

First of all, thank you, Josef, for your invitation. It's truly an honor to be here. It's such a beautiful city. And then have an opportunity to present a point of view, which in some cases is a bit more strict when it comes to other voices in Europe.

And there's a very clear explanation as to why it is, and maybe I will have a possibility to expand on that. You truly mentioned that one of the things is our history. Definitely it forms our attitudes. I don't think that I know a family in my country who has not been affected by Russian occupation.

My grandmother, when she was four, she was deported to Siberia. She had to spend almost two decades there chopping logs and fishing in the cold Siberian sea until she was given a chance to return to her own home country.

My wife's grandmother, and you can go on and on. So basically the whole country is built on the memory of the occupation. These days, it's not just a memory, it's also geography. When we are talking in Brussels during our first councils about Wagner, we're talking about something that is quite remote happening somewhere.

For us, the closest Wagner bases are as close as five kilometers from the Lithuanian and Polish border to give you an idea as to how close to the action we are. I would like to start by reflecting on the name that was given for the panel, which sounds very nice and quite provocative.

*Sivis Pacem Para Verbum*. Indeed, it's very important to talk and have a possibility. That's what diplomats usually need to do. But I would like to add a different slogan that was uttered by none other as Thirdor Roosevelt, who suggested that if you choose to speak softly, it's always good to carry a big stick.

And the question remains, and the question that I would like to answer is, have we given a big enough stick to Ukraine so that we could have a chance to talk softly? And when it comes to opinion of countries like mine, countries like Baltic states or countries in Eastern flank, we definitely do not think that a big enough stick has been given.

Especially now, one of the main questions currently is, and then Josephi had a chance to ask Dmitriy about the ongoing counter offense. And we see day by day anonymous commentators coming from different capitals in Europe and across the Atlantic saying, oh, it's too slow.

Oh, it's not delivering enough on the results. And I have a counter question. How much did it take for us to debate the delivery of tanks? How much did it take for us to deliver rocket launches? We're still not all the countries, just two countries in the alliance are delivering the long range rockets.

We're still waiting for others. So how can you expect the counter offensive to happen like this if we have not planned for it? And when we're talking about the biggest problem, the strategic problem that I had a chance to raise from the very beginning of the war, is that you have to start not from the tactical perspective.

What can we send now? What do we have in the warehouse? How do we achieve in the next election that we are going to have but from the strategic standpoint? How do we assist Ukraine winning this war?

What is needed to win the war? How many tanks are needed to win this war? How many rockets? What kind of rockets? What kind of strategy is needed so that they can achieve the results? And if you start at the end and you go all the way back, then yes, you can have complaints and you can say, look, we had a plan.

It's a wonderful plan. You were supposed to receive 2,000 tanks, 500 aircrafts, F-16 or F-22 or whatever, and you're not delivering. You're failing at the plan. But if we didn't have any plan, we just delivered what we had on the warehouse, how can we ask of anything?

We're lucky now that Ukraine has shown an incredible strength, an incredible resolve out of bounds of anything that we could have anticipated and used whatever we could have given them and made what they achieved now. I'm asking myself a question. So, okay, so if we, at least some of us, would agree that there is a strategic problem that we somehow, for some reason, are not envisaging the end goal of this.

We want, you know, go step by step, tactically, but not strategically. Why is that? And I'm thinking of two reasons. One reason is either we don't think that event is a serious enough event that we actually need to be strategic at this. We don't yet think that it's Europe or the West or even the global rules-based order is under threat.

That is still a local conflict, bigger than in Georgia, bigger than in 2014, still local, not too serious. So we can take our time. Look, the way that I think that things are actually evolving, Putin is quite clear as to what he wants to achieve. And he was very clear when he said, maybe I don't remember the exact date, when he said that the biggest mistake of 20th century was the dissolution of Soviet Union.

And I'm absolutely convinced that actually he's correcting that mistake. He has already a leverage on Georgia with occupied territories. He has his troops in Moldova. He has a leverage on Armenia. At least he thinks he has. He thought that he does not have a strong enough leverage on Ukraine after 2014.

He was not able to bend Ukraine onto its will. So now he's doing that. What we're seeing, if he's successful, is a slow encroachment of a decrepit empire. And yes, we want to believe that he's weak, he's slow, he cannot do this.

But if he tires Ukraine out, if he tires us out, then the question for my country is who is next. The second thing, the second reason could be that we are worried. That if we give Ukraine a stick big enough, it actually is able to win, to push Russia out, to take Crimea out, that what happens with Russia?

Russia has instilled this fear on us. They're saying, first of all, nuclear threat. Nuclear blackmailing, actually. You know, if you cross a line, there will be a nuclear escalation. There could be a nuclear escalation.

A second thing is instability in Russia. Do you want instability in Russia? If you arm too much, as Dmitryov said even today, F -16 is already escalation. There might be, you know, Putin would fall and then we'll see something of an instability in Russia.

Do you want that? And then we might stop. Oh, let's think about this. Honestly, again, speaking, you know, as a Lithuanian, we've been in this situation. In 1990, March 11th, Lithuania declared its independence.

We did not debate it with our European partners. We did not have any. We did not debate it with our NATO partners because we did not have any. Our people voted for independence and we declared it. We were asked to stop, not to escalate, because our independence will bring instability to Soviet Union.

And it may be brought, but it did not stop us. So one key, some of the key lessons, and additionally, if this is really a driver, if this is a real driver of a policy not to give Ukraine the biggest possible, then we are entering a very different page, opening a new page of our world history, which is very realistic, which actually would mean that power trumps right, that power is the right.

That means that the liberal world order where borders, human rights, human people decisions, democratic governments are subject to power from outside. And this is a very dangerous world, very dangerous world and especially dangerous to those who are closest to those powers who can exact that, who are close to the powers who can exact this, this threat in my country, countries, others on the Eastern flank, Iceland, island of Taiwan.

I think that they are very much worried when they are looking at how this this event will go further. So I'm truly hopeful that we can still find our way out, not to be locked in, understand that this is not to be locked in, understand that this is not an important event. It's super important. It's a rebuilding of Berlin Wall event that we are seeing now. And that we do not give in to Russia's blackmail. No nuclear, no otherwise of instability.

So what do we need to do? Plan for Ukrainian victory. Not plan to stand with Ukraine as long as it needs, as long as it's required. Plan for victory. They need to win. They need to win. We need to win for us.

Continue arming. And this is where, again, I would just join Dmitry in thanking Joseph. The voice was very much heard in Brussels and far wider. Calling for armaments for Ukraine. Explain to our people that peace can only come after Ukrainian victory.

There will be no peace without victory. There will be just a delayment of a different war, a delay in the war. Call Russian bluff. Not given to blackmail, nuclear or otherwise. Explain to ourselves and to our people that Russia can lose.

It has lost in the past. Afghanistan. It can go as far as Japan, a Crimean war in the 19th century. And Ukraine and those in Russia's crosshairs need to be added to a rebuilt European security architecture.

And this is what Dmitry very clearly called NATO and EU. If we want Europe safe and secure, those countries who are now used, who is leveraged by Russia, need to be added to European security architecture. Thank you. Thank you, Gavdilio.

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Thank you. In your country, for historical, geographical and moral reasons, before giving the floor to Aurea, we'll use the privilege of being organized of this event. And you said we haven't had a strategic approach.

Our answer has been the tactical one, using the White House. It's a very clear image. What do we have in the storehouses? Use it. And you give two explanations for that. The second one was fear. Fear of reacting and provoking Russian reaction.

And they remember that very well. No, no, no, no, take care. It's going to go too far. The first reason was that it's not serious enough. Not serious enough that it's local and it can be localized. So we could say the first, the second is fear.

And the second would be on awareness. On awareness. On awareness. We were not aware of what was the problem or the issue. Awareness, we didn't realize exactly what was going on. And the second one was fear. I think these two words can be cornerstone for an explanation of the history, the way it has been developing since the starting point of the war.

Maybe there wasn't a third reason. Unavoidable. Whatever you do will not change the... Nothing. Ukraine will be clash. So it's not the pity to try to support them. Like we decided to do in 2014 when Crimea was wrapped.

It's unavoidable. Nothing can prevent it from happening. And many people believe, and it was among them, that the war was going to be short. And Rostev was going to be in Kiev in a couple of weeks.

And in fact they were on the outskirts of Kiev. But it was not unavoidable. So let's discuss about these three words. Unavoidable, unawareness and fear. Nauria, please. Thank you. Good morning.