed to appreciate that their national interests were tied up with either complementing or assuming the long time British role of preventing Eurasia’s domination by a single power. President Franklin Roosevelt and the United States did not fight the war to become the ‘balancer’ in international politics. They fought it primarily to defeat the Axis powers and to preserve their way of life¹¹.”

However, in the recognition of the threat to the United States and its institutions that a powerful Soviet Union represented, Washington had fundamentally redefined its core interests. Leffler highlights that “the essentials of American grand strategy called for a Eurasian land mass free from the domination of a single hostile power (or coalition of adversaries) and a world trading system hospitable to the unrestricted movement of goods and capital¹².” Explicitly, this meant that a recovered Europe would certainly help the US national interests avoid being profoundly affected as shown in the Department of State’s report titled “Certain aspect of the European recovery problem from the United States standpoint” in July 1947. The report shows that the United States had important economic interest in Europe. Europe had been the US market and main source of supply for a wide range of products and services to the people of the United States.

⁹ Powaski R. E., *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. ix.

¹⁰ Ridley J., *Lord Palmerston*, London: Constable, 1970, p. 334.

¹¹ Miscamble W. D., *Debating American Grand Strategy after Major War: Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy*, Elsevier Limited, 2009, p. 554.

¹² Leffler M. P., “American Grand Strategy from World War to Cold War 1940-1950”, in Kennedy P., Hitchcock W. I., eds., *From War to Peace: Altered Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century*, New Haven, New York, 2000, p. 58-59.

Furthermore, the report affirmed that security in Europe had been strategically important to US security. This underpinned US determination to defend Europe from being disintegrated:

The broad pattern of our foreign policy, including the confidence we have placed in the United States, has assumed the continuation in Europe of a considerable number of free states subservient to no great power, and recognizing their heritage of civil liberties and personal responsibility and determined to maintain this heritage¹³.

To sum up, the core national interests of the US were physical security, the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity and world order. It also should be noted that the very first priority was given to US influence. These interests have been somewhat reconfirmed in President Barack Obama's Nobel Peace Prize lecture in Oslo in December 2009: "The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms ... We have done so out of an enlightened self-interest because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren¹⁴." The pursuit of such "enlightened self-interest" has been the essential element of US national policies in general and US policy towards European unity in particular.

3. Essential motives

US politicians' public statements about their support for European integration fairly reflected US foreign policy; but the motives for such US assistance were much more complicated. An analysis of the themes emerging from the documentary research has revealed five main reasons why the United States supported European integration:

Firstly, from its own experience of development from thirteen colonies to a successful federal model and market economy, the United States highly hoped to conduct its economic and political system in Europe through the course of European integration. The endeavour to realize this high hope was apparently

¹³ Department of State's report "Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint", July 23, 1947, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/6-1.pdf#zoom=100>, 18 01 2013.

¹⁴ Obama B., *A Just and Lasting Peace*, Nobel Peace Prize 2009 lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2009, <http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html>, 18 01 2013.

expressed in US politicians' addresses. For instance, in his speech before the OEEC council (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) calling for greater integration in Europe in Paris on October 31, 1949, Paul Hoffman, the head of the Economic Cooperation Administration lectured US lessons on the Europeans as follows:

The substance of such integration would be the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restriction on the movements of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away. The fact that we have in the United States a single market of 156 million consumers has been indispensable to the strength and efficiency of our economy. The creation of a permanent, freely trading area, comprising 270 million consumers in Western Europe would have a multitude of helpful consequences. It would accelerate the development of large-scale, low-cost production industries. It would make the effective use of all resources easier, the stifling of healthy competition more difficult¹⁵.

Supporting the move for economic integration from within Western Europe, the United States wanted to apply such a pattern in the region. This would ensure not only economic, socio-political stability on the continent but also the US's long-term economic development. US enterprises would see in Western Europe not merely a chance to share the fruits of an expanding economy but also the opportunity to have a part in the exploitation of a great new mass market on this continent.

Secondly, the United States held the view that an economically integrated Europe would be more efficient and rational. This would definitely be in the US's interests. President Eisenhower indicated that a "Europe cannot attain the towering material stature possible to its peoples' skills and spirit so long as it is divided by patchwork territorial fences" was unable to solve its problems¹⁶. In the spirit of an old age axiom "united we stand, divided we died", he also pointed out that "once united, the farms and factories of France and Belgium, the foundries of Germany, the rich farmlands of Holland and Denmark, the skilled labour of Italy, will produce miracles for the common good¹⁷." In addition, European integration would help to prevent movements of nationalism and wars in Europe. The United States profited

¹⁵ Hoffman P., *Hoffman's Speech before the OEEC Council Calling for Greater Integration in Europe*, October 31, 1949, <<http://www.hum.leiden.edu/history/eu-history/historical/schuman.html>>, 16 09 2013.

¹⁶ Eisenhower J., *General Ike: A Personal Reminiscence*, Norwalk: Easton Press, 2003, p. 230.

¹⁷ Ibid.

more from dealing with a united European partner than with individual larger and smaller European nations. The question “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” raised by Henry Kissinger, US top diplomat under presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in the 1970s, implicitly meant it was necessary for Europe to be united to speak in one voice. This eventually produced a more efficient and rationale European partner for the United States in international politics.

Thirdly, European unity in the security and economic areas would lighten the burden put on the United States after the Second World War. This was probably the reason for Clayton’s recommendation for a three-year grant only to help Europe to rebuild its economy based on a European economic federation, an unthinkable measure in the United States itself. Eisenhower firmly held that European unity “would mean early dependence from American aid and other Atlantic countries” as he really sought to decrease US federal expenditure, which required a massive deduction in defence expenditure.¹⁸ President Kennedy, the Republican successor, also concerned about the US’s increasing negative balance of payment shared the view that a united Europe should be able to play a greater role in the mutual defence, do more for developing countries and together with the United States, lower the trade barriers and solve economic disputes:

A united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations¹⁹. (Kennedy 1962).

US concern about reducing its economic and military burden could be solved partly with “a solid, healthy and confident Europe” as clearly stated by President Eisenhower: “If with our moral and material assistance, the free European nations could attain a similar integration, our friends would be strengthened, our own economies improved, and the laborious NATO machinery of mutual defense vastly simplified²⁰”.

¹⁸ Eisenhower J., *General Ike: A Personal Reminiscence*, Norwalk: Easton Press, 2003, p. 232.

¹⁹ Kennedy J. F., *Address at the Independence Hall in Philadelphia*, July 4, 1962, <<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-113-001.aspx>>, 29 07 2015.

²⁰ Eisenhower, (note 16) p. 232.

Fourthly, a strong Europe could help to contain the Soviet Union. The United States was determined to contain the expansion of communism in Europe. The United States sought to prevent the scenario in which the peoples of Western European nations would not have resisted the Soviet Union's invasion very much because they were disappointed with capitalism and democracy and considered communism as a fairer and better system. France and Italy, nations in Western Europe, had strong communist parties. Communists had leading roles to play in the resistance in these two countries in the Second World War. Communists had also done well in democratic elections in France and Italy. The United States diminished any possibilities that communist parties in such nations were able to gain power, either through the ballots or revolutions, as this would eventually lead to the further expansion of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.

Acting on our own, by ourselves, we cannot establish justice throughout the world; we cannot insure its domestic tranquillity, or provide for its common defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But joined with other free nations, we can do all this and more. We can assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke of poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade and payments at the highest possible level of growth. We can mount a deterrent powerful enough to deter any aggression. And ultimately we can help to achieve a world of law and free choice, banishing the world of war and coercion²¹.

In the US perspective, the most effective way to avert those possibilities was to sustain strong US military forces in Western Europe following the Second World War to deal with any potential expansion of communism or the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, and to provide economic assistance to Western European nations to help them reconstruct their infrastructures and economies destroyed by tragic events during the Second World War. This would indicate the superiority of the capitalist system and democracy to the communist system.

The last motive behind US support for European integration is associated with its concern about a Germany in Europe. Seemingly, from the US approach, it was important to restore Germany's industries, as contributions from Germany to the rehabilitation of Europe were crucial. Yet, an industrially restored Germany would accumulate economic might and ultimately military power and political dominance in Europe. Such German dominance was one of the deep roots of the war, which had just devastated Europe as much as Germany and France. The United States held the view that the best solution to the German problem was to

²¹ Kennedy, (note 19).

integrate Germany with Western Europe generally and with France particularly. An industrialized Germany in a strong European framework would decisively contribute to preventing future problems with this state.

These motives were central between 1945 and 1950 when the United States promoted the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. Indispensable contributions

Policymakers in Washington had an intention to guarantee that the United States would have a long-lasting influence on the European continent and continue to shape the future of Europe²². US enthusiasm for the creation of a more united Europe was clearly expressed in the European Recovery Program (ERP), or the Marshall Plan aimed at reconstructing the Western European economy, and the establishment of NATO aimed at defending physical security on the continent. Yet, it should be noted that European economic integration was a process evolved from within Western Europe. European leaders designed a plan for the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) with the hope that economic integration would ensure peace and prosperity on the continent. The United States was interested in their scheme and encouraged European economic unity. US policy ensured that a more united Europe remained friendly to the United States. The Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations between 1945 and 1968 had tried to make the new Europe fit into a wider Atlantic framework. The Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO were the important contributions of the US leading to the formation of the ECSC and the EEC.

4.1. The Marshall Plan and European integration

The U.S. leadership firmly believed that economic recovery in Europe was vital to achieve and sustain stability in the region. From the US view Western Europe was crucial in establishing a stable equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though the United States enjoyed a position of unparalleled

²² Larres K., *Assertive Supremacy and Enlightened Self-interest: The United States and the 'Unity of Europe'*, Johns Hopkins University, 2009, p. 5.

military might and great economic and political influence after the immediate Second World War, its leadership, guided by the conviction that no nation could build a safer and better world alone and the realization that there was a strong connection between stability and national security, as one of the concluding remarks underlined in the report completed by the Special “Ad Hoc” Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in 1947: “The United States has need of friends in the world today and particularly needs to take care that other nations do not pass under the influence of any potentially hostile nation²³”.

Implicitly, the report affirmed that it was in the interests of the United States to help European and other devastated areas over the period of constructions. The main purpose of US assistance was to support socio-economic stability, prevent political chaos and extremism, contain the spread of communism and orientate foreign countries towards Capitol Hill.

On May 28, 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall made a decision that the US government needed to do something about the situation in Western Europe. Based on the assessments of European circumstances put forth in the reports and memoranda from committees of the State Department which repeatedly described the emergency needs of Western Europe and called for immediate action taken by the United States, it was agreed that these Western European countries, especially Italy and France, were running out of food and fuel supplies for the fall and winter and had insufficient finances to buy such necessities²⁴. It was concluded that these Western European countries were unable, by their own efforts, to deal effectively with the major crisis on their soil. Seriously, “a collapse of France and Italy could initiate expanding economic depression and political repercussions throughout Europe and, potentially, over a wide part of the world²⁵”. At the meeting, Acheson

²³ Report of the Special ‘Ad Hoc’ Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Files: Series 360, April 21, 1947.

²⁴ Memorandum from Mike Mansfield, *Clifford Papers*, ca. 1947, *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-00-00&documentid=5-9&pagenumber=>>; Charles Kindleberger to Benjamin Cohen, State Department File, Kindleberger Papers, *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, April 5, 1946, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1946-04-05&documentid=4-6&pagenumber=1>>; Notes for Acheson speech, “The Economics of Peace”, ca. March 1947. Subject File, J. M. Jones Papers, *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-00&documentid=1-3&pagenumber=1>>, 27 12 2013.

²⁵ Objective Committee, European Recovery Program Basic Document no. 1, October 31, 1947, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/6-3.pdf#zoom=100>>, 29 09 2013.

recommended that a speech needed to be delivered by Marshall to show the problematic situation in Europe but not to put forth any blueprint for action. After that the speech was prepared by the instructions of Marshall²⁶. Secretary of State George Marshall made this speech at the Harvard University on June 5, 1947. This was an official proposal for what was then known as the Marshall Plan, which provided over US \$12.5 billion (equivalent to roughly US \$60 billion today) for rebuilding Western Europe. He made clear in his address that Europe was definitely in a political and economic chaos and a response from the United States was needed urgently to cope with the problem facing the Europeans. He emphasized that the aid for European reconstruction of its economy and society was not aimed to fight any nations, but to fight hunger and depression. In the speech it was made clear that a solution had to be set forth by the Europeans and the United States would provide friendly assistance and support for a European practical program. By calling on European governments to design a coordinated aid program on their own, Marshall indicated that Washington wanted Western European countries to come up with a scheme for using the aid. This plan expected to be designed as “a joint effort rather than a hodgepodge of national requests²⁷”.

The Marshall Plan was lauded by Western Europe, as the Europeans understood that a large-scale program entirely funded by the United States could enable them to rebuild European economies, and only the United States was in the position to give them a helping hand. The main requirements for the economic recovery of Europe were reviving industrial and agricultural production, rehabilitating the European transport network, developing facilities for increasing European exchanges, and meeting interim import deficits. Moreover, adopting a federal structure was a condition to receive Marshall Plan aid. Free trade, a customs union, and the reduction of social welfare were included in the list of essential characters the United States gave to Western European governments²⁸. Funds were also offered to the Soviet Union and its allies but the conditional terms on economic cooperation and disclosure of information were unacceptable to the Soviet Union²⁹.

²⁶ See Hogan M., *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; Milward A. S., *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984; Jones J. A., *Fifteen Weeks*, New York: The Viking Press, 1955; Gimbel J., *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

²⁷ Aren J. V. O., *Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War World*, New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2000, p.3.

²⁸ Gilber M., *Surpassing Realism: The Politics of European Integration since 1945*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 22-23.

²⁹ McMahon R. J., *The Cold War: Very Short Introductions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 30.

The Soviet Union was suspicious of the US's motivation for aiding European reconstruction. Its leaders even made an accusation that Washington's motive behind the Marshall was to gain control of Europe and penetrate into Moscow's sphere of influence. The US desire for entire European recovery could not be realized as eight countries behind the Iron Curtain, under pressure from the Soviet Union, refused to take part in the European Reconstruction Conference in Paris on July 12 1947³⁰. US aid recipients included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. These nation-states established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later the OECD) to coordinate the program based on national needs and make sure it was implemented in consistence with US guidance³¹. The OEEC was the very first of a long line of organizations that contributed to uniting Europe. Although, contrary to US expectations, the OEEC was principally intergovernmental in nature, this was one of the first institutions that helped to enhance the liberalization of trade among the member states, and brought in the ideas of monetary agreements and economic cooperation between Western European countries. European industrial and business practices were modernized on the basis of high-efficiency US models, artificial trade barriers were reduced; and a sense of hope and self-reliance were promoted³².

Due to the energetic efforts of President Truman himself and his administration, the Marshall Plan became a reality. The passage of the Marshall Plan was "America's answer to the challenge facing the free world³³". It was ironical that Joseph Stalin was also an important figure behind this reality. President Truman once said that without his "crazy" moves "we never would have had our foreign policy [...] we never could have got a thing from Congress³⁴".

It is undeniable that the United States was motivated by self-interest in initiating the Marshall Plan. This was expressed, for example, in the declaration

³⁰ Norman A. G., Richard D. B. & Joseph M. S., *America and the Cold War, 1941-1991*, California: Praeger Security International, 2010, p.126.

³¹ Scott S., *From War to Wealth: 50 Years of Innovation, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development*, 1997, p.16.

³² Eichengreen B., *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 62-73.

³³ Truman H. S., 1948, Statement by the President upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act, <<http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=1430>>, 15 12 20 13.

³⁴ Marshall Plan, Chapter section from: Airbridge to Berlin – The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its Origins and Aftermath, by Giangreco D. M., Griffin R. A., 1988, *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/BERLIN_A/MARSHALL.HTM>, 29 12 2013.

of Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William L. Clayton after his fact-finding mission to Europe in May 1947: “It is now obvious that we grossly underestimated the destruction to the European economy by the war... Europe is steadily deteriorating³⁵”. He added that “the immediate effects on our domestic economy would be disastrous: markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, depression, a heavily unbalanced budget on the background of a mountainous war debt. These things must not happen³⁶”. The United States, Clayton concluded, must create a substantial aid program and that “the United States must run this show³⁷”.

By the time the Marshall Plan ended in 1952, industrial production in Western Europe had amounted to 40% above the pre-war level (Constitutional Rights Foundation 1975, *The Marshall Plan for Rebuilding Western Europe*). Trade and exports also increased far above what they were before the war. The economy of all recipient states had surpassed pre-war levels and their output in 1951 was 35% higher than in 1938³⁸. In the next two decades, the economy of Western Europe continued to grow and prosper extraordinarily. The Marshall Plan was a great success, a contributing factor of European integration since it lifted trade barriers and established institutions to coordinate the economy on a continental level³⁹. This ultimately stimulated the whole political reconstruction of Western Europe⁴⁰.

This was also echoed by Herman Van der Wee, a Belgian economic historian. The Marshall Plan, he argued, “gave a new impetus to reconstruction in Western Europe and made a decisive contribution to the renewal of the transport system, the modernization of industrial and agricultural equipment, the resumption of normal production, the raising of productivity, and the facilitating of intra-European trade⁴¹”. The Marshall Plan indeed was a great success of US foreign policy. It established a firm foundation for the integrative process in Europe:

³⁵ Papayoyanou P. A., *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.132.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Eichengreen, (note 32) p. 57.

³⁹ Mee C. L., *The Marshall Plan: The Launching of the Pax Americana*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

⁴⁰ Milward A. S., *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951*, London: Newton, 1984, p. 466.

⁴¹ Van der Wee H., *Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy, 1945-1980*, London: Penguin, 1984, p. 44.

The material assistance and the moral encouragement provided by the Marshall Plan brought a powerful new impetus to the campaign for European unity. In fact, it can be said that the American policy of economic aid, coupled with the pressure of the Communist danger, created conditions in which, for the first time, the unification of Europe became a practical possibility⁴².

The success of the Marshall Plan was greater than the United States and Western European people had expected. Perhaps, the biggest benefits brought by the Marshall Plan were intangible. It promoted cooperation and coordination among traditional foes enhancing openness in governments. In addition, it gave the Western Europeans hope and confidence for the future⁴³.

The Marshall Plan aid was contingent on Western Europe adopting the liberal ideas of free trade, reduction of protectionism, and easy convertibility of currency. States receiving the Marshall Plan aid and others signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in October 1947. The GATT established rules for trade and states eradicated many trade barriers⁴⁴.

Without this US-sponsored program, it was very unlikely that the Western European economies and polities would have stabilized so quickly. The Marshall Plan has contributed to the creation of a post-war order in Western Europe and transatlantic relations, which have favourably served US core interests. Noticeably, this was a collaborative order in which the Europeans were full partners and could have the greatest voice in their nations' affairs.

4.2. The formation of NATO and European integration

Along with the concern for reconstructing the European economy, the US and Western European leaders were worried about gaining power to confront the Soviet Union with superior force and ambitions, especially when the Soviet ambitions were revealed, not by verbalization but through its course of action. In February

⁴² The Council of Europe, 1949, quoted from Hogan M. J., *Blueprint for Recovery, The Marshall Plan Investment in Peace - 50th Anniversary*, U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, <<http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/marshall/pam-blu.htm>>.

⁴³ Agnew J., Entrikin J. N., *The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor*, New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 211.

⁴⁴ Tipton F. B., Aldrich R., *An Economic and Social History of Europe from 1939 to the Present*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987, p. 87.

1948, a coup d'état was engineered in Prague by the Kremlin and Czechoslovakia was pushed behind the Iron Curtain. Four months later, in June a blockade was imposed on Berlin by the Soviet Union in order to dislodge the Western powers from that city. The Americans and Europeans considered that these events signalled Moscow's overt hostility and aggressive intention and held the view that Europe's economic recovery was impossible in the atmosphere of tension and insecurity. According to the State Department expert, Hickerson, if the Soviet Union was able to topple the anti-communist regime of Czechoslovakia so easily, they could undermine other governments like they did in Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia might not be the last target of the Kremlin⁴⁵. In the Truman administration's perspective, after its destruction of the independence and democracy of nations in Eastern and Central Europe and now the fall of free Czechoslovakia in its orbit, the Soviet Union posed a real threat to the other free nations in Europe. In such a crisis situation, both the US and European leaders realized the need to protect Europe physically was as urgent as the need to rebuild this region economically. From the realization that a precondition for European recovery was military security, European leaders started to have conversations on the establishment of an effective European security alliance in February 1947. Though the European leaders expressed their wish to have the involvement of the United States in their alliance, the Truman administration was not prepared to take part in a joint security system with the Europeans, particularly in an election year. On March 17 1948, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France signed the Brussels Pact of collective self-defence, which officially created the Western European Union's Defence Organization. Article IV of the Brussels Treaty stated clearly the mechanism of collective defence: "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power"⁴⁶.

The old isolationism prevailed in US foreign policy making and formulating was weakened after the coup d'état in Prague. In May of 1948, a resolution was proposed by Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg to recommend that the

⁴⁵ Graebner N. A., Burns R. D., Siracusa J. M., *American and the Cold War, 1941-1991: A Realist Interpretation*, Vol. 2, California: Praeger, 2010, p. 132.

⁴⁶ "The Brussels Treaty": Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, March 17, 1948, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-207E2B09-4E1A764B/natolive/official_texts_17072.htm?>, 23 12 2013.

United States could join the new European defence pact that would abide by the United Nations charter but not under the control of the Security Council in which the Soviet Union had veto power. The Truman administration approved the Vandenburg Resolution, which “established bipartisan support for American participation in a European system of collective defence” and started to have formal negotiations with the Europeans⁴⁷. France, which had feared expansions from both Germany and the Soviet Union, required the United States to automatically take part in any European wars whether they had been triggered by the Germans or the Russians. However, Washington only accepted the menace that came from the Soviet Union and reminded Paris that Western occupation of Germany would prevent an invasion in France from the Germans. This reflected that Washington’s commitment to the European defence system was stemming from its fear of Soviet expansionism and its aim to create a new balance of power. Also, large-scale military assistance from Washington to support the rebuilding of Western Europe’s defence capabilities was needed. While European nations preferred individual grants and aid from Washington, the United States refused to provide aid for individual nations and insisted on giving support on the basis of regional coordination. Besides, the question of scope was put on the negotiating table. The Brussels Treaty signatories demanded that membership in the alliance had to be restricted to the members of that treaty and the United States. The US negotiators reminded the Europeans that there was more to be gained from an enlargement of the new alliance with an inclusion of the North Atlantic nations (Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and Portugal). From a geographic strategic view, the combination of these nations’ territories would form a bridge between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean and this would certainly constitute favourable conditions for military action to be taken effectively if it deemed necessary⁴⁸. The United States played a vital role in countering the military power of the Soviet Union and European security was an important condition for European economic recovery, therefore, formal treaty negotiations were concluded shortly on the conditions put forth by the United States. The five Brussels Pact states along with the United States, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and Portugal signed the North Atlantic Treaty in

⁴⁷ Graebner, Burns, Siracusa, (note 35) p.134.

⁴⁸ For outstanding overviews on the creation of NATO, see Lawrence S. K., *A Community of Interest: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-195*, Washington, DC: Government Printing, 1980; Lawrence S. K., *NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007; Escott R., *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977; and Ireland T. P., *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of NATO*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981.

April 1949 in Washington to establish a new intergovernmental military alliance. They reached an agreement that any armed attack against one or more of the European state parties or the North American state parties to the North Atlantic Treaty would be seen as an attack against all of them⁴⁹.

The establishment of NATO was part of a wider process of European integration. It critically helped to safeguard freedom and security to support the greater political and economic integration in Western Europe. Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO in his lecture on NATO in 1954 recalled: “It became obvious that unless something was done to restore the balance of military and economic power, there was no reason why the States of Western Europe should not also be gobbled up, one by one. But how was this to be done? No single nations could do it alone. It could only be done by combining. It was in that dark hour that the North Atlantic Treaty was conceived and signed⁵⁰”.

It was undeniable that the United States played a strategic role in the structure of NATO and in the pursuit of its goals, as stated by Lord Hastings Ismay, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down⁵¹.” With the US commitment to Western European security, the Europeans could step forward with plans for reconstruction and integration of their economy. As the Cold War escalated and Europe was divided, integration came to be considered as a means by which Europe was able to enhance its security, in close cooperation with the United States, against the Soviet threat and the communism danger. The United States was drawn deeper into European affairs to defend the vulnerable nation-states on this continent. Washington came to be seen as a “zealous champion on European integration⁵²”.

5. Concerted efforts: the European Coal and Steel Community

The above-mentioned movements, although remarkable and full of hope, “fell far short of the integrationist objectives of those who sought to escape from national

⁴⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty, (note 7).

⁵⁰ Hastings I., *Lecture on NATO: What It Is and How It Works*, November 5, 1954, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A63F6257-8D0B59BB/natolive/opinions_17417.htm?selectedLocale=>, 23 12 2013.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Dinan D., *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 4th ed., Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010, p. 13.

rivalries⁵³". The question of Franco-German relations was unsolved. France, after three German invasions, was still very much concerned with Germany's future and saw European unity as a solution⁵⁴. Washington agreed with Jean Monnet, the key figure behind the formation of the ECSC, on the limits of national sovereignty and the advantages of supra-nationality in Western Europe. According to them, the lessons of modern US history could be applied to war-torn Europe. With the enhancement of interstate trade and the establishment of a single market, the United States had become a prosperous and mighty power. So could Western Europe. In that way, European integration became a crucial part "of a grand design for remaking the Old World in the likeness of the New⁵⁵". Put simply, Monnet's idea of eliminating nationalism and developing supra-nationalism in Europe was supported by the United States. Washington wanted France to come up with a supra-national solution to the German problem. In October 1949, then Secretary of State Dean Acheson had a meeting in Washington, D.C. with "the more important American Ambassadors in Western Europe," and called for French action towards European integration⁵⁶. He wrote in the letter to them: "I have in mind a timetable for the creation of supra-national institutions, operating on a less than unanimity basis for dealing with specific, economic, social and perhaps other problems⁵⁷". What the United States described was a kind of a very strong federal system or supra-nationalism: "A single market involving the free movement of goods, services and capital⁵⁸".

The partnership between France and Germany had to be the first step in the creation of a united Europe as British Prime minister, Winston Churchill emphasized in his speech at Zurich University on September 19, 1946. "In this way only can France recover the moral leadership of Europe. There can be no revival

⁵³ Nicoll W., Salmon T.C., *Understanding the New Europe Community*, 2nd ed., New York: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994, p. 12.

⁵⁴ See Goldsborough J., "The Franco-German Entente", *Foreign Affairs*, 54 (3), 1976; Storey J., "The Franco-German Alliance within the European Community", *World Today*, 1980.

⁵⁵ Wallace W., Introduction to Roger Morgan and Caroline Bray, *Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany*, Brookfield: Gower, 1986, p. 4.

⁵⁶ Milward A.S., *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951*, London: Newton, 1984, p. 391.

⁵⁷ Telegram from Dean Acheson to the US Embassy in Paris, Washington, 19 October, 1949, <http://www.cvce.eu/obj/telegram_from_dean_acheson_to_the_us_embassy_in_paris_washington_19_october_1949-en-ef456d4c-b0cc-4a98-a496-586b8ccb19b5.html>, 16 12 2013.

⁵⁸ Dinan D., *Europe Recast: A History of the European Union*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004; Eichengreen B., Kenen P., "Managing the world economy under the Bretton Woods system: An overview", in Kenen P., eds., *Managing the world economy: Fifty years after Bretton Woods*, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994, p. 26.

of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important... In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together⁵⁹.

On May 9, 1950, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, argued for European economic integration as a way to rapprochement between France and Germany, and proposed the Schuman Plan. The fundamental scheme was to create a supra-national High Authority to take control of the coal and steel industries of France, Germany and any other states that wished to join.

This, Schuman stated, would “make war not merely unthinkable but materially impossible⁶⁰”. On April 18, 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed, creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Six nation-states: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg made up this first European Community. The objectives of the Treaty, as stipulated in Article 2, were to make contribution, through the common market for coal and steel, to economic development, increase in employment and improvement of living standards:

The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute, in harmony with the general economy of the Member States and through the establishment of a common market [...] to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living standard in the Member States⁶¹.

In the light of the formation of the common market, the free movement of products without customs duties or taxes was introduced. This put an end to discriminatory measures or practices, subsidies, aids granted by States or special charges imposed by States and restrictive practices. Evidently, the ECSC could be understood as an international community on the premise of supra-nationalism and international law, formed to help the European economy and prevent future wars by integrating its member states as stated in the Schuman Declaration:

It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an

⁵⁹ Winston Churchill’s speech on a Council of Europe, Zurich University, September 19, 1946, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/14362/1/S2-1.pdf>>, 27 01 2014.

⁶⁰ Declaration [on French proposal to place coal and steel under “higher authority”] by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, Paris, May 9, 1950, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/14363/>>, 16 09 2013.

⁶¹ Treaty of Paris, April 18, 1951, <http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/historic%20documents/Paris/TRAITES_1951_CECA.pdf>, 22 12 2013.

organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe⁶².

The very first supra-national organization of Europe began work in August 1952 and was governed by four institutions: A High Authority, a Special Council of Ministers, a Common Assembly and a Court of Justice.

The US attitudes and views towards the formation of the ECSC were positive and constructive. The United States favoured the French efforts and considered the Schuman Plan as the most significant step towards economic prosperity and peace in Europe since the Marshall speech on the ERP. According to Secretary of State Acheson, the ECSC was a community that could offer reconciliation and cooperation.

Monnet [was] most anxious that this proposal be accepted as a significant far-reaching effort not only toward Franco-German understanding but European federation and not viewed as an expedient or trick by which France could gain any particular advantage on the continent. [...] In commenting on [the] proposal believe it is important that [the] French be given credit for making a conscious and far reaching effort to advance Franco-German rapprochement and European integration generally⁶³.

The United States considered the birth of the ECSC as a means to unify Europe and preserve lasting peace as indicated in President Eisenhower's letter to chairmen of senate foreign relations and house foreign affairs committees on June 15 1953.

While in Europe, I watched with keen interest the efforts to work out the first steps toward European federation. My experience there convinced me that the uniting of Europe is a necessity for the peace and prosperity of Europeans and of the world.

[...] This Community (the ECSC) seems to me to be the most hopeful and constructive development so far toward the economic and political integration of

⁶² The Schuman Plan Declaration, May 9, 1950 [Translation of the text of Schuman's radio announcement of a French-German pool for coal and steel], < http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/pdf/geschiedenis/eu-history/EU_06.doc>, 24 12 2013.

⁶³ Acheson D., The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, May 10, 1950, <www.let.leidenuniv.nl/pdf/geschiedenis/eu-history/EU_07.doc>, 20 05 2013.

Europe. As such, this European initiative meets the often-expressed hopes of the Congress of the United States⁶⁴.

That both Germany and France mutually re-emerged and cooperated was a chance for the hopes often expressed by US leaders to be realized. European federation would help to diminish the need of the United States to guarantee peace in Europe. In the mind of US leaders, this very community was also seen as a potential and essential ally against the Soviet Union. That seemed to be what the United States were deeply concerned over. Although there was also a fear of the formation of a cartel by France, which might cause conflicts with the interests of the United States, Washington soon overcame that fear⁶⁵. Moreover, the split between France and the United Kingdom continued to concern US leaders and Britain's refusal to join the ECSC was criticized.

6. Concerted efforts: the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community

Due to energy crises, the Common Assembly put forward a proposal of extending the powers of the ECSC to cover other sources of energy. However, Jean Monnet, the chief architect of European unity, wanted a separate community to cover nuclear power. Louis Armand was given a task to study the prospects of nuclear energy use in Europe. His report concluded that further nuclear development was essential to fill the shortage left by the exhaustion of coal deposits and to decrease dependence on oil producers. However, the Benelux states and Western Germany were also enthusiastic about initiating a general common market, as sectoral integration, they claimed, had its weaknesses: "In the last four years the Coal and Steel Community has proved that the common market is not only feasible but, on balance, advantageous for all concerned. But it has also shown that "integration by sector" raises its own problems of distortion and discrimination. The Benelux, Western Germany and Italy had therefore chosen to create a common market for

⁶⁴ Eisenhower D. D., Letter to Chairmen of Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees Concerning the European Coal and Steel Community, June 17, 1953, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9614>>, 21 01 2014.

⁶⁵ Acheson D., *Present at the creation: My years in the state department*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969, p. 383.

all products rather than continuing to experiment with the sector approach⁶⁶". Unfortunately, France was strongly against this because of its protectionism and Jean Monnet supposed that it was too ambitious. In an effort to satisfy all interests, Jean Monnet ultimately put forth the proposal of creating both as separate communities.

Following the Treaty of Paris, the signing in Rome of the Treaties in 1957 setting up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) has been viewed as a crucial stage in the history of European integration. The EEC established a general common market featuring a customs union, which was based both on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital and common policies. Only one year after the official creation of the EEC, there were tariff deductions and quota increases in the early practical move to the economic union of Europe. The United States and European leaders highly hoped that the EEC would be much more than simply a customs union. Expectedly, it would be a vehicle that could provide the impetus for full integration in Europe. The EEC had to work out common policies for agriculture, transport, and foreign trade. Additionally, it had to bring into effect common economic, financial, monetary, and labor policies. In essence, the EEC was leading the road to both political and economic integration as its leaders put forth with particular vigor:

We look upon the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom as a single unit. They are all aspects of a process of development, which in the end should lead to a politically united Europe. Our aim is a free and peaceful Europe, a Europe worth living in and able to attract all European peoples who can freely determine their own destiny⁶⁷.

When having a meeting with Dr. Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community at the White House on May 16, 1961, President Kennedy reemphasized the US government's strong assistance for the EEC and the course of the European integration as outlined in the Treaty of Rome. President Kennedy held the view that the European integration process of the six signatory nations of the Treaty of Rome constituted a complementary driving force for the development of the Atlantic community. Also, President Kennedy expressed the US wish to have a common agricultural policy within the EEC.

⁶⁶ George S., Bache I., *Politics in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 72.

⁶⁷ "Three Presidents on Official Visit to U.S.", *Bulletin from European Community*, Special Issue, 1959, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/43616/1/A7420.pdf>>, 12 12 2013.

Continually, in his “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” on January 4, 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson showed the US government’s high hope of a strong and united Europe that would be in cooperation with the United States. European integration, in President Johnson’s perspective, was not built on any abstract design. It was created and developed on the basis of “the realities of common interests and common values, common dangers and common expectations⁶⁸”. In addition to ensuring Dr. Hallstein of the continued strong support of the US for the goal of European unification, President Johnson embraced European leaders’ decision to merge the executive bodies of the three European Communities (the ECSC, the EEC and the Euratom) as a further essential step in the European integration process.

Regarding Euratom, its first pact for cooperation was linked with the United States. In this 25-year agreement, Washington provided a long-term credit of \$135 million to the EEC to purchase reactors and nuclear components, which would be used to build atomic-power plants within the Community. Moreover, the United States offered an amount of US \$90 million for fuel guarantees and pledged to give \$50 million for research and development over the first five-year period. The United States-Euratom agreement for cooperation was an indication of Washington’s consistent supports to European leaders’ efforts to strengthen unity in the continent. Euratom, dedicated to the civil importance of atomic energy, initiated a common nuclear market: “Euratom’s very name is significant, for it couples in a single word two of the revolutionary changes brought about in the 20th century. The first is the new industrial revolution unleashed by the peaceful application of nuclear energy. The second is the economic and political revolution that is leading toward the unity of Europe⁶⁹”.

Roughly five years after the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC came into effect; Western Europe took an irreversible step forward towards integration. There was no doubt about the US’s continued support for more comprehensive forms of European integration. Washington was particularly satisfied that Western European leaders had recognized the need for their countries to continue to advance “beyond cooperative arrangements to Federal institutions, with necessary transfer of sovereign power⁷⁰”. The United States encouraged and supported Germans and other Europeans advocating such views. The US ambitions of 1947-1949 for a

⁶⁸ Johnson L. B., Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1965, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26907>>, 16 09 2013.

⁶⁹ Three Presidents on Official Visit, (note 67).

⁷⁰ Lundestad G., *Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 49.

customs union under the OEEC were basically similar to the European common market concept expressed in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Thus, in principle the United States had a very favourable attitude towards the creation of the EEC. President Eisenhower publicly announced the US's full support for a European common market that would further speed up the economic integration of Western Europe in his speech in Miami, Florida, on October 29, 1956:

Nothing has been more heartening than the recent announcement of two new proposals that would advance further the economic integration of Europe.

The first is the concept that six Western European countries might establish a common market in which all internal barriers to trade would be completely eliminated, just as they are within the United States. The second is the challenging idea that, thereafter, Great Britain, in association with other countries on the European Continent might gradually, over a period of years, establish a free trade area around the common market⁷¹.

Despite its keen interest in the founding of the EEC, the Eisenhower administration realized this new and crucial advancement of European integration might pose such challenges as the discriminatory effects of the EEC and the consequences on the balance of trade. But President Eisenhower and the State Department supposed that when the US economy was in a good condition, it was unproblematic for Washington to confirm that the European integration process could be worth certain economic sacrifices⁷². Like US views towards European integration in the Eisenhower administration, US support for the EEC remained enthusiastic and consistent in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as shown respectively in their joint statements with Dr. Hallstein, the President of the Commission of the European Economic Community.

The President and Dr. Hallstein were in full agreement that the European integration movement of the six signatory countries of the Treaty of Rome complements and reinforces the progressive development of a true Atlantic Community⁷³.

⁷¹ Eisenhower, D. D., Address at the International Airport, Miami, Florida, October 29, 1956, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10680>>, 22 01 2014.

⁷² Coppolaro L., Trade, Security and GATT: The United States, Western Europe and the Political Economy of Trade Liberalisation (1947-1972), University of Lisbon, 2010.

⁷³ Kennedy J. F., *Joint Statement Following Meeting With Dr. Walter Hallstein, President of the European Economic Community*, May 16, 1961, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8132>>, 21 01 2014.

The President and Dr. Hallstein agreed on the high value of existing close relations between the United States and the Common Market. They agreed that continued progress toward European integration strengthens the free world, as European partnership with the United States grows closer.

President Johnson assured Dr. Hallstein of the continued strong support of the United States for the goal of European unity. The President extended his congratulations on the recent decision to merge the executive bodies of the three European Communities, which the President sees as another significant step in the process of European integration⁷⁴.

During the mid-1960s, there were a number of crises in the EEC. The root cause was General de Gaulle's policy on Europe: He tried to enhance France's position in the EEC by keeping the latter's supra-national power to a minimum. Instead, he sought to pursue intergovernmental cooperation among member states. In addition, tensions increased between France and the Five because of the failure of the Fouchet Plan for a "Union of States" in 1962 and France's refusal of the British application for accession to the Common Market in 1963. However, such tensions could not deny the fact that the Six still attempted to settle on an appropriate roadmap for European integration.

In summary, the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome leading to the creation of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom were strong indications of the early concrete achievements of the European integration process. Politically and economically, the launch of the ECSC, EEC and Euratom was a major historical event. It was the firm foundation for the development of "the European Family." The coming together of the European countries helped eliminate the old-time opposition of France and Germany and move definitively away the ghost of war on the European continent as Robert Marjolin recalled in his memoirs: "who would have thought during the 1930s, and even during the ten years that followed the war, that European states which had been tearing one another apart for so many centuries and some of which, like France and Italy, still had very closed economies, would form a common market intended eventually to become an economic area that could be linked to on great dynamic market⁷⁵". The process leading to the formation of both the ECSC and the EEC was enthusiastically encouraged by the United States as it had been implemented within the Atlantic framework that US governments outlined. With its Marshall Plan aid and participation in NATO,

⁷⁴ Johnson, (note 68).

⁷⁵ Marjolin R., *Architect of European Unity: Memoirs, 1911-1986*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989, p. 306.

the United States was a leading contributor to the peace, security and economic recovery in Western Europe. The vitality of the European integration project depended on US economic and political capital for its success.

Conclusion

With a historical approach, this article has demonstrated that the US policy on Europe from 1945 to 1968 was built on Washington's endorsement of developing Western Europe into a regional union based on the US socio-economic and political model. U.S. leaders from the Truman to Johnson presidential periods made fundamental decisions to rehabilitate Western Europe economically and build up its confidence politically. Their policy stance was clear: The best way to achieve stability in Europe was by uniting Europe. From the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, through to the promotion for the births of the ECSC and the EEC, the United States had consistently shown its willingness to expend its wealth, and even its troops, to bring peace and prosperity to Europe. Explicitly, this meant that the United States could not live in isolation.

Lithuania's Foreign Policy Under the Eastern Partnership Programme in 2009–2014: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy

Maksimas Milta*

Abstract

The article addresses Lithuania's foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership programme in 2009–2014 from the perspective of small states' abilities to influence decision-making processes within the European Union. The author aims at revealing the puzzle of Lithuania's marginal capacities of absolute power being disproportional to the output of its foreign policy towards implementation of the Eastern Partnership programme and hence utilising "smart state strategy" conceptualised by Anders Wivel. The novelty of the study rests on expansion of applying the smart state strategy towards the post-negotiation stage of the policy implementation. The article contributes to the debate over the applicability of the "smart state strategy" approach towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, by arguing that Lithuania's foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership programme in 2009–2014 does indeed serve as an example of such behaviour, however recognising Lithuania's initial shift from utilising "small state policy" to "smart state strategy".

Keywords: small state studies, smart state strategy, influence, Lithuania, Eastern Partnership, European Union.

Introduction

Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union (EU) in 2007, fostered the process of reconsidering the role of the European Union's external policy and frameworks, applied to its neighbourhood in Europe, mainly in the south and east, through institutionalisation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the form of the Union for Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme, respectively. The narrative of a "more for more" principle has become the dominant political rhetoric; the intention to form a circle of friends across the EU's external borders supplemented by the introduction of bilateral and multilateral

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tracks of cooperation has been widely promoted by stakeholders and opinion-makers. Emergence of the EaP programme, inaugurated in May 2009 during the Prague Summit, for the first time conceptualised EU external policy vis-à-vis its neighbourhood in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus through establishment of four different pillars of multilateral cooperation and bilateral cooperation with a final goal of establishing political and economic association between the EU and its neighbouring states in the east.

Lithuania, one of the smaller EU Member States, historically focused its foreign policy on its direct (Belarus, Russia) and indirect (Ukraine, Georgia) neighbours in the east, and soon after the EU accession in 2004 it switched to promoting itself as a regional leader and role model for the future successful transition of the aforementioned countries to the rule of law and democracy, thus ensuring its own geopolitical intentions of having a safe and predictable political environment across Lithuania's borders. Conventionally considered as a small state within the context of EU decision-making, Lithuania has achieved a tangible level of recognition while contributing to promotion of the EaP programme within its relations with 6 EaP countries, becoming particularly accelerated during its rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU (Presidency). This proactive behaviour of a state, representing 0.59% of the population and possessing an equal amount of votes within the Council highlights an inherent puzzle, whereas its marginal capacities in the decision-making process across the EU has been disproportional to the output of Lithuania's foreign policy towards implementation of the EaP programme, thus signalling the effect of a smart state strategy¹. Placing utmost political prioritisation of Lithuania's Presidency on achieving deliverables of Association Agreements (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with the EaP programme's frontrunners, thus encompassing the common European interest, stood as core for exploiting its coalition-building skills with EU Member States.

Given the fact of the EaP countries standing on the edge of Lithuania's security policy and geopolitical interests, the ability to obtain a broad coalition of Member States and the support of the European institution in political prioritisation of the EaP programme demonstrates Lithuania's fulfilled externalisation of foreign policy interests by means of Europeanisation, galvanised due to the rapid development of Russia's imposed geopolitical and security setting in Eastern Europe.

¹ Hereinafter used, as conceptualised in: Wivel A. and Grøn C.H., "Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy", *Journal of European Integration* 33 (5), 2011.

The article searches for answers to the following research question: How does engagement into implementation of the EaP programme reflect Lithuania's foreign policy shift to a smart state strategy? In addition, its aim is to assess Lithuania's foreign policy vis-à-vis 6 EaP countries through the smart state strategy prism under the framework of implementation of the EaP programme.

This article discusses the following argument: the shift of Lithuania's foreign policy under the Eastern Partnership programme in 2009–2014, from utilising “small state policy” to “smart state strategy” rests on exercising self-interested mediator and lobbyist roles in the post-Lisbon Treaty institutional environment.

The innovativeness of the article is based on the expansion of Anders Wivel's introduced categories of “small state policy” and “smart state strategy”, whereas the application of both takes place in the post-adoption stage of the European Union policy initiative, in this case, the EaP programme. Merging the conceptual framework of the Europeanisation of foreign policy with the analytical instruments of small states' behaviour, reviewed in the context of geopolitical determination of policy-making, contributes additional input into the European integration research.

The article has three parts. First, the existing strategies of a small state's behaviour within EU external policy decision-making and overall distinguishing between “limiting damage” and “expanding influence” approaches are addressed providing a theoretical basis for the article. Second, in the analytical part the 2009–2011 period of implementing the EaP programme is reviewed, whilst Lithuania's delivered foreign policy is attributed to represent a “Good European” or “small state policy” example, primarily determined by the combination of the election cycle and economic turmoil milieu. Third, the period from post-Warsaw summit until the end of 2014 of the EaP programme's implementation is analysed, whereas explanation of the transformation within Lithuania's foreign policy of adopting a “smart state strategy” approach by means of the self-interested mediator and lobbyist roles are utilised.

1. The influence of small states in the European Union: room for manoeuvre

The predecessor of the EU – the European Coal and Steel Community was initially founded by 3 larger (West Germany, France, Italy) and 3 smaller states (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), whilst the current 28 EU Member States demonstrate a significant change in composition of the membership, given

that the population of 20 of the 28 Member States is less than 12 million per country. Thus significant transformation within the membership structure of the EU and deepening of the integration between Member States, especially after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty makes analysis of small EU Member States' behaviour within the decision-making process a valuable branch of European integration studies.

There is no consensus among scholars regarding precise criteria for defining the smallness of states. Starting from the 1960s, several generations of scholars aimed at conceptualising the issue, including Raimo Väyrynen, Andres Wivel, Baldur Thorhallsson, Tom Crowards and Diana Panke. For the research addressing the EU decision-making process, the allocation of votes within the Council of the EU in the post-Lisbon Treaty environment and more often the appearance of informal consultations of larger states, should be mentioned² as a general means of defining the smallness of states. Recent research in the field of small state studies suggests³ a shift in reviewing not the power a state *possesses* but rather the power it *exercises*, thus addressing the relational nature of a definition tied to a specific spatial-temporal context. This suggestion is a useful tool for illustrating the vagueness of absolute criteria in defining the influence of a small member state in EU decision-making⁴. Defining small state capacities within the EU power asymmetry proposes a puzzle regarding the size of a Member State affecting its actions within EU decision-making, thus the action capacity of a small state, as argued by Thorhallsson⁵, stands as a valuable instrument for further analysis. In the present article a working definition of a small EU Member State will be addressed to those Member States, having less than the average amount of votes in the Council (i.e., less than 3.57 in the Qualified Majority Voting system)⁶. Utilisation of the following variable is based on the widespread application of this approach and its usefulness in studies⁷

² Wivel et Grøn, (note 1) p. 525.

³ Wivel A. and Thorhallsson B., "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19 (4), 2006, p. 654.

⁴ E.g., Belgium's impact on reforms of local governance, Luxembourg's role in creating the European Monetary Union, and Denmark's contribution towards EU environmental and climate policy are illustrations of the exercised influence of small states in the past.

⁵ Thorhallsson B., "The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives", *Journal of European Integration* 28 (1), 2006, p. 8.

⁶ In ascending order: Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Croatia, Ireland, Finland, Slovakia, Denmark, Bulgaria, Austria, Sweden, Hungary, Portugal, Czech Republic, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands

⁷ Panke D., "Good Instructions in No Time? Domestic Coordination of EU Policies in 19 Small States", *West European Politics* 33 (4), 2010, p. 771.

related to the determination of small states' behaviour in the post-Lisbon Treaty institutional environment.

Traditionally, policy, exploited by a small state in the EU decision-making process, is defined by adjusting to the binding powers of the larger Member States (i.e., minimising the negative impact of the limit of absolute power) through utilisation of the following strategies⁸:

1. Hiding – institutionalised through neutrality or non-alignment status;
2. Seeking shelter – conducted through membership in alliances (e.g., NATO);
3. Binding – ensured through establishment of internationally applied and recognised rules, institutions and norms.

However, the complexity of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (precisely, further reviewed EaP programme) provides a political configuration where particular Member States are empowered to exercise specific interest in a proactive way, primarily caused by their own legacy and national priorities. Lithuania stands here as an object of interest and is conventionally considered as a small state endogenously and exogenously, also when applying the article's working definition.

From the security perspective, small states traditionally seek to be sheltered by the larger states, thus relying on the latter's actions. Adjusting this feature to the temporal dimension of the launch of the EaP programme, it is important to stress that the purpose of the programme was not only a way to externalise and institutionalise the Polish-Swedish draft on the basis of the Union for Mediterranean precedent, but also to develop a visible instrument for accommodating the security setting in Eastern Europe and ensuing ties between the EU and the 6 EaP countries, especially in the aftermath of 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Some scholars argue⁹ that small states possess structural disadvantages on the level of exerting influence and decision-making when compared to their bigger counterparts, primarily due to a lack of resources and funding of diplomatic staff, organisational capacities and the limits of possible expertise provision.

On the other hand, small states are able to deliver influence via dimensions of: bargaining power (threat), argumentative power (expertise), and power of reputation (image). Panke claims¹⁰ these approaches can also be enhanced in the following manner:

⁸ Thorhallsson B. and Bailes A.J.K., "Instrumentalizing the European Union in Small State Strategies", *Journal of European Integration* 35 (2), 2013, p. 99.

⁹ Panke, (note 7) p. 801.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 802.

1. Bargaining power can be supplemented by institutional coordination at the regional level and strategic coalition building with bigger states.
2. Argumentative power can be assisted by a small state contacting the European Commission and relevant policy prioritisation.
3. Power of reputation can be adjusted by the impartiality of a small state and professional execution of the Presidency by a small Member State.

When it comes to the latter, scholars stress: “holding of the Presidency by smaller countries can therefore be considered an institutional opportunity to strengthen their position”¹¹.

Small states are not limited in uploading their national interests to the level of EU decision-making, in particular if strategies corresponded with the steps undertaken by a small member state, such as learning, coordination and legitimacy, according to Panke¹². Prior research demonstrates¹³ that small Member States demonstrate a visible level of support for the implementation of legal norms, in this way ensuring the suitable legal framework for further steps to be undertaken in a specific area, which traditionally involves the consensus culture of EU decision-making. Additionally, researchers bring evidence of the smallness of small states not resulting in dis-functionality within their own foreign policy, but rather the foreign policy of small states being focused on a small functional and geographical range of interest, therefore requesting fewer resources to be allocated than what the larger states do¹⁴.

Despite being asymmetrically dependent on larger EU members, the smaller states are able to utilise factors of their own smallness for uploading national priorities. Among these factors, consistency, persuasive ideas and credibility are traditionally suggested when reviewing the impact of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the formation of the European Monetary Union¹⁵. Thus the way small states utilise their own influence is determined by the vulnerabilities small states possess in terms of absolute power. This is why small states’ behaviour within the EU decision-making process can also be grounded on utilising weaknesses

¹¹ Theunis B., “Reflections on Small States and Their Influence in the European Union”, in Mlfiet K. and Keygnaert W., eds, *The Baltic States in an Enlarging European Union: Towards a Partnership between Small States*, KU Leuven, 1999, p. 170-171.

¹² Panke, (note 7) p. 813.

¹³ Archer C. and Nugent N., “Introduction: Small States and the European Union”, *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 11 (1), 2002, p. 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁵ Maes I. and Verdun A., “Small States and the Creation of EMU: Belgium and the Netherlands, Pace-Setters and Gate-keepers”, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43 (2), 2005, p. 327-348.

for delivering influence, through the state acting as a) lobbyist, b) self-interested mediator, or c) norm entrepreneur, as conceptualised by Wivel¹⁶. Although small states are often seen as the weak part in the asymmetric relationship, exploiting influence over decision-making processes within the EU also prerequisites solid efforts aimed at viable coalition-building.

Wivel argues¹⁷ that the behaviour of small EU Member States is located in a continuum of two extremes: small state policy and smart state strategy, whereas small states are encouraged to maximise own influence if the following characteristics of a smart state strategy are preserved:

1. A small member state's goals and means towards the promotion of specific policy should be highly focused, instead of aiming at an explicitly broad agenda, while a small member state should also be ready to negotiate the suggestion.
2. Seeking common European interests should be ensured, preferably avoiding conflict with existing policies, but rather supplementing existing policies with an additional framework or focus area, whereas coalition-building skills are required.
3. Mediation skills between the interests of larger Member States should be delivered.

Summarising the existing approaches in small Member States' delivering influence in EU decision-making, it should be noted that small states are generally considered as able to deliver this influence, though they do bear the vulnerability of a lack of absolute power. Despite traditionally directing their own foreign policies in accommodating the interests of larger Member States, smaller states are advised to consider exploitation of proactive behaviour, involving (1) a combination of coalition-building skills, (2) a precise and realistic agenda towards a common European interest, (3) the ability of prioritisation of argumentation-led discussion and (4) possession of a relevant reputation based on professional arrangement of the Presidency and impartiality of their own interests, if they intend to deploy their own influence at the European level. Categorisation of various modes of behaviour provides a specification of how the smart state strategy can be exploited either through prioritising exerting influence either through the institutional frameworks of the European Commission and European Parliament (lobbyist approach) or through the Council dimension (self-interested mediator), or by reaching a

¹⁶ Wivel and Grøn, (note 1) p. 530.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

benchmarking level of policy-implementation domestically prior to its exploitation at the European level (norm entrepreneur).

In the next two analytical chapters of the article, Lithuania's foreign policy under the EaP programme in 2009–2014 will be assessed on the basis of fulfilling the logics of a small state policy or smart state strategy approach in order to track the evidence of the shift that took place during the given period, and its causes.

2. Good European: from European Neighbourhood Policy to Warsaw Summit

Soon after the fulfilment of Lithuania's initial mission of "returning to Europe"¹⁸ by joining the EU and NATO in 2004, coherent adaptation of the "Good European" role of smooth adaptation of *acquis* during pre-accession negotiations and asymmetric dependence on EU budget support¹⁹ within the EU decision-making process has become a dominant trend of behaviour, as determined by the insufficiency of professionals in public service and aspects of identity transition after the re-establishment of independence. However, scholars distinguish certain policy areas where Lithuania's involvement has been different, among such are the EU Neighbourhood policy and its Eastern Dimension²⁰.

The unprecedented scale of EU enlargement in 2004 has given a pretext for determination of the enlarged Union's relationships with its neighbourhood in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe and developing a circle of friends of the Union across its boundaries in order to ensure security and stability. Originally announced in the communication "Wider Europe – Neighbourhood", the suggested vision of the ENP Eastern Dimension excluded the Southern Caucasian countries of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, thus limiting the scope of the neighbourhood as suggested by the Eastern Dimension to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. At the same time, Lithuania's accession to the EU coincided with the election of Valdas Adamkus for a second Presidential term, whilst the role of "regional leader" has

¹⁸ Vašcenkaitė G., "The Discrepancy of Lithuanian Foreign Policy: 'Normative' Deeds for the 'Realpolitik' Needs?", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 24, 2011, p. 34.

¹⁹ Vilpišauskas R., "National Preferences and Bargaining of the New Member States Since the Enlargement of the EU: The Baltic States – Still Policy Takers?", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 25, 2011, p. 11.

²⁰ Pastore G., "Small New Member States in the EU Foreign Policy: toward 'Small State Smart Strategy'?", *Baltic Journal of Political Science* 2, 2013, p. 80.

become the dominant ideological narrative²¹ of his foreign policy²². Lithuanian diplomats argue that the first indication of Lithuania's perceived role resulted in strong advocacy for inclusion of the Southern Caucasus countries into the ENP Eastern Dimension, eventually achieved by an official launch in 2004. Symbolically, Lithuania is the only small EU Member State maintaining a network of embassies across all the EaP recipient countries²³, which illustrates *ex ante* prioritisation of bilateral relations with the 6 EaP countries.

Studies of the regional leader role's rationale argue²⁴ that its finality is grounded on the geopolitical logics of securing Lithuania's neighbourhood by means of counterbalancing Russia's impact in Eastern Europe and actively standing for Euro-Atlantic integration of the neighbourhood. Strong personal ties between Adamkus, President of the United States George W. Bush, Presidents of Poland Kwaśniewski and Kaczyński, formulate key elements in promotion of the regional leader's role by Adamkus. Alas according to senior diplomats²⁵, despite Adamkus' involvement in mediating Ukraine's Orange Revolution political crisis and advocating for Georgia's territorial integrity during the Russo-Georgian war, the regional leadership role did not convert into Lithuania's influence across European institutions, primarily due to its incomparability and lack of experience of operating under Brussels' game. Shortage of experience for delivering influence under the institutional setting of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), supplemented by its hard-liner standing towards the vision of bilateral relations of EU and Russia, culminated by Lithuania's veto during post-Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) mandate negotiations, resulted in Lithuania's isolation in Brussels. The forthcoming presidential victory of Barack Obama and the further shift of United States foreign policy priorities towards the Asia-Pacific region all in all resulted in marginalisation of the regional leader's role.

²¹ Laurinavičius Č., Lopata R., and Sirutavičius V., "Kritinis požiūris į Lietuvos užsienio politiką: kas pasikeitė nuo Augustino Voldemaro laikų?" ["A Critical Approach to Lithuanian Foreign Policy: What has Changed since Augustinas Voldemaras' Times?"], *Politologija* 54, 2009, p. 111.

²² The first documented public appearance of a "regional leader" role for Lithuania's post-2004 foreign policy is attributed to the Interim President Paulauskas. Details: PaulauskasA., "Lithuania's New Foreign Policy", Speech at Vilnius University, May 24, 2004, <http://paulauskas.president.lt/one.phtml?id=4996>, 02 05 2015.

²³ Among the larger Member States of the European Union, only Poland, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Germany have embassies in every one of the 6 recipient countries of the Eastern Partnership programme.

²⁴ Jonavičius L., "Geopolitical Projections of New Lithuanian Foreign Policy", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 17, 2006, p. 29.

²⁵ Senior official (1) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

The severe economic crisis in Lithuania, supplemented by the presidential victory of Dalia Grybauskaitė coincided with the inauguration of the EaP programme on the basis of the earlier submitted Polish-Swedish proposal. Grybauskaitė's foreign policy agenda in the early years of her first term is considered²⁶ pragmatic, avoiding unilateral hard-liner decision-making and shifting focus onto the importance of Nordic-Baltic cooperation. Both the destination of Grybauskaitė's first official visit abroad (i.e., Sweden²⁷) and regular participation in Nordic-Baltic informal meetings of delegations during every European Council meeting illustrates a shift from the previous role of regional leader²⁸. The mutual visits of President of Belarus Lukashenka and Grybauskaitė in 2009–2010 demonstrate both Lithuania's foreign policy alignment with the goals of the EaP programme and a dramatic shift from Adamkus' policy of avoiding contact with the authoritarian leader of Belarus. On the whole, Grybauskaitė's foreign agenda in the discussed period was focused on deepening networking with Western European EU Member States in order to obtain political recognition of Lithuania for accumulation of political capital in future and being able to proceed with the "Brussels game" in the long-run. Hence, her lack of pro-active foreign policy correlates with overall adoption of the "Good European", or policy-taker's role vis-à-vis the general EU legislation negotiations as argued by Vilpišauskas²⁹.

The Lithuanian Parliamentary elections of 2008 resulted in formation of the centre-right Andrius Kubilius Government, that devoted explicit prioritisation of the EaP programme in a separate sub-chapter of the Government programme³⁰, including references for "creating efficient Eastern Partnership policy", "aiming at development of integration between European Union and Eastern partners" and "promoting active policy of the European Union in order to solve the problem of Russia's military personnel deployment in Georgia and Moldova". Meanwhile Lithuania's Constitution determines the President's leading powers in outlining

²⁶ Vaščenkaitė, (note 18) p. 37.

²⁷ Symbolically, the first country visited by President Adamkus after his re-election in 2004 was Poland. Details: Press Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Prezidentas su darbo vizitu lankysis Lenkijoje (President will visit Poland), 05 08 2004, <<http://archyvas.lrp.lt/lt/news.full/5178>>, 02 05 2015.

²⁸ Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentė. Vizitai (President of the Republic of Lithuania. Visits), 08 04 2015, <<https://www.lrp.lt/lt/prezidentes-veikla/vizitai/108>>, 02 05 2015.

²⁹ Vilpišauskas, (note 19) p. 18.

³⁰ Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo nutarimas Nr. XI-52 Dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės programos (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Resolution XI-52 On Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania), December 9, 2008, <<https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/TAR.F1EEF18DCA0B>>, 02 05 2015.

the country's foreign policy³¹, hence Grybauskaitė's imposed approach to limiting unilateral proactive behaviour of Lithuania's foreign policy vis-à-vis the EaP countries reduced implementation of the Government's programme to levels of Development Cooperation and means of technical assistance to recipient countries.

Externally, the combination of the election cycle of the European Parliament and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, thus establishing the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), transformed the institutional disposition of Member States in determining EU foreign policy. The Polish Presidency of 2011 did not manage to deliver initialing Ukraine as AA as a result of political developments in Ukraine, accompanied by the imprisonment of Tymoshenko, resulting in the ensuing frozen year in EU–Ukrainian relations³² and the widely assumed failure of the Warsaw Summit³³.

As a result, the first stage of implementation of the EaP programme, starting with discussions over internal demand of strengthening the ENP towards the east, initiated by the German Presidency³⁴ and ending with the Warsaw Summit, did not become a prime time for Lithuania to deliver influence over EU decision-making processes vis-à-vis the EaP programme. Instead, Lithuania demonstrated supporting behaviour characteristic of a “Good European”, determined by its possession of endogenous and exogenous limits and a crisis of transition from its previously exercised role of a regional leader and with its diplomatic capacities additionally restrained due to chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2011. Therefore, analysed within Wivel's suggested categories, Lithuania's reluctance to engage in bargaining behaviour vis-à-vis the EaP programme in 2009–2011, utilisation of a policy-taker's approach and the general focus on Grybauskaitė's announced pragmatic policy approach provides evidence of the essential logics of small state policy – taking smallness of the state as a departure point for formulating policy actions on “damage control”.

³¹ Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992, <<http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm>>, 02 05 2015.

³² Senior official (1) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

³³ Audronius Ažubalis, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 17, 2014

³⁴ Senior official (1) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

3. Acting smart: before and after the Vilnius Summit

The EaP programme is a unique example of EU policy-making, primarily due to being a “project in the making”, thus the flexible design of the programme facilitates exploiting further enhancement of cooperation, based on the achievements of the recipient country; the EaP tackles both CFSP and counterbalances the geopolitical setting in Eastern Europe, through undermining the previously dominating position of Russia. Public discourse has no doubts as to the significance of the Polish-Swedish contribution for drafting the initial EaP proposal, when the post-Warsaw timeline of the EaP programme implementation is projected, i.e., the stage of actual implementation of the programme (different from the stage of *negotiating* the programme), involving respective competition for discursive attention and political prioritisation, provision of funding, expertise and technical assistance among other existing EU programmes.

The failure of the Warsaw Summit and the ensuing frozen year in EU–Ukraine relations³⁵ produced the risk of the EaP programme’s failure in tackling recipient countries. Assuming these initial conditions and learning from the experience of the Polish Presidency, an explicit round of preparations for Lithuania’s Presidency was launched by the Seimas adopting Presidency priorities, among them – the EaP programme, thus demonstrating the unprecedented case of a smaller EU Member State determining the foreign policy initiative as its Presidency priority in the post-Lisbon Treaty institutional environment. As according to diplomats³⁶ and scholars³⁷, in order to proceed with this step, comprehensive preparation work with European institutions, primarily the EEAS, has been undertaken.

Domestically, recognition of the growing importance of the EaP programme took place through inclusion of the EaP programme in a revised version of the National Security Strategy of 2012 with explicit reference to the importance of the

³⁵ Senior official (1) at Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

³⁶ Audronius Ažubalis, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 17, 2014; Expert at the Parliament (Seimas) of Lithuania, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 17, 2014; Senior official (1) at Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014; Expert (1) at Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014; Senior official (2) at Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014; Expert (2) at Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

³⁷ Kaznowski A., “Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership”, *EU Diplomacy Paper*, 6, 2014, p. 11.

EaP programme for Lithuania's security environment³⁸, institutional transformation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas the existing Department of Eastern Neighbourhood Policy was supplemented by the introduction of an additional Eastern Partnership division. According to then-Foreign Minister Ažubalis, the EaP started to dominate within the discourse of bilateral relations with recipient countries³⁹; diplomats confirm that discussions about Lithuania's bilateral relations with recipient countries started to encompass issues of the Eastern Partnership on regular basis⁴⁰. Lastly, Prime Minister Kubilius' office also commissioned a Presidency-related research project⁴¹ in order to provide evidence for further political decision-making and preparation for taking over Presidency duties. Lithuania's orientation towards the comprehensive fulfilment of its Presidency duties was demonstrated by the timing of arranging Presidency preparations⁴² that was instrumental in maintaining 'institutional memory', in terms of the handover to the new Algirdas Butkevičius Government after the Parliamentary elections of 2012.

Despite Lithuania's election cycle, the frozen year in EU–Ukraine relations, accompanied by modest progress over Moldova's, Georgia's and Armenia's AA, was marked by adoption of the FAC list of conclusions on Ukraine, highlighting 10 issues to be tackled by Ukraine in order to proceed with initialling AA and DCFTA with the EU⁴³; according to diplomats, adoption of Council recommendations indicated a chance of reaching deliverables with Ukraine during the Vilnius Summit, although consequent utmost political prioritisation of producing deliverables resulted in placing outstanding risks on the entire Presidency and the requested unprecedented concentration and coordinated effort across the

³⁸ Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution Amending the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution on the Approval of the National Security Strategy. XI-2131, 26 June 2012, <http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=433830>, 02 05 2015.

³⁹ Audronius Ažubalis, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 17, 2014.

⁴⁰ Senior official (2) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

⁴¹ European Union-funded project "Increase of the Lithuanian European Affairs system effectiveness" (No VP1-4.2-VRM-05-V-02-001).

⁴² Soon after the Warsaw Summit, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted the "Resolution on the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of European Union", Presidency of the Council of the European Union Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established and an explicit Presidency inter-institutional plan of work was adopted by October, 2012.

⁴³ Council of the European Union, Press Release - 3209th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, 17438/1/12 REV 1, 10 December 2012, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-12-516_en.htm> 02 05 2015.

Presidency, Member States and European institutions⁴⁴. In the situation of the inherited trajectory of requested progress with Ukraine to be achieved in order to achieve Lithuania's internal geopolitical goal of pursuing Ukraine's integration with the European Union, experts emphasise successful orientation of Lithuania's Presidency on a facilitating role and provide very favourable assessment of implementation of its Presidency duties⁴⁵, in particular by avoiding undermining of EEAS and European Commission roles⁴⁶, hence standing as an honest broker, assisting European institutions in fostering its policies, earning trust and support across institutions, accumulating potential for its further utilisation during sensitive discussions on reaching deliverables with EaP recipients at the Vilnius Summit.

Prior research in the field of EU decision-making vis-à-vis external relations is sceptical over the Presidency's influence on agenda-setting potential⁴⁷, given that only COREPER II remains to be chaired, whilst FAC, PSC and the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) are chaired by EEAS officials. However, scholars do also argue that informal relations and mechanisms remain equally important for the rotating Presidency⁴⁸, thus maintaining good relations with EEAS officials forms a prerequisite for utilising agenda-shaping and brokering influence, as demonstrated by Lithuania through maintaining very good relations⁴⁹ with Petteri Vuorimäki, Chair of COEST. Analysts highlight⁵⁰ Lithuania's efforts in organising excursions for COEST and PSC members to Chisinau and Kyiv as a means of informal lobbying for members interest in supporting fostering of the EaP agenda.

When it comes to utilisation of coalition-building skills, working closely with EaP enthusiasts like Sweden and Poland and prior networking in the region ensured support of Baltic and Nordic counterparts, promoting our own smallness appeared to stand as an attractive factor in bringing in support of the Visegrád group, whilst Germany's support was ensured thanks to the like-mindedness of Foreign Minister

⁴⁴ Senior official (1) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

⁴⁵ Kaznowski, (note 36) p. 27.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 27; Senior official (2) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

⁴⁷ Kaczyński P. M., "What is Left for the Rotating Council Presidency under the Lisbon Rules?", in Fabry E., ed., *The contribution of 16 European think tanks to the Polish, Danish and Cypriot EU Trio Presidency*, Paris: Notre Europe, 2011, p. 340.

⁴⁸ Westlake M., *The Council of the European Union*, London: John Harper, 1999, p. 50.

⁴⁹ Kaznowski, (note 36) p. 23.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

Westerwelle regarding the EaP programme's topicality and Lithuania's imposed political prioritisation of the programme. According to diplomats, Germany's support was highly instrumental during negotiations on the COREPER II level⁵¹, supplemented by the United Kingdom's steadily growing support⁵² for Lithuania's efforts in agenda-shaping and brokering the EaP agenda, with the milestone of Prime Minister Cameron's participation in the Vilnius Summit ensured smooth proceedings with legislative procedures and reaching deliverables with recipient countries to-be-signed at the Vilnius Summit.

The rapid development of domestic politics in Ukraine and Armenia, as a result of Russia's imposed pressure on both⁵³, led to the inability to sign AA during the Vilnius Summit. While Armenia's rationale has been argued by its intention join the Eurasian Customs' Union, President Yanukovich expressed concerns over the negative impact of the AA and DCFTA on jeopardising Ukraine's economy, which caused a wave of public protest in Kyiv, referred to as the Euromaidan, which resulted in the ousting of President Yanukovich. In this respect, Lithuania's contributed efforts of utmost political prioritisation of reaching deliverables during the Vilnius Summit has advanced the turning point of European Union–Ukraine–Russia relations, as according to scholars⁵⁴, the scale factor of internal political changes in Ukraine due to Euromaidan ensured the EU's (including the larger Member States⁵⁵) eventual recognition of the crucial importance of the EaP programme. In total, during its Presidency Lithuania ensured the conclusion of 141 legislative and 283 non-legislative dossiers⁵⁶, including outcomes reached under implementing the priority of the Eastern Partnership.

Kaznowski's comparative study of the utilisation of the Lithuanian and Polish Presidencies provides a useful avenue in determining Lithuania's fulfilment of Wivel's conceptualisation of the smart state strategy. The scholar argues that the

⁵¹ Senior official (1) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

⁵² Senior official (2) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

⁵³ Kaznowski, (note 36) p. 17.

⁵⁴ Laurinavičius M. and Kasčiūnas L., "Lietuvos pirmininkavimui ES Tarybai pasibaigus: kaip neiššvaistyti pasiektos sėkmės, o pasinaudojant ja sustiprinti šalies užsienio politiką" ["Aftermath of Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union: How not to Waste Success reached, but to Utilise it for Strengthening of National Foreign Policy"], *Rytų pulsas* 56 (1), 2014, p. 2.

⁵⁵ Audronius Ažubalis, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 17, 2014.

⁵⁶ Grybauskaitė D., Speech to the European Parliament, January 14, 2014, <<https://www.lrp.lt/en/activities/speeches/speech-by-president-dalia-grybauskaite-to-the-european-parliament/6590/18502>> 02 07 2015.

Lithuanian Presidency “was admired among Member State officials for the way in which they actively consulted and engaged with them in achieving common objectives”⁵⁷, thus providing an added value as “in the long-term many predict that Lithuania will enjoy favourable relations with the EEAS and future Council Presidencies”⁵⁸. This favourable evaluation of Lithuania’s Presidency goes in line with the assessment provided by the European Council on Foreign Affairs Scorecard 2014⁵⁹ of Lithuania as a “leader” in categories of 1) Support for the European Commission in resisting Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries, 2) Support for a strong line on the release of Tymoshenko, and 3) Support for efforts to achieve a visa-free regime with Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.

Inability of the EU to pursue President Yanukovich to sign AA and DCFTA during the Vilnius Summit is considered by analysts as a turning point in the progress of the EaP programme⁶⁰. Despite rapid development of the domestic political setting in Ukraine, involving unprecedented public protests in Kyiv and throughout the country, the ousting of President Yanukovich, extraordinary Presidential and Parliamentary elections and election of a consolidated pro-European majority across all branches of power, the first reactions in the aftermath of the Vilnius Summit argued⁶¹ a need for revision of the programme, through recognition of Russia’s role in the region, increasing funding mechanisms for adjustment of transition costs of recipient countries and introduction of clearer finality of the programme through the offer of membership in the European Union.

Right before the galvanisation of resistance between public protesters and President Yanukovich, a non-paper, enlisting 20 points on the EaP programme after the Vilnius Summit was circulated within COEST in the beginning of February, 2014. Produced as a common effort of 13 Member States⁶², the non-paper suggests

⁵⁷ Kaznowski, (note 36) p. 27.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵⁹ European Council on Foreign Affairs, Scorecard 2014 – Lithuania, <http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2014/countries/lithuania>, 02 05 2015.

⁶⁰ Kasčiūnas L. and Keršanskas V., “Lessons from Vilnius”, *New Eastern Europe* 10 (1), 2014, p. 10-11.

⁶¹ Meister S., “After Vilnius: Why the EU needs to rethink its Eastern Partnership”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 20 December 2013, <http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_after_vilnius_why_the_eu_needs_to_rethink_234>, 02 05 2015; Moshes A., “The EU’s defeat in Vilnius: can the Eastern partnership be salvaged?”, *Comment* 20/2013, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013, <http://www.fiaa.fi/assets/publications/FIIA_Comment_20_2013.pdf>, 02 05 2015; Osica O., “The Eastern Partnership: Life Begins after Vilnius”, Centre for European Policy Analysis, 13 December 2013, <<http://cepa.org/content/eastern-partnership-life-begins-after-vilnius>>, 02 05 2015.

⁶² Namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.

aiming at maintaining political prioritisation of EaP via strengthening visibility, enhancement of the programme through designing a differentiated concept of PCA for Armenia and a pledge to express more explicit support of development in recipient countries.

Notwithstanding the eventual breakthrough of the EaP by signing AA and DCFTA with all three frontrunners of the EaP programme in mid-2014, the progress and agenda of the EaP programme in 2014 was heavily dominated by Russia's actions vis-à-vis Ukraine, primarily its occupation of Crimea and military intervention into the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Rapid development of the security setting in Europe has resulted in three rounds of sanctions on behalf of the European Union towards Russia, with Lithuania taking an exceptional hard-liner position, thus gaining additional recognition from the United Kingdom⁶³. In addition to Lithuania's bilateral aid to Ukraine provided through means of development cooperation, humanitarian and military aid accounts for 0.6 million Euros, supplemented by the delegation of 18 Lithuanian experts⁶⁴ to Ukraine provides additional recognition among European counterparts.

From the Parliamentary perspective, a consistent advocacy for ensuring Ukraine's territorial integrity and demand for applying sanctions towards Russia has been raised by the Seimas in three consequent resolutions⁶⁵ in January–April of 2014, supplemented by the Committees on European Affairs and Foreign Affairs adopting a strategy on Lithuania's support to Ukraine, informally referred to as the Marshall Plan to Ukraine in the Lithuanian media⁶⁶, initially drafted by the opposition faction of the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats⁶⁷,

⁶³ Senior official (1) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

⁶⁴ That is Office of the Government, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, OSCE Project Co-ordination in Ukraine, EU delegation to Ukraine, EUBAM, EUAM, European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department and the International Organisation for Migration Mission to Ukraine.

⁶⁵ Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, . Pareiškimas dėl padėties Ukrainoje [“Resolution on situation Ukraine”], January 23, 2014, <<https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/656f3e20843111e3a31cd3b1d0ac5038>>; Rezoliucija dėl Rusijos Federacijos keliamų grėsmių Ukrainos ir visos Europos saugumui [“Resolution on Russian Federation's imposed threats to Ukraine's and Europe's security”], March 13, 2014, <<https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/72738100abd11e38e1082d04585b3dd>>; Rezo-liucija dėl padėties Ukrainoje [“Resolution on situation Ukraine”], April 24, 2014, <<https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/ac7879f0cc5511e3a8ded1a0f5aff0a9>>, 02 05 2015.

⁶⁶ Kubilius A. and Ažubalis A., “Opinion: Lithuania's strategy for long-term support to Ukraine”, *The Lithuanian Tribune*, October 6, 2014, <<http://en.delfi.lt/opinion/opinion-lithuanias-strategy-for-long-term-support-to-ukraine.d?id=66038290>>, 02 05 2015.

⁶⁷ Audronius Ažubalis, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 17, 2014.

aimed to be promoted by Lithuanian Parliamentarians within the COSAC dimension⁶⁸.

On the level of political discourse, Grybauskaitė has been consistently demonstrating a hard-liner position towards developments in Ukraine by stating that “Russia is terrorizing its neighbors and using terrorist methods”⁶⁹, which has been widely circulated in domestic and international media. Her encompassed hard-liner standing towards Russia was also supplemented by strong voicing of the presence of an existential threat to Lithuania, both in the international media⁷⁰ and during her annual State of the Nation address⁷¹. Another firm standing has been demonstrated in naming Russia as a “terrorist state”⁷², which on the whole should be interpreted as perceiving Lithuania’s *realpolitik* foreign policy determination⁷³, inherited from the times of Adamkus’ promoted role of regional leader. Lastly, Lithuania’s election as non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) for the 2014–2015 mandate has provided a forum for utilisation of a hard-line standing regarding military confrontation in Eastern Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea⁷⁴, thus initiating 8 out of 26 total meetings⁷⁵ dedicated to Ukraine’s issue within the UN SC. According to Kojala⁷⁶, Grybauskaitė’s shift in foreign policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood in 2013–2014 has demonstrated a switch to Adamkus’ role of Regional-subsystem collaborator from her Internal

⁶⁸ Expert at the Parliament (Seimas) of Lithuania, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 17, 2014.

⁶⁹ “Lithuania’s president: ‘Russia is terrorizing its neighbors and using terrorist methods’”, *The Washington Post*, 24 September, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lithuanias-president-russia-is-terrorizing-its-neighbors-and-using-terrorist-methods/2014/09/24/eb32b9fc-4410-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story.html> 02 05 2015.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014 <<https://www.lrp.lt/en/speeches/state-of-the-nation-address/-2014/20827>>, 02 05 2015

⁷² Dalia Grybauskaitė: Rusija yra teroristinė valstybė [‘Dalia Grybauskaitė: Russia is a terrorist state’], *15min.lt*, November 20, 2014, <<http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/dalia-grybauskaitė-rusija-yra-teroristine-valstybe-56-467874>>, 02 05 2015.

⁷³ Vaščenkaitė, (note 18) p. 55.

⁷⁴ Expert (3) at Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 5, 2014.

⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, *Lithuanian Diplomatic Yearbook 2014,22* December 2014, <<http://www.urm.lt/uploads/newsletters/2014/12/22/45ccf6d948e41ff1b7e9814c0492ff7f41814756.html>>, 02 05 2015.

⁷⁶ Kojala L. and Ivanauskas V., “Lithuanian Eastern Policy 2004–2014: The Role Theory Approach”, *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 32, 2014, p. 72.

development role, according to Holsti's role conceptions⁷⁷. In this respect, utilisation of her hard-liner standing, based on the geopolitical determination of Russia's imposed threat to Lithuania through its actions towards Ukraine and the progress of the EaP programme, requires strengthening cooperation ties with Poland and overcoming the crisis in top-level political relations between the two states, which also coincides with recommendations submitted by interviewees⁷⁸.

Summarizing the rationale of Lithuania's behaviour during the EaP programme in 2012–2014, it is important to highlight the following summands:

- Combination of 1) comprehensive organisational preparation, based on learning from the Polish Presidency and agenda-planning, 2) establishment of cooperative and trustworthy relations across European institutions, 3) utmost political prioritisation of the EaP programme, 4) absence of undermining larger Member States' roles and fulfilment of vital coalition-building, 5) consensus among domestic stakeholders regarding importance of the EaP programme as an empowering instrument of domestic foreign policy ensured Lithuania's agenda-shaping and brokering powers during its rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU within bilateral and multilateral tracks of cooperation, thus delivering smooth implementation of its own determined goals vis-à-vis recipient countries, with an overarching objective of fostering European integration of recipient countries (or at least frontrunners), thus exercising the roles of "self-interested mediator" and "lobbyist" under its smart state strategy determined behaviour;
- Success in coalition-building has been driven by its ability of justifying the Eastern Partnership as a common European interest to various groupings of Member States, therefore exploiting the role of honest broker within the Council;
- The ability to reach set goals under the EaP framework and expand internal outreach of the EaP among other CFSP areas was possible due to exercising the facilitating role of Presidency and consistently avoiding undermining External Actions Service and Commission roles, thus ensuring trustworthy relations, allowing Lithuania to exploit the

⁷⁷ Holsti K. J., "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (3), 1970, p. 245-246 (cited in Kojala and Ivanauskas, (note 76) p. 53.

⁷⁸ Expert (3) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 5, 2014; Expert (1) at Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Vilnius, December 29, 2014.

- resources of European institutions in reaching smooth consensus during negotiations over unilateral expansion of trade preferences towards Ukraine and overall negotiations on the AA and DCFTA;
- Geopolitical escalation in Eastern Europe, illustrated by Russia's imposed pressure on Armenia and Ukraine, supplemented by Crimea's occupation and Russia's military presence in Eastern Ukraine strengthened the rationale towards toughening the geopolitical orientation of Lithuania's foreign policy. Given on-going escalation, internal demand for the introduction of a more tangible security component within the revised EaP programme started to prevail in the political discourse.

Conclusions

Emergence of the EaP programme, as an extension of the ENP, provided an unprecedented political initiative of the EU vis-à-vis its neighbourhood in Eastern Europe, bearing significant geopolitical importance to one of the smaller EU Member States – Lithuania. Recipient countries of the EaP programme stood as core of Lithuania's previously possessed regional leadership policy under Adamkus. Despite Grybauskaitė's exercised change of means, rhetoric and strategic partnerships of foreign policy, its geopolitical character has remained.

The incompatibility of Lithuania's regional leadership role with the institutional environment of the European Union galvanised during post-PCA mandate negotiations was later supplemented by Grybauskaitė's announced orientation on a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, which resulted in bearing a "Good European" or "small state policy" approach over all areas of EU policy-making with an orientation towards enhancement of socialisation and networking across Member States during the first stage of the EaP programme's implementation. Simultaneously, enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty has led to the appearance of a new range of actors within the EU external policy, decreasing the already limited powers of influence of small Member States, thus determining new ways of informal cooperation among Member States to be utilised in order to influence decision-making processes, involving coalition-building, brokering and others.

Development of the security setting in Eastern Europe, reflected in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, consolidation of power by President Putin of Russia and the ensuing occupation of Crimea and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine resulted in Lithuania's domestic demand for fostering implementation of the EaP programme to ensure the EU's counterbalancing presence towards Russia's

traditional influence in Lithuania's sensitive neighbourhood in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. As a result, a shift in policy orientation from "small state policy" to "smart state strategy" was achieved by means of comprehensive agenda-planning and trustworthy relations with European institutions, exercising coalition-building among Member States and providing utmost political prioritisation during Lithuania's Presidency. In this respect Lithuania's impact towards promotion of the EaP programme within the EU agenda should not be limited by a revision of the formal roles and responsibilities assigned by the Lisbon Treaty, but rather by exploitation of informal means of agenda-shaping and argument-led brokering, encompassing the smart state strategy's fulfilment which should also be interpreted as an exploitation of uploading the character of Europeanisation.

Lithuania's exhibited proactive behaviour towards the EaP programme during the preparation for, implementation and aftermath of the Presidency has been grounded on fulfilling Wivel's outlined recommendations for ensuring smart state strategy implementation, i.e., coalition-building skills, precise agenda towards a common European interest, and the ability of prioritisation of argumentation-led discussion. While exploiting the political prioritisation of the EaP programme during the rotating Presidency, diversification of a bilateral and multilateral track of activities encompassing recipient countries' possessed vulnerabilities allowed ensuring smooth fulfilment of the intended deliverables with Georgia and Moldova, whilst exceptional fulfilment of Lithuania's lobbying efforts towards the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan's implementation with Moldova has contributed to the continuation of a pro-European coalition in Moldova. Lastly, Lithuania's ability to socialise and network with Member States supplemented by its trustworthy relations with EEAS has allowed it to multiply its domestic resources by the ability to externalise efforts through the respective involvement of European institutions, all in all leading to the fulfilment of its own goals in the Eastern Partnership programme.

It should be noted however that Russia's imposed escalation of the security setting in the EU neighbourhood has toughened Lithuania's stance, inherent for its regional leadership role under Adamkus, though possession of an outstanding reputation based on professional arrangement of the Presidency and previously assured networking and socialisation with Member States has prevented Lithuania's isolation, compared to its prior experience with post-PCA mandate negotiations, and led to the recognition of Lithuania, demonstrating a by-product of smart state strategy exploitation in the EaP programme.